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IRAN MISSION

IT GOES ON AND ON

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NEW YORK TIMES
1 MAY 1980

The Iran Operation: 'Hard Questions That Need Answers Now'

By Seymour M. Hersh

WASHINGTON — It had the appeal of any good Hollywood thriller. Our superbly trained commandos sweep into the United States Embassy in Teheran, snatch the hostages and flee to safety — rescuing America's honor and extricating Jimmy Carter from the Rose Garden.

Was it possible? Or was it doomed from the start?

The overall Carter Administration rescue plan apparently won't be made known for weeks or months — if then — pending reviews by Congressional investigating committees and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Until then, the President has put himself in the position of saying, in effect, to the American people and the world: "Trust me. I had a secret plan to end the war." We last heard that during the Nixon Administration.

Some details of the raid are being leaked daily and, of course, Washington is abuzz with rumors. At this point, less than one week after the aborted mission, there are hard questions that need answers now.

To begin with, was the Central Intelligence Agency brought fully into the planning of the rescue operation? Some of my intelligence sources whose information has been highly reliable in the past complain that planning for the rescue was tightly controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the top level of the Defense Intelligence Agency — to the exclusion of the C.I.A.'s full expertise. A senior Administration official, told of the complaint, responded sharply: "I don't think more than two or three people in the entire Agency knew enough to have an informed opinion. A lot of people are mouthing off because they're angry about being cut out."

A specific focus of complaint is the Pentagon's selection of its landing site for the first step of the mission. That site, in the midst of a vast salt desert more than 200 miles southeast of Teheran, was — as we now know — also adjacent to a highway. As the Pentagon explains it, the intelligence planners for the rescue had known in advance that the highway was in regular use but had analyzed the "rhythm" of traffic, as one official put it, and con-

cluded that the six C-130 aircraft and six helicopters necessary for the mission could rendezvous and refuel without being observed. It was sheer bad luck, a "complete aberration," a senior official said, that an Iranian tour bus happened along just as the first C-130 landed. The 44 passengers on the bus were rounded up and would have been flown out of Iran if the mission had gone ahead.

It should be said that, so far, there is no evidence that the mission was aborted for any reason other than that given by the White House — the breakdown of three helicopters. But how quickly would the disappearance of those 44 Iranians have been noticed? Wouldn't anxious family members have begun asking questions? United States Government officials indicated that no one considered the bus passengers to be a serious hindrance to the operation, since the desert area was known to be heavily trafficked by smugglers and thieves, and, as one official said, "People just would have thought the bus was hijacked."

Other intelligence officials who were not directly consulted on the mission, however, said that the highway in question served as one of the roads between Yazd, a city of 100,000 people, and Meshed, with a population of 300,000, some 400 miles apart, and that there was regular bus service between them. In addition, Meshed, along with Qum, is one of the major religious shrines in Iran — a holy city. There is a constant flow of worshippers to Meshed, where one of Islam's most important religious leaders, the Eighth Imam, is buried. Most of those pilgrims travel at night across the salt desert in an obvious attempt to escape daytime heat.

The selection of that desert site at that time raises questions about some of the assumptions made by the rescue planners about the culture and people of Iran.

One Iranian now living in the United States who still maintains close ties to the Government in Teheran speculated that the desert landing site had been reconnoitered and selected by a former member of Savak, the ousted Shah's secret police, who is now working undercover in Iran for United States intelligence. "The Americans still go back and talk to the same people who have been telling them what they want to hear," the Iranian said. "The old Savak officers have never un-

derstood the revolution. It's a year after it happened and they are still in a daze."

The Iranian added, with obvious bitterness, that testimony given early last year at people's tribunals after the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi had shown why some Savak agents would have been familiar with the desert area selected as the initial American landing zone: Savak considered the area a safe place for tossing anti-Shah political prisoners out of helicopters.

Most of those I interviewed do not believe it was possible for American intelligence agents to have penetrated the relentlessly vigilant student militant group that had direct control of the 50 hostages inside the United States Embassy. Nonetheless there is little doubt that a combination of satellite reconnaissance, electronic intercepts and careful on-the-scene observation by agents could generate enough specific information to provide analysts with a fix on which building in the large embassy area was housing which hostages.

The American effort to establish firmly the location of each hostage was a major one for the intelligence community, and, it should be noted, one of the obvious reasons why the student militants limited any contact between the hostages and other Westerners. Similarly, there is no reason to doubt that the commando team knew how to defuse the mines and explosive devices that are said to ring the inside walls of the embassy.

Even some of the staunchest critics of the rescue effort have suggested in interviews in recent days that the commandos, save for the loss of helicopters, could have penetrated the em-

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bassy grounds by quickly overpowering the few revolutionary guards who would have been posted outside in the early-morning hours of the planned attack.

But how to escape? Whatever the plan — whether by helicopter extraction, by truck to a secondary location, or perhaps through a tunnel system that may exist under the embassy grounds — the commandos inevitably would have found themselves in a fierce battle.

A number of Americans have complained that the Carter Administration does not fully understand the extent of popular support throughout Iran for the militants' action in seizing the hostages.

"The strategy did not take into account the passion of the people and their willingness to act — their spontaneity," said one American with wide experience in post-Shah Iran. "It's a foolish and unreal strategy." He told of having been in Teheran late last year when the national television station presented documents indicating that one of the hostages had served as a spy. "Within 30 seconds I heard a roar from across the city," the American said. He went to his hotel window, he said, and watched as thousands of Iranians climbed to their rooftops, shouting, "Allah Akbar" ("God is great"). He went on: "And now you have a mass population that's armed — automatic weapons are as common as M & M's at a movie theater." Speaking of last week's aborted mission, he said, "As soon as the gunfire at the embassy started, the people would come running."

All of this raises a final series of questions about anticipated casualties.

What were the odds of rescuing all of the hostages without serious injury or death? What were the odds, as calculated by the mission planners, on returning with, say, 25 of the hostages? Is there any evidence that has not been made public indicating that President Carter acted out of fear that some — or all — of the hostages were nearing a life-or-death situation?

And why did not the Government warn the American reporters and businessmen in Iran — said to number more than 300 — to evacuate before authorizing the rescue mission?

It seems clear that if the operation had been successful, all Americans in the country could have faced serious and perhaps extreme reprisals. Some, perhaps, would have been taken hostage. It seems clear that with economic sanctions and other steps having been consistently threatened in recent months, Mr. Carter could have ordered all newsmen and businessmen to leave Iran weeks ago without necessarily jeopardizing the cover of the operation.

Perhaps the failure of the operation will be as instructive for Jimmy Carter as was the Bay of Pigs for John F. Kennedy in April 1961.

Theodore C. Sorensen, in his 1965 book on the Kennedy Presidency, "Kennedy," revealed that the same advisers who had urged the President to authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion also were urging him in May 1961 to expand the war in Laos. "But now," writes Mr. Sorensen, "the President was far more skeptical of the experts, their reputations, their recommendations, their promises, premises and facts." Mr. Sorensen recorded Mr. Kennedy as exclaiming months later: "Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise, we'd be in Laos by now — and that would be a hundred times worse."

Seymour M. Hersh, a former reporter for The New York Times, is writing a book on Henry A. Kissinger.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 May 1980

Iran convinced US meant to topple regime

By Ned Temko

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Tehran, Iran

The verdict, among Iranian leaders, is virtually unanimous: President Carter's troops were out not only to free 53 American hostages but also to topple the Tehran government and sink the Islamic revolution.

Western Europe reportedly is trying to talk Mr. Carter out of any further military action. But one ominous result of the failed US rescue mission of April 25 has been to reinforce already rife "American conspiracy" theories here. That, in turn, makes a negotiated resolution of Iranian-United States differences even more complicated.

Indeed, primed by Iran's distinctly xenophobic brand of nationalism and the Islamic revolution's gusto for "martyrdom," the mounting distrust of US intentions is taking on all the appearances of a jihad, or Muslim holy war.

"Ours is a nation of blood, our philosophy is jihad," Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared hours after the failure of the US mission.

To most Americans, Iran's contention that the rescue operation's ultimate aim was to topple Ayatollah Khomeini will seem ridiculous, perhaps paranoid.

But Iranian officials point to "evidence" they say was culled from documents left behind when the mission was ditched in the eastern desert. The man sent to the scene by Ayatollah Khomeini to pore through the mission's remains told journalists that captured maps highlighted such landmarks as the Muslim holy city of Qom, the site of Tehran's Friday prayers, and the residence of the Ayatollah.

Western reporters were afforded a quick, cursory glance at some of the alleged documents. One was, indeed, a minutely accurate map of Tehran, with some areas marked in green; another appeared to be a huge, fold-out route map for the US operation.

But it was impossible to confirm the details cited by Iranian officials, much less their later charge that the Americans had actually planned to kidnap Ayatollah Khomeini.

Yet for many Iranians, that is beside the point. History haunts this

revolution, particularly the involvement of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 27 years ago in toppling Iran's Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq, who had nationalized oil and unsettled the West, and reinstating a briefly exiled Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi.

From the start of the hostage crisis last November, one major snag in finding a negotiated exit has been the conviction of Ayatollah Khomeini and numerous other Iranians that President Carter, in the words of one source close to the Ayatollah, "is out to try another 1953."

Even relative "moderates" such as President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr have long suspected US intentions. When President Carter was trying to work out a scheme for transferring control of the hostages from their militant student captors to the Iranian government in March, Mr. Bani-Sadr reportedly told one confidant:

"It is a trick. Carter wants me to go through with this arrangement so he can paint the government here as an international outlaw."

The deal fell through, regardless, when Ayatollah Khomeini and the militant embassy captors in effect passed a joint veto.

But Iran's President provides perhaps the best example of the redoubled suspicion of Washington among prominent Iranians since the hostage rescue attempt.

Speaking shortly afterward, Mr. Bani-Sadr charged that the Americans actually had been trying to "overthrow the [Iranian] central power, demolish the government's sovereignty, and prepare the ground for the emergence of a regime desirable for the US."

Virtually every Iranian official, from the Ayatollah down, has echoed these sentiments.

At the same time, virtually every instance of unrest in a revolution with more than its share of disorders has been blamed on the Americans for their alleged "fifth-columnists" or "lackeys" inside Iran.

Part of this, no doubt, is a matter of political convenience. Anti-Americanism is one possible means of unifying, however imperfectly, an increasingly disunited revolution.

But in the words of one European ambassador: "It would be a mistake to underestimate the depth and genuineness of Iranian suspicions toward the United States. These feelings are serious, and must be taken into account in any effort to reach a negotiated settlement over the hostages."

Even without accounting for Iranian suspicions, there are growing indications that President Carter's European allies will have a tough time working out a negotiated resolution before the Iranian-US crisis hardens prohibitively.

Leaders of the European Community (EC) nations, speaking in Luxembourg April 28, reaffirmed plans to impose economic sanctions unless Iran moved decisively toward resolving the hostage crisis by mid-May. The Europeans also suggested that a renewed United Nations initiative might be the best way to move things in that direction.

But on both fronts there are difficulties. And Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, leader of the hard-line clerical faction in the Revolutionary Council, on April 30 became the latest Iranian figure to suggest that a "spy trial" of the hostages, and ultimately of overall US policy, now is a much more likely possibility.

President Bani-Sadr, on a directive from Ayatollah Khomeini, has invited United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to Tehran May 10. Yet the stated reason is not to restart moves to free the hostages, but to view signs of "American aggression against Iran." Cuban President Fidel Castro, as current head of the nonaligned nations, and Palestinian guerrilla leader Yasser Arafat are among other leaders invited.

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Ayatollah Khomeini, in calling for the international conference, also added that he thought organizations like the United Nations were supporting Washington's "cannibalistic crimes."

It remained far from clear, European diplomats here commented, whether the invitation could be used to reintroduce UN mediators into the hostage equation.

The logic of the Europeans' May deadline, meanwhile, also seems in danger of being undermined. Ayatollah Khomeini has empowered an as-yet-unselected parliament to decide what will happen to the hostages, and the Europeans had hoped that task would be under way by the middle of May.

But parliamentary elections, originally set for May 2, have been pushed back a week. Iran's deputy interior minister was quoted April 29 as saying the legislature would not even convene before the end of May.

Ayatollah Beheshti in his April 30 news conference suggested that a number of organizational tasks for the new parliament could further delay any decision on the American captives.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 May 1980

Iran fiasco rekindles debate on US military readiness

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

What is the real state of readiness of the US armed forces? Could lack of readiness have aborted the April 24 hostage rescue mission in Iran?

President Carter has insisted there is "no connection" between the admitted problems the services have with spare parts and lack of trained people, and the technical failures that caused him to terminate the mission. But the question persists.

Most senior commanders in the US armed services acknowledge that the loss of trained personnel to better-paying civilian jobs, rising fuel costs, and sometimes insufficient or inadequate spare parts have affected overall readiness for combat.

Refusing to apply the general principle to the particular case of the helicopter breakdowns that caused abortion of the Iran mission, President Carter told his April 30 news conference that there was no linkage, "because we focused the enormous resources of our nation and its elaborate military capability on this particular equipment used in this operation.

"Had there been some shortage," the President insisted, "of either technicians, or spare parts, or their maintenance capability, it would not have been permitted in this particular case of the helicopters, the C-130s, or the equipment the men took in for the rescue operation. So there is no connection between those at all."

Just the same, many people at all levels of the armed forces and Defense Department are asking questions:

- If — as the President, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insist — six serviceable RH-53D helicopters were the minimum needed (only five remained when the mission was terminated), why not have provided 12, or 15, or even 20 helicopters?

- Why did maintenance crews aboard the aircraft carrier Nimitz, apparently not informed of the special stress the choppers would suffer on their long flight, not install standard sandscreens on the engines to protect them from the sandstorms that downed at least one of the big "Sea Stallions?"

- Were there any disagreements along the chain of command — between Col. Charles A. Beckwith, the site commander in Iran; Maj. Gen. James G. Vaught, the overall operation commander (both of them Army officers); the Joint Chiefs in Washington; or others in authority elsewhere?

- Did the Soviets, as claimed by some congressional sources, warn the US to call off the mission, and was that a factor in ending it?

The answers, given by Secretary Brown and General Jones in a strong backup to the President's remarks defending the decisions to plan, execute, and end the mission, were a flat "no" to the last two questions.

On the related issues of maintenance and the sand screens, they avoided direct answers. Defense Department spokesman Thomas Ross later confirmed to some reporters that the screens had been omitted, largely in the interest of more engine power. Other officials affirmed this had not been responsible for the downing of the sand-struck chopper; its gyro artificial horizon, but not its engine, had failed.

US special forces agents who infiltrated Iran to prepare and assist in the later phases of the actual rescue in Tehran reportedly have all been "exfiltrated" safely from Iran.

An alleged report by the Central Intelligence Agency estimating 60 percent of the hostages would be killed under the rescue plan does not exist, "according to my knowledge," said Secretary Brown.

Still unanswered were much larger questions about the readiness of the more than 2 million men and women and the equipment of the US armed forces stationed around the world, of which the raiding force represented a tiny, ultra-trained elite.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
1 May 1980

Fleeing Commandos Abandoned Military Secrets to the Iranians

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Though the helicopters of the U.S. rescue mission in Iran were equipped with special explosives designed to destroy the secret material aboard, the departing commandos failed to detonate them, thus handing the Iranians an intelligence coup, U.S. officials disclosed yesterday.

The officials confirmed that the U.S. commandos had taken along wire and thermite explosives for the specific purpose of destroying sensitive papers and gear.

But, as fires from burning aircraft lit up the desert night at the refueling rendezvous point last Thursday and touched off ammunition, the 180 commandos and air crewmen were ordered to rush aboard their C130 transports without waiting to blow up the helicopters.

With all that ammunition flying around in the dark, the commander on the ground, Col. Charles Beckwith, apparently feared that his five remaining C130 transports at Desert One might be set afire, stranding his team on the desert 500 miles inside Iran.

A Pentagon official said the commando team had been dragging the helicopter that could not take off from Desert One away from the refueling site, apparently with the idea of blowing it up; when another helicopter collided with a C130 full of fuel. The collision set both aircraft on fire and touched off the ammunition.

Another bit of bad luck was revealed yesterday when a Pentagon executive told Congress the helicopter that got caught in a sandstorm and returned to the carrier Nimitz in the Arabian Sea was the one carrying gear for repairing hydraulic systems.

Two of the RH53 choppers experienced hydraulic failures, one on the way to Desert One and the second after it landed there. Whether they could have been repaired that first night and kept the mission from being aborted is another of the unknowns piling up about the operation.

Exactly how big an intelligence grab the Iranians scored in going through the six helicopters abandoned at Desert One has not been disclosed.

But the Iranians already have displayed enough sensitive photographs and maps from the choppers to disturb U.S. intelligence specialists. They fear some highly secret code gear may have been lost to the Iranians as well.

Among the "friendlies" who took risks to help the attempted rescue of the 53 hostages in Tehran were some Iranians. One fear, unconfirmed, is that the documents left in the helicopters might enable the Tehran government to find these Iranians.

One government intelligence specialist termed it "sloppy planning" to let anybody in the American rescue party carry his wallet, as was done on this mission. The Iranians have displayed a serviceman's wallet left at Desert One.

Asked whether the rescue team was forbidden to carry such detailed identification, a Pentagon spokesman

said no such restriction had been imposed.

The spokesman also said the rescue team did not blow up the first of the seven helicopters abandoned on the desert for fear the resulting fire would alert the Iranians to the mission. The pilot of this helicopter landed short of Desert One after experiencing problems with his controls.

"All the classified equipment and material were destroyed," said the Pentagon in reference to the secret gear on that first helicopter.

The 50 members of the Delta Detachment commando team whose mission aborted in the desert returned to home base at Fort Bragg, N.C., on Tuesday.

Although few troopers would talk to reporters who greeted them at the Fayetteville Municipal Airport, the Associated Press said one complained:

"You've got a mission. You know you can do it, and somebody tells you to pull out."

The commandos were wearing civilian clothes and carrying black shaving kits but no luggage.

In a related development, The New York Post reported yesterday that some of the helicopters were doused with a combination of salt water and fire-extinguishing foam when a crewman accidentally set off the sprinkling system 10 hours before taking off on the first leg of the rescue effort from the carrier Nimitz.

The Pentagon confirmed that five choppers had been doused for 60 seconds, but said this "did not in any way contribute to any of the problems" experienced by the choppers after take-off.

Staff writer Douglas B. Feather contributed to this report.

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30 April 1980

Raid Copters Had No Sand Screens, Pentagon Confirms

By George C. Wilson
and Douglas B. Feaver

Washington Post Staff Writers

Screens to keep sand out of the engines were removed from the eight helicopters sent over the Iranian desert to rescue American hostages in Tehran, the Pentagon confirmed yesterday.

Two of those helicopters broke down, and a third lost its way in a sandstorm during the first phase of the rescue attempt, prompting the commanders and President Carter to cancel the whole mission.

Second guessing about the sand screens was part of a larger, unofficial post-audit of the failed mission. The Pentagon was so stung by some of the criticism that Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who planned the mission, and Defense Secretary Harold Brown agreed to meet briefly with reporters at the Pentagon yesterday to respond. Pentagon spokesman Thomas B. Ross said that "the removal of the sand screens had no impact on this mission." He said they were removed to provide a 3 percent increase in the helicopters' power, including their lifting power.

Jones said when asked about the sand screens that "the problems of the helicopters were not ones of propulsion," meaning it was not the engines that broke down, even though unprotected by screens.

Pentagon officials have said that the hydraulic systems on two of the Army RH53 helicopters failed, not their General Electric engines. But several General Electric and government officials expressed astonishment yesterday at the decision to leave off the screens since the helicopters would be flying low over sand, not over water as is the usual mission for the mine-sweeping RH53.

The sand screen for the RH53 helicopter was designed to prevent long-term wear and tear on the engine, said Ross, adding that the rescue task force in rehearsals had "determined that by removing the screen overall engine performance could be improved by 3 percent without negative impact on the mission."

Government helicopter experts said the hydraulic system could be penetrated by sand on such a long flight as the 500 nautical miles from the Nimitz aircraft carrier to the refueling base in the Iranian desert. But whether the engine sand screens could have prevented this is unclear, since the helicopter hydraulic system is sealed off from the engine.

Here are points Jones and Brown covered at the Pentagon meeting:

Mission support. "We were not denied anything by anybody," said Jones. Brown said the mission originally called for sending in seven helicopters, in case one of the needed six broke down, but an eighth was added just to be safe.

One published report claimed President Carter had scaled down the original plan.

Joint Chiefs' approval. Jones said "all of the joint chiefs" studied the plan that was executed and concluded that "we had a good chance of success. We thought we could be successful." He said the chiefs knew there would be "some risks" but adjudged the plan "militarily feasible" and recommended it to Brown, who then approved it and sent it on to President Carter.

Casualties expected. Asked about a radio report that the Central Intelligence Agency had estimated 60 percent of the hostages would be killed under Carter's rescue plan, Brown replied: "There is no such study to my knowledge."

Command decision. Brown said "all" of the commanders of the rescue mission agreed that it should be called off once they were down to five helicopters instead of the six considered a minimum for success. "None of them wished to proceed with less than six helicopters," the secretary added.

"There wasn't any question about the wisdom of extraction," said Jones in backing up Brown.

There have been reports that there was a hot argument among commanders during the first night of the mission about whether to proceed to phase two or call off the rescue attempt for lack of the sixth helicopter.

Security. Brown said that there was no evidence that either the American or Israeli press had published anything that alerted Iran to the rescue mission.

Destroying documents and helicopters. Brown said "the fierce burning and ammunition in both the helicopter and C130 cooking off" after they collided in the night at the refueling spot kept the rescue team from destroying their choppers and removing secret equipment from them before leaving Iran.

Jones, after he and Brown had addressed some of the specific criticism of the planning and execution of the mission, said "the Joint Chiefs of Staff are very disturbed about the implications that on the scene people didn't act properly." He said this criticism "by people who were not there does a disservice to some very valiant men."

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
30 APRIL 1980

Second Senate panel to probe Iran rescue attempt

From Inquirer Wire Services

WASHINGTON — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced yesterday that it would investigate the ill-fated attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and its chairman said it would seek a commitment from President Carter to consult with Congress before any other military operations in Iran or elsewhere.

The Senate Armed Services Committee and its chairman, John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), had announced Monday that an investigation would be conducted into the malfunctions on the helicopters sent on the rescue mission. Breakdowns in three of the eight caused the mission to be called off.

After a two-hour, closed-door meeting, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Frank Church (D., Idaho), said it had agreed on these steps:

- Some time next week, it will meet with Cyrus R. Vance's replacement as secretary of state and seek to work out an agreement with the executive on advance consultation before any new military operations.

- It will ask why President Carter chose not to consult with Congress before ordering the rescue mission last week that resulted in the deaths of eight U.S. servicemen.

- At an "appropriate date," probably some time in the next several weeks, the committee will open its own investigation into the mission.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) asked Church in a letter to call the mission's commander, Col. Charles Beckwith, as a witness and to seek pertinent tapes and transcripts of meetings between the President, his advisers and military officials responsible for the rescue operation.

Several retired military leaders, including Elmo Zumwalt, former

chief of Naval Operations, and Thomas Moorer, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have asked why more helicopters were not sent.

Some of them have also indicated that the hasty departure of the rescuing force, in which helicopters, maps and classified papers were abandoned intact in Iran, raises questions as to whether all the facts of the aborted mission have been publicized.

"The haste with which they withdrew indicated some kind of concern about local action against them. I don't think that any plan that was not interrupted by one thing or another would omit the requirement to destroy the equipment," Moorer said.

It was learned yesterday that a Soviet spy ship had trailed the U.S. carrier Nimitz, from which the rescue helicopters took off, for some time before the mission began. But officials said that the carrier had outrun the ship before the mission was begun, and that there was no reason to believe that the Soviets were aware of the mission.

In a related development, House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D., Mass.) said yesterday that President Carter had had a "secret rendezvous" Sunday

with 150 of the men who took part in the rescue mission. The White House confirmed the Speaker's report but refused to give any details. There was no explanation for O'Neill's figure of 150 men. Defense Secretary Harold Brown has said that 90 men plus air crews were involved.

The CIA, according to a report by radio station KCBS in San Francisco, had anticipated that 60 percent or about 30 of the American hostages would have been killed or wounded had the rescue attempt been carried out as planned. A CIA spokesman refused to comment on the report.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
30 April 1980

Sand Filters of Helicopters Removed Before Mission

But Failures Are Pinpointed As Hydraulic, Electrical

By John J. Fialka

Washington Star Staff Writer

The sand filters were removed from the eight RH-53 helicopters used in the aborted attempt to rescue the American hostages in Tehran, Pentagon officials revealed yesterday.

Tom Ross, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, said the filters were taken off the air intakes to improve engine performance for the mission. He and other Pentagon officials said this was not a factor in aborting the mission, that failures of three of the eight helicopters were hydraulic and electrical.

"The difficulties encountered on the mission were unrelated to removal of the sand screen," Ross said. Several of the helicopters flew through a fierce sandstorm on their way to the desert base.

Ross' disclosure came after a hastily called press conference at the Pentagon during which Defense Secretary Harold Brown and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones, denied two reports circulating in the aftermath of the mission.

One of them is based on rumors that the ground commander, Army Col. Charles Beckwith, was dissatisfied with the decision to end the mission and wanted to go on to Tehran.

Without naming Beckwith, Brown and Jones said the ground commander initially recommended to abort the mission after the failure of the third helicopter.

Brown and Jones also strenuously denied an account by New York Times columnist William Safire who said that initial plans for the raid involved as many as 350 men and a large number of small helicopters accompanied by fighter-bombers. Safire said these plans were whittled down as the result of President Carter's concern for a "safer option."

"We were not denied anything by anybody in the way of force or anything like that," said Jones, who added that the Joint Chiefs recommended the plan that was carried out.

Jones and Brown appeared after members of the helicopter crews and the 90-man raiding party had been debriefed. It was reported yesterday that Beckwith is in Washington and may appear before two Senate committees investigating the causes of the mission's failure.

Brown was asked why the raiders had not destroyed the remaining helicopters before their hasty departure from the desert on the C-130 transports. Pentagon officials have admitted that classified documents and equipment were left aboard one of the helicopters.

Brown said the fiercely burning fires and exploding ammunition caused by the collision between one of the helicopters and a C-130 worried the ground commander that the remaining C-130 might be seriously damaged by explosions if the group remained.

Brown said two press accounts written just before the mission began gave the Pentagon serious concern that security might have been breached.

One was a report in the Israeli press of the increased military air traffic in Egypt. The second was an article in The Washington Star written by Miles Copeland, a former CIA agent, describing how a raid to save the hostages might be carried out.

In his article, Copeland suggested the use of a secret incapacitating gas that he said is in possession of the CIA. The gas, Copeland said, could "render unconscious every living person and animal within a radius of 200 yards of the embassy compound," leaving them with only a "slight headache" when the effects wore off.

The Copeland article caused the Pentagon to carefully watch for any sign of an Iranian reaction. "None happened, and so we started breathing again and went ahead," said Brown.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
30 April 1980

U.S. Jets Encounter Iranian Plane Over Oman Gulf; Gunfire Denied

By Raji Samghabadi
Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran. — Two carrier-based U.S. fighter jets met an Iranian patrol plane yesterday over the Gulf of Oman and the American jets "escorted" the Iranian plane back to Iranian air space.

Iranian authorities claimed the U.S. jets "started to shoot" at the Iranian plane, but the Pentagon said no weapons were fired.

The aerial encounter was the first military encounter between the United States and Iran since militants occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 50 Americans hostage Nov. 4.

In Washington, the Defense Department issued a statement saying the two F-14s "made a routine intercept" of an Iranian C-130 near the Strait of Hormuz and escorted the plane back to Iranian air space. U.S. officials said the jets were sent up after the Iranian plane came within 50 miles of the carrier USS Nimitz, one of about 30 American warships in the Indian Ocean.

In Tehran, the Iranian army joint staff reported the American jets started to shoot at the Iranian plane but "changed their direction" after four Iranian jetfighters were sent to escort the patrol plane back to Iran.

In Tehran, an Iranian air force F-4 Phantom buzzed the city for 30 minutes in the wee hours this morning in search of "an unidentified object above the capital."

The flight, which repeated the same pattern again and again over the city, awakened and frightened many residents.

At about 1:30 a.m. local time, the Armed Forces Joint Command assured people the operation was "a routine patrol."

But the 1st Tactical Air Command, stationed near here, had a different story later in the morning. In a statement broadcast over the radio at 7 a.m., it said the Phantom fighter bomber was searching for "an unidentified object" picked up by radar above the northern section of the city.

"The operation did not uncover a hostile aircraft. There are indications that the aircraft belonged to Iran. We will provide further details later," the statement said.

Meanwhile, Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, after a meeting with President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, said he was making arrangements for the transfer of the bodies of American commandos killed in the aborted hostage rescue attempt to the Red Cross for eventual delivery to their families in the United States.

"The bodies will be turned over to the families, not the U.S. government which is cynical and uncaring about human life," Capucci said. He said he "hated to deal with the U.S. government" and would make all the necessary arrangements with the International Red Cross. The bodies are not expected to go to the United States for several days.

Capucci, the former head of the Greek-Melkite community in Jerusalem, who was expelled by Israel in 1977 after serving three years of a sentence for smuggling arms to Palestinian guerrillas, went to the morgue where the bodies are being kept and to the site of the commandos' wrecked aircraft in the desert near Tabas.

The Iranians insist they have nine, not eight, bodies to deliver. Islamic judge Sadegh Khalkhali, who brought the corpses to Tehran from the staging site, has accused President Carter of "lying."

In a television documentary that has been screened many times, Khalkhali exhibited what appeared to be nine plastic and cotton wrapped bodies. Khalkhali kept screaming throughout the program "this is proof of Carter's crime."

(The Carter administration has said only eight Americans died in the rescue attempt.)

In other developments, the officials probing the staging site said they have found evidence that the rescue party intended to deliver money and communications equipment to "a U.S. fifth column in Tehran."

Bani-Sadr has seized every opportunity in the past 48 hours to advance the theory that the U.S. attempt was aimed not at the rescue of the hostages, but at "the overthrow of the Islamic state."

In a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Bani-Sadr drew a parallel between the abortive commando operation and the CIA sponsored coup that toppled the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and restored the shah in 1953.

Late Monday night, four journalists from the German magazine Stern were arrested by armed men in the Intercontinental Hotel.

This story is based in part on wire-service reports.

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES
30 APRIL 1980

U.S. Agents, Sent to Iran for Raid, Have All Departed, Military Says

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 29 — American military officials said today that all the paramilitary agents infiltrated into Teheran for the rescue of American hostages had quietly slipped out of Iran the same way they entered early this year, posing as European businessmen.

The agents, whose number is unknown, included Special Forces troops, officials said.

Carter Administration officials also disclosed today that President Carter received a long briefing from the rescue mission's commanders at the White House on Saturday. On Sunday, the officials said, he flew to an undisclosed location to meet about 150 members of the rescue team.

The total rescue force numbered about 180. Half were commandos who would have assaulted the embassy; the others included aircraft crews, communications officers and other support forces.

The Special Forces troops who were infiltrated into Teheran were reported to belong to a unit in Europe containing people who speak European languages. They were reported to have bought a warehouse in Teheran that was to have served as a final staging area for the assault on the embassy.

Meanwhile, Gen. David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown called in reporters this afternoon in an effort to counter rumors and speculation flooding Washington about the rescue operation last week.

One rumor has held that the rescue mission was forced upon a reluctant Pentagon. General Jones said: "We want to be on the record that the Joint Chiefs of Staff take responsibility for the plan and the exercising and its implementation."

'Good Chance of Success'

He said that after much thought, all five of the Joint Chiefs, the nation's senior military council, concluded that the operation had "a good chance of success" and recommended to President Carter that "we go on April 24." Secretary Brown agreed and the President decided to do so.

Another rumor was that the military wanted a much larger operation but was forced by a timid White House to scale it back. General Jones and Mr. Brown said the military commanders had everything they needed. General Jones said, "We were not denied anything by anybody."

A third item of speculation has held that the commander on the ground, unofficially reported to have been Col. Charlie Beckwith, wanted to continue the operation despite the loss of three of the eight helicopters inside Iran. General Jones and Mr. Brown said that everyone from the mission commander to President Carter concurred in the recommendation from the ground commander to withdraw.

The secret meeting between President Carter and members of the rescue mission on Sunday was disclosed by the Speaker of the House, Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts.

According to Mr. O'Neill's account of the meeting, which was based on a conversation with Mr. Carter, the President was impressed with the patriotism of the team. Mr. Carter told Mr. O'Neill that the servicemen stressed that they were honored to have participated in the mission and would be grateful to try again. Mr. Carter said that tears welled up in his eyes.

Iranian Plane Is Intercepted

In another development, Pentagon officials said that two Navy F-14 Tomahawk fighters intercepted an Iranian C-130 transport headed toward the American fleet in the Arabian Sea today in a "routine intercept." No shots were fired in the incident, which took place in international airspace over the Strait of Hormuz, and the Iranian plane eventually turned back, the officials said.

In their briefing for reporters, General Jones and Secretary Brown disclosed fur-

ther details about the evolution of the plan to rescue the hostages.

General Jones said that soon after the hostages were seized on Nov. 4, the military started working on rescue plans. The planners came up with "many, many different options," the general said, but none seemed to have "a reasonable chance of success."

Even so, he said, the plans were tried out in exercises in which the forces were permitted all the troops, equipment and transport they wanted. "To my knowledge," said Secretary Brown, "nothing was denied by headquarters."

Turning Point in March

But the problems, General Jones said, appeared to be insurmountable. He did not elaborate, but other officers pointed to the distance from the United States, the lack of staging areas and threats to the lives of the hostages by their captors.

General Jones went on to say, however, that by early March, he and the other Joint Chiefs had "growing confidence" that a rescue operation was "militarily feasible." Part of the reason behind that was a record of successful practice runs in the United States.

Then in early April, he said, the service Chiefs presented the concept and received approval to proceed with the initial movement of forces. When the mission commander said they were ready to go into Iran, the Chiefs recommended to the President that the plan be executed.

Mr. Brown said that articles in The Washington Star and an Israeli newspaper about possible rescue missions had caused some concern, but that intelligence monitoring showed no signs of an alert in Iran.

Mr. Brown also said that the Soviet Union did not know about the operation, that the United States, contrary to a rumor, had not received a hot-line message from Moscow warning against the operation and that the United States told Moscow of the mission when it was over.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 19THE WASHINGTON POST
30 April 1980*Norman Podhoretz*

Lesson of Failure

What is the lesson of the failed American attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran? To judge from much of the published comment, it is that the president should have subjected himself to a series of consultations before going ahead.

Thus some have said that the president would have been wise to share the burden of responsibility with Congress. Others have strongly suggested that, wise or not, such consultations were required by the War Powers Act and that the president probably exceeded his authority and may have broken the law in acting without congressional cooperation.

Yet another line of argument has been that the president should have consulted not only with Congress but with our allies as well. After all, the only reason they finally agreed to economic sanctions against Iran was to head off military action by the United States; according to this argument, therefore, the president was breaking a promise to the allies by ordering the commando raid and should at least have given them an opportunity to talk him out of it in advance.

The odd thing is that all these criticisms have invariably been accompanied by an acknowledgment that if the rescue effort had succeeded, there would have been universal rejoicing and applause. And indeed, can anyone imagine Sen. Frank Church complaining about violations of the War Powers Act or Cyrus Vance resigning in response to the sight of the American hostages returning to the United States in the company of their heroic liberators? If that is so, however, it means the real issue is not a failure to consult but a failure to plan and execute the operation properly.

At this stage it is impossible to say what exactly went wrong with the operation and why. Yet we do know that a high proportion of the helicopters used—three out of eight—broke down and that no backup was available. Whatever the cause of the breakdowns may have been—whether faulty maintenance procedures or the scarcity of properly trained mechanics or even bad luck—the fact remains that the operation revealed a surprisingly low level of technical efficiency.

As for the lack of backup, Gen. Yitzhak Rabin (who as prime minister of Israel in 1976 had a hand in staging the spectacular rescue of the hostages held in Entebbe) has expressed astonishment at a plan that did not take account of how sensitive helicopters are "and how vulnerable to technical failure." Perhaps, as Edward Luttwak has suggested, the reason so small a number of helicopters was sent on the mission is that the president was being overly cautious. But even so, the technical judgment involved was grossly unreliable.

In other words, whatever else may have

come into play, the collapse of this operation must be ascribed in large measure to inadequacies in the very area that Americans have always been assumed to excel—the mechanical and the technological.

The lesson, then, of the aborted rescue attempt in Iran is that the military capability in this country has deteriorated to a greater degree than had previously seemed evident even to some of us who have been worrying about the decline of American power for the past five years and more.

That the United States had lost its edge over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons was already clear long before Iran; that we lacked the conventional forces to defend the oil fields of the Middle East against a direct Soviet assault seemed probable; that we had destroyed the CIA's ability to counter an indirect Soviet assault was equally likely; that we had all but lost the will to use force under any conceivable circumstances was blatantly obvious from our supine response to the act of war committed against us by Iran nearly six months ago (and also became manifest in the timid handling of the rescue operation itself).

Now to this dismal and ominous catalog of diminished military capabilities, we can add a decline in mechanical and technological competence.

There has been a great reluctance in our political culture to face up to these facts. At every stage they have been denied, and when denial has become rationally impossible, they have been dismissed as insignificant.

Military power, we have been told over and over again, is obsolete in an interdependent world. Yet the Soviet Union, and many other nations too (Vietnam and Cuba, to name only two), are finding uses enough for this "obsolete" instrument of international conflict, while we for our part are humiliated in spirit and menaced by a threat to the most vital of all our economic interests.

To face these facts—to absorb them, to think about their implications—leads inexorably to the conclusion that the United States is doomed unless we undertake a massive program to restore our military capabilities all across the board. Those who oppose such an effort naturally prefer to dwell on other things. And as they argue about the War Powers Act and deplore the president's refusal to seek the permission of the Germans and the French before trying to rescue our hostages, the time we still have left to profit from the true lesson of Iran—and of Afghanistan before it—slips relentlessly by.

The writer is editor of Commentary magazine.

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WALL STREET JOURNAL
30 APRIL 1980

Why Did the Shah Miscalculate So Badly?

BY DANIEL PIPES

Amin Saikal, a young Afghan scholar teaching at the Australian National University, had the good fortune to finish his study of the Shah's policies just as Iran was hurled to the center of the world's attention. His good timing explains the flashy and inaccurate title of his book, "The Rise and Fall of the Shah," for Mr. Saikal discusses neither the rise nor the fall of the Shah; he does, however, provide an important analysis for what went wrong with the Shah's policies.

Mohammed Reza Pahlevi reigned from 1941, but he took command of the Iranian

The Bookshelf

"The Rise and Fall of the Shah"

By Amin Saikal. Princeton University Press. 279 pages. \$14.50.

"Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution"

By Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi. Ma'rifi Publishing House. 392 pages. \$30 (Australian).

government only in 1953, when the CIA helped restore him to the throne. At that time, he was intent on achieving two main goals: "to strengthen the monarchy and to transform Iran into a strong modern pro-Western state"; and, Mr. Saikal argues, these twin ambitions continued to inspire the Shah for the subsequent quarter century, until 1978. But whereas the Shah believed a strong monarchy and a strong Iran to be complementary, Saikal argues that these goals were "constantly in conflict with each other," and that this conflict eventually destroyed the regime.

One familiar example shows how the two contradicted each other: The Shah encouraged tens of thousands of Iranians to study in the West in order to acquire modern skills; but these students also acquired Western ideas of freedom which, carried back to Iran, clashed with the Shah's notion of a docile subject population. Disaffection of these former students led to their massive repression by the secret police and contributed vitally to undermining the Shah's government.

Similarly, the Shah's decision to rely heavily on American support during the first 10 years of his rule, 1953-63, brought Iran economic and military aid, but at the expense of alienating the many Iranians who deeply resented an American presence in their country.

Dependence on the United States was diminished in 1963 with the launching of the "White Revolution," a program to redistribute agricultural lands, restructure industry and bring social benefits to the masses. With these moves, "the Shah attempted to achieve two objectives: to solidify and widen the popular bases of his rule; and to reduce his dependence on the United States." These reforms "achieved several short-term objectives" by improving the Shah's "domestic credibility and security; (but the) failure to disperse political power for fear of losing his own central position in the long run undermined the Shah's ability to plan and execute his reforms according to the needs of Iran." Again, the interests of the ruler and of the country clashed.

A new era for the Shah began in 1970, when fundamental shifts in the oil market greatly enhanced the value of Iran's oil exports. In one of the best sections of this book, Mr. Saikal demonstrates that Iran had a hidden but key role in the OPEC price rises, in the Arab oil boycotts and in nationalization of Middle Eastern oil production; while leading OPEC forces, the Shah skillfully avoided being blamed for this in the West.

In combination, the White Revolution and the oil boom should have placed the Shah in an excellent position in the 1970s to achieve his ambitions for Iran and the monarchy. Yet, as we all know, he made monumental mistakes. As regards Iran, "the Shah's progress in strengthening and exerting Iran's position as an anticommunist, pro-Western power in its region failed to transform Iran into a self-generating industrial and military power." As regards the monarchy, he believed that the Iranian people wanted a splendid imperial rule emphasizing Iranian nationalism rather than Islamic values. The fact that Iran's new ruler, the Ayatollah Khomeini, represents the antithesis of the Shah indicates the depth of this miscalculation.

While the Shah's goals and programs are presented with clarity and a sure touch, Mr. Saikal does not consider the larger questions posed by their failure. What were the key mistakes and could they have been avoided? How much do the roots of this tragedy lie in one man's personality and how much in the unhappy history of modern Iran? What lessons should Iranians, Americans, and others learn from this episode? Mr. Saikal analyzes only the content and direct effect of the Shah's policies; he does not attempt to understand their genesis or significance.

S.A.A. Rizvi, an Indian Muslim (who coincidentally also teaches at the Australian National University), has blatantly jumped on the Shah & Khomeini bandwagon. The title, "Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution," the picture on the cover of Ayatollah Khomeini praying, and mention of the Tehran hostages in the blurb strongly imply that this book focuses on recent events, while, in fact, it is a standard textbook on Iran, covering topics such as its geography, ancient history, and culture.

An original version of this book apparently carried up to the mid-19th Century; then, with Iran so prominent in the news, Mr. Rizvi added two long chapters on subsequent events, including a detailed but plodding account of internal Iranian politics, which lead up to the collapse of the Shah's regime.

Although useful as a summary of events, this account is not reliable. After flaunting his bias in the dedication—"To the Memory of the Martyrs of Islamic Revolution"—Mr. Rizvi condemns every action of the Shah's government on page after page. By denigrating the Shah's "exorbitant increase in oil prices and reckless foreign investments" he manages even to make "the spectacular rise in Iranian prosperity" from 1965 to 1977 sound malevolent. And while the current Iranian regime claims that the Shah's personal assets reach the astounding sum of \$50 billion, Rizvi blithely fixes them at "not less than \$200 billion" in 1977, or 10 times all Iran's oil revenues for that same year.

The Shah's extravagant regime, its total collapse, and its replacement by the polar opposite rule of Khomeini make fascinating reading; while each of these two books illustrates part of this picture, we still must wait for a full account of the remarkable events in Iran during recent years.

Mr. Pipes teaches Islamic history at the University of Chicago.

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NEW YORK TIMES
29 APRIL 1980

U.S. Task Force Planned to Free Three Diplomats

Small Group Was to Enter Iranian Foreign Ministry

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 28 — Carter Administration officials said today that if the effort to rescue American hostages in Teheran had gone according to plan last week, United States paramilitary forces infiltrated into Iran early this year would have slipped into the Foreign Ministry to free three American diplomats held captive there since November.

Details of the plan to rescue the diplomats indicated that the assault at the Foreign Ministry would have been carried out by a small force of raiders in coordination with the main rescue attempt at the United States Embassy less than a mile away.

When the diplomats were free, according to officials close to the rescue mission, they would have been taken to the embassy and flown out of Teheran along with the 50 hostages held there.

Officials also revealed today that American intelligence agents infiltrated into Iran personally reconnoitered landing areas in the desert and near Teheran that had been selected for use by the rescue force. These inspections, which took place in recent weeks, indicated that the landing zones could be secured and would remain undetected during the rescue mission, officials said.

Traffic Came as Surprise

The appearance of a bus and a truck at the desert location just as American planes were landing last Thursday night was "completely unanticipated," according to one official. He said intelligence reports indicated that no vehicular traffic would be encountered.

The disclosure of additional details about the mission came as questions continued to arise about the feasibility of the rescue effort.

Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are scheduled to discuss the mission tomorrow in executive session. Hearings may follow; committee officials said.

The Senate Armed Services Committee announced today that it had begun an investigation into the breakdown of three RH-53 helicopters, which forced cancellation of the mission. Chairman John C. Stennis, Democrat from Mississippi, said the investigation would focus on maintenance, training, supplies and performance.

The House Armed Services Committee also announced that it would hold hearings on the mission next week.

Crews Unaware of Mission

These hearings and inquiries, officials said, will focus on several key questions raised in the aftermath of the mission.

Helicopter performance is one. Military officials acknowledged today that the eight helicopters used in the mission were maintained by crews aboard the aircraft carrier Nimitz that were unaware of the rescue mission and the strains it would place on the aircraft.

The helicopters used in the mission were also not the same ones that had been flown successfully in the United States during practice runs, officials said. Senior Administration officials have said that security considerations prevented transporting the helicopters used in practice to the Nimitz for use in the mission.

Another issue that will be examined, according to Senate investigators, is the command structure used in the mission. The mix of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine personnel, plus the deployment of paramilitary forces in Teheran, created a potentially confusing line of command, officials said.

Congressional committees will also try to determine whether military officials were certain that the mission was feasible. Top civilian officials in the Administration denied today that the rescue operation had been scaled down by the White House to reduce the chances for bloodshed.

Several top military officers, however, suggested that Pentagon doubts about the mission had been overridden by the White House.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown said last week that he and senior military officers had approved the mission and considered it feasible.

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ON PAGE A9

THE WASHINGTON POST
29 April 1980

Iran Tells Reporter For NBC to Leave

Reuters
TEHRAN, April 28—NBC correspondent Erik (Rick) Davis has been ordered to leave Iran as soon as possible by the Ministry of National Guidance, the official Pars news agency reported today.

Pars said the ministry objected to a report by Davis on the Tehran funeral of an Iranian student alleged here to have been killed by CIA agents while under psychiatric care in the United States.

The State Department says the student died of a heart attack. An NBC spokesman in New York said the network would not comment until the outcome of an appeal to Iranian authorities is announced Tuesday.

SAN FRANCISCO AP
29 April 1980

CIA HOSTAGES

CIA reportedly thought some hostages would have died in rescue --

The Central Intelligence Agency believed that 60 percent of the American hostages in Iran would have been killed or wounded if President Carter's rescue plan was carried out as planned, KCBS Radio reported.

The all-news station, quoting a source it said has been "accurate in every detail so far," said Monday there was a CIA report saying "60 percent of the American captives were likely to be killed or wounded even if the assault had gone off as planned."

A CIA spokesman in Washington who has not identified declined comment on the story.

The station quoted the source as saying the plan was approved even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly were given the CIA document.

The CIA believed that it would be impossible to free all the hostages at the same time because they were in small groups in different areas of the embassy compound, KCBS said it was told by the source. The document said that if some of the hostages had been freed others would probably have been executed, the source said.

U.S. military men carried more than \$1 million in Iranian currency to "pay local partisans," the station's source claimed.

Pentagon officials refused comment on the report. The CIA has not been officially linked with the aborted rescue plan.

White House press secretary Jody Powell denied in Washington that Carter did not follow advice from his military planners.

"At no time did the President deny or fail to concur in any suggestion from the military planners for the requisite amount of force or capability with regard to firepower or transport," Powell said.

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11111-IRAN-VANCE1

11111 BY JEFFREY ANTEVIL1

WASHINGTON, April 29, REUTER - CYRUS VANCE OPPOSED THE IRAN HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION NOT BECAUSE HE DOUBTED ITS FEASIBILITY BUT BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE SEVERE POLICY CONSEQUENCES, INCLUDING SOVIET INTERVENTION, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID TODAY.

THE OFFICIALS SAID MR VANCE, WHO RESIGNED AS SECRETARY OF STATE IN PROTEST OVER THE MISSION, WAS THE ONLY ONE OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S SENIOR ADVISERS TO OPPOSE IT.

THEY SAID REPORTS THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ALSO RECOMMENDED AGAINST THE MISSION, PREDICTING MANY CASUALTIES AMONG AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN, WERE NOT TRUE -- OR AT LEAST NOT REFLECTED IN CIA DIRECTOR STANFIELD TURNER'S STANCE.

ADMIRAL TURNER, THE OFFICIALS SAID, VOTED FOR THE MISSION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC). OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NSC INCLUDE THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE.

THE MISSION WAS CALLED OFF WHEN THREE OF THE EIGHT LARGE HELICOPTERS BEING USED BY THE RESCUE FORCE DEVELOPED MECHANICAL TROUBLES. THEN, DURING THE WITHDRAWAL FROM AN IRANIAN DESERT STRIP 200 MILES FROM TEHRAN, EIGHT U.S. SERVICEMEN WERE KILLED AND FIVE INJURED IN A COLLISION BETWEEN A C-130 TRANSPORT PLANE AND A HELICOPTER.

HOWEVER, DESPITE THE TRAGIC OUTCOME OF THE MISSION, MR VANCE DID NOT BASE HIS OPPOSITION ON ITS FEASIBILITY, THE OFFICIALS SAID.

HIS CONCERN, THEY SAID, WAS THAT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT SUCCEEDED OR FAILED, IT COULD INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE STRATEGIC PERSIAN GULF REGION AND GIVE MOSCOW AN EXCUSE FOR INTERVENING THERE.

OTHER POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS CITED BY MR VANCE INCLUDED ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM U.S. ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN AND FROM FRIENDLY OIL-PRODUCING PERSIAN GULF STATES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT.

IN FACT, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID TODAY, DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(over)

"FALLOUT FROM THE FAILED RESCUE ATTEMPT; TO DROP PLANS TO VISIT THE GULF REGION NEXT MONTH.

MR BROWN HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO INSPECT THE AMERICAN FLEET IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND VISIT SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION; INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA; ON HIS WAY TO THE NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN BRUSSELS MAY 13 AND 14.

THIRTY-SEVEN U.S. WARSHIPS; INCLUDING FOUR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS; ARE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN -- THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF AMERICAN NAVAL VESSELS IN THE AREA SINCE WORLD WAR II.¹

MR VANCE HANDED HIS RESIGNATION TO THE PRESIDENT ON APRIL 21; BEFORE THE RESCUE MISSION WAS MOUNTED LATE LAST WEEK; BUT IT WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY MR CARTER OR MADE PUBLIC UNTIL YESTERDAY.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID THE FAILURE OF THE RAID MIGHT HAVE MADE MORE FAR-REACHING MILITARY MOVES; SUCH AS A NAVAL BLOCKADE OR MINING OF IRANIAN PORTS; LESS LIKELY; AT LEAST FOR A COUPLE OF MONTHS.

PREVIOUSLY; OFFICIALS HAD BEEN SAYING THAT A DECISION ON MILITARY MOVES WAS LIKELY TO BE MADE IN MID-MAY IF OTHER EFFORTS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES HELD IN THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN SINCE NOVEMBER 4 HAD NOT BROKEN THE CRISIS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID THE POLICY OF PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS; AND OF WAITING FOR INTERNAL IRANIAN POLITICAL TURMOIL TO SETTLE -- THE POLICY WHICH MR VANCE STRONGLY ADVOCATED -- MIGHT NOW GET A TRIAL.

IN THAT SENSE; THE OFFICIALS SAID; MR VANCE HAD WON A VICTORY OF SORTS; BUT AT A TERRIBLE PRICE.²

PENTAGON OFFICIALS; WHILE NOT DISPUTING THAT THIS THEORY COULD BE CORRECT; SAID MR BROWN HAD RECOMMENDED THE RESCUE OPERATION IN PART BECAUSE HE HOPED IT WOULD ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR MORE EXTREME MILITARY MEASURES SUCH AS MINING OR A BLOCKADE.

MR BROWN SAID FRIDAY THAT A NAVAL BLOCKADE OF IRAN COULD EXPAND OR INTERNATIONALIZE THE CONFLICT.

IN ADDITION; OFFICIALS SAID; MR BROWN SAW THE MISSION AS A WAY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD THE WILL AND THE UNITED STATES THE ABILITY TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER AGAINST IRAN TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

"OBVIOUSLY SECRETARY VANCE CAME DOWN ON ONE SIDE OF THE ISSUE AND SECRETARY BROWN AND THE OTHERS CAME DOWN ON THE OTHER SIDE;" ONE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID.

OFFICIALS SAID THE DEBATE BETWEEN ADVOCATES OF RESTRAINT SUCH AS MR VANCE AND SUPPORTERS OF TOUGHER POLICIES SUCH AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI WAS A PERMANENT PART OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND WOULD NOT BE SETTLED; EVEN

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
29 April 1980

A Hollywood scenario minus happy ending

By HARRISON RAINIE

Washington (News Bureau)—The Iranian military trucks slipped up to the entrance of the captured U.S. Embassy without a hitch. Only military vehicles were allowed on the streets of Tehran after the sundown curfew.

Along with sympathetic Iranians and an infiltration team, the 90-man American commando squad moved swiftly around the perimeter of the embassy, cutting phone and electric power lines and neutralizing the relatively few militants standing guard at their watch posts. Gas worked with some. Garrotes and guns had to be used on others.

The signal was given and an explosion blew a gaping hole in the walls of the now-awakening compound. Before the remaining embassy captors had sized up the situation, the trucks roared into the sprawling complex, and swarming U.S. commandos cut them down. Gas worked with some; garrotes and guns—with silencers—had to be used on others. The hostages were gathered for their flight to freedom.

A squadron of giant RH-53D Navy Sea Stallion helicopters swooped into the embassy, scooped up the triumphant rescue team and its cargo and whisked them to the airfield where the revved-up C-130 transports barely waited for the doors to close before they took off into the still-darkened skies.

A perfect ending to a painstakingly plotted rescue. But it was not to be. The Blue Light commandos never made it to the embassy. The second phase of the daring American rescue plan—the easiest phase, according to its planners—was never used because three of the helicopters broke down during the first phase. The margin of error was wiped out and the mission was canceled.

Around the Pentagon and the planning circles for the rescue plan, the saddest thoughts are what might have been.

If at least six of the eight RH-53D helicopters had managed to complete the gruelling 500-mile low-flying mission from the carrier Nimitz to the salt flat Desert One refueling stop, and if the refueling had gone smoothly instead of ending in a fiery crash that killed eight crewmen, an intricate rescue operation unmatched in logistical sophistication would have proceeded.

Though Carter administration officials have publicly not revealed any of the details of the second phase, other sources have described the operation this way:

The refueled helicopters would have moved from the first staging point 200 miles southeast of Tehran to a mountainous site—appropriately named Mountain Hideout—outside Tehran but shielded from Iranian authorities by the terrain. As dawn broke the equipment would have been camouflaged and the commandos would have stayed in hiding until the night returned.

The hiding spot was pinpointed by a team of Iranians who had joined the American rescue effort because of their disaffection with the revolutionary government and by infiltrators who had moved into the country a few weeks after the Nov. 4 embassy takeover for just such a rescue mission. Some were apparently with the Americans during the first phase of the mission, dressed in military uniforms.

This group—called assets by Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher and friendly by other officials—also had assembled a small armada of Iranian military vehicles at the mountain site.

At nightfall the rescue team would have boarded the trucks for the trip downtown to the embassy, first stopping at an abandoned warehouse (formerly owned by an American firm that pulled out after the revolution) for a final briefing on the outskirts of the city.

Months of preparations would have come into play once the team was at the embassy wall. As almost 30 practice missions at an embassy replica at the CIA training base at Camp Peary, Va. taught them, the team would have moved to cut telephone and electric lines. Each commando had an assignment—wipe out a technical gadget or take out a guard.

The practice drills also made them familiar with the guard posts, some of which had been left untended in recent weeks as the interest of the militants waned and fewer were available to staff the grounds at night. Most of the commandos were equipped with gas masks and there were some indications that a nonlethal gas was the first weapon that would have been used against those guards. If real trouble developed, long-barrel .22-caliber pistols with silencers, assassin specials now gaining favor with the mob, were at the ready.


Once the initial resistance was quelled, explosives would have been used to rip away a section of the wall to get the trucks into the compound to unload more commandos for combat and to round up the 50 hostages. At the same time a smaller team would have invaded the Iranian Foreign Ministry where three American officials have been under a form of house arrest.

Then, depending on the response from Iranian military and police authorities, the hostages would have been rounded up at the embassy if fighting was light or they would have been moved to the nearby Amjadieh soccer stadium if fighting was heavy. The idea was to call in the helicopters to the most secure area, and the commando force was ready to fight through the streets of Tehran to find the safest part of town.

Holding the 53 hostages, the 90 American commandos and the undetermined number of friendlylies, the helicopters, by then bearing pasted-on Iranian air force decals, would have taken the group to a second out-of-town airstrip. This one was west of Tehran and called Desert Two.

Abandoning the helicopters and leaving them behind, the group would have boarded the waiting C-130s. Presumably under air cover dispatched from other navy aircraft carriers in the region, the C-130s would have—and under the plan should have—flown to freedom.

CONTINUED



Robert Juffras/Daily News

After hostages were rounded up by American commandos, they would have been removed by helicopter from U.S. Embassy if resistance was light. If Iranian military response was heavy, hostages would have been moved to Amjadieh soccer stadium for removal by copters.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-21**NEW YORK TIMES
28 APRIL 1980

ESSAY

The
Calling
Card

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — The United States has much to be sorry for but nothing to be ashamed of. In planning a commando rescue, President Carter deserves the temporary support of his countrymen — not because he is the President, but because he finally tried to act like a President.

The mission's failure is wrongly interpreted as evidence of the folly of direct action, or is explained as the result of bad luck and mechanical difficulties.

In fact, the reason the rescue failed was not that one helicopter pilot lost his way, but that the conception of the raid was not bold enough: the President wanted so much to make his surgical strike bloodless that he could not make the incision. By reducing the risk of loss of life, he increased the risk of failure of the mission; and the tragic irony came when lives were lost after his decision to retreat.

Months ago, the original plan called for a 350-man force, conveyed by many small choppers, supported by fighter-bombers. This was scrapped not because it was considered foolhardy — as we now know, the publicly derided rescue mission was secretly believed to be possible — but because it would have cost some American lives and probably Iranian lives.

President Carter could not deal with that and called for a "safer" option. The scaled-down plan finally adopted — 90 men, with eight helicopters straining technical capabilities — was attractive to him because it could be cancelled along the way. Much emphasis was put on the bailout points; military strategist Edward Luttwak calls that "deciding to get married and concentrating on divorce arrangements."

By convincing himself of the "humanitarian" side of the operation, the President rationalized his minimalist approach to the combat side. That was one reason he did not consult with Congress under the War Powers Resolution: not only was he not making war; he was seeking to avoid combat.

That hope of exerting military power without violence vitiated the commando spirit so necessary to a daring mission. The Delta force had months before been transported to the Mideast, and then had been psychologically let down when it was sent home. When satellite communication insured that the decision on whether or not to abort the mission would be made in the Oval Office rather than in the field, the spirit of caution took over.

That is why — if Pentagon spokesmen are accurate — the colonel in charge at the staging area went by the book: no sixth chopper, no mission. Never mind that five 50-passenger helicopters could hold all 90 raiders plus all 53 hostages with room to spare for infiltrated agents; although the sixth chopper was not "mission-critical," caution called for turning back. The colonel knew that if real trouble developed at the embassy scene, no U.S. air strike would be called in, and nobody wants to risk a Bay of Pigs. The basis of the turnback decision was not a field commander's loss of nerve but an institutionally built-in denial of nerve.

There must have been more to that decision than "mechanical difficulties." If the three hostages held at the foreign ministry were expected to be rescued along with the 50 at the embassy, some cooperation in Mr. Ghotb-zadeh's office is indicated. Since our C.I.A. has rejected Paris approaches by his representatives for fear of being enticed into a Soviet-sponsored setup, it may be that part of our caution was based on reports that the secrecy of the rescue mission had been compromised in Teheran.

The upshot was that the President narrowed the danger of casualties but lowered the chances of success. This was surely humanitarian but tragically ineffective; beware the daring of a cautious man.

The lesson for Mr. Carter was the same as that taught to President Kennedy in Cuba and President Johnson in Vietnam: If soldiers are to be sent in as a last resort, be prepared to apply enough force to overwhelm the enemy; otherwise, don't play with firepower. Mr. Carter should replace the politico-bureaucrat he named to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a soldier who has the judgment to tell the President that the national honor cannot always be defended without casualties.

Though the half-measure was unsound, the President's decision to take action was morally upright and in the national interest. Mr. Carter has told the Iranians and the world that in Iran, the unacceptable is really not going to be accepted. Terrorists may still be laughing at America, but the laughter has a new trace of nervousness.

During the war in Vietnam, President Nixon sent a commando unit into enemy territory to rescue prisoners of war held at Son Tay. The camp turned out to be abandoned and there was some hilarity at our ineptitude. When some self-flagellator suggested to Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel's Ambassador to the United States, that such raids be subcontracted to the Israelis, he responded tartly that our mission expressed our seriousness of purpose: "You left your calling card up there."

America has left its calling card in Iran. One way or another, American power will be back. As the victim of aggression, we have the obligation — using economic pressure, duplicity or military force — to redeem our honor and free our citizens.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
28 April 1980

Bani-Sadr Says Bodies Will Be Sent to Kin

By Raji Samghabadi
Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran — President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said today the bodies of the American commandos killed in the aborted hostage rescue operation and displayed at the U.S. Embassy yesterday, will be turned over to the International Red Cross, representatives of Pope John Paul II and the Swiss government for delivery to their relatives.

In a statement read on the state radio, the president said the bodies, put on display yesterday at the occupied U.S. Embassy here, have been turned over to the Tehran morgue. He denied Iran intended to bargain the bodies for money or other concessions from the United States.

Bani-Sadr said arrangements will be made for the families of the victims to claim and receive them through the Red Cross, Swiss and papal representatives.

Meanwhile, some of the 50 American hostages here were reported transferred from the embassy to the former U.S. consulate in the northern city of Tabriz, 60 miles from the Soviet border. Others reportedly were sent to the holy city of Qom, 80 miles to the south of Tehran, where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini makes his headquarters.

The militants at the embassy compound refused to give any details on the number or identities of hostages in each group. In a statement, they asked the citizens of Tabriz and Qom to help militants who accompanied the hostages and to "be vigilant and take action against the slightest suspicious movement."

The militants claimed President Carter wanted to provoke the militants into killing the captives so that he would be "rid of the problem once and for all."

The militants again raised the possibility of "espionage trials," saying Carter was terrified that such hearings would "unmask his corrupt government."

An insider of the clerical establishment said that the hostages would be kept in nine different cities in all.

"According to details I know, they will be constantly moved around, into different houses and districts, and from town to town, to minimize the effectiveness of enemy intelligence work," he said.

Asked whether the hostages

would be maltreated, he said: "We don't burn people like Carter does for kicks. That line of work is up his alley."

The same view was expressed by an Islamic judge, Sadegh Khalkhali, who brought the bodies to Tehran from the staging area of the abortive commando raid at Tabas.

"I sincerely offer the families of these victims of power, lust and ambition my heartfelt condolences.

What kind of a man is Carter? He is driven insane by his desire for another term in office," said Khalkhali, standing on the ramp of a U.S.-built Friendship aircraft that flew the bodies to Tehran.

The charred remains of the American commandos were wrapped in cotton to prevent disintegration. Five bodies are complete, but four consist of skeleton heads and ashes.

The United States has said that eight Americans died in the aborted venture, and the Pentagon said yesterday that one American, Petty Officer 1st Class Stanley E. Thomas, had lost his wallet during the hurried departure of the rescue team from the desert landing strip. It was believed this may have led the Iranians to believe nine bodies were involved.

Bani-Sadr, at Khomeini's bidding, had asked international organizations and human rights groups to send delegations to Iran to exhibit "undeniable evidence of U.S. military intervention."

An editorial in Jomhuri Islami, the newspaper of the powerful, hard-line Islamic Republican Party, said the bodies should not be returned until Washington releases Iranian assets frozen in the United States.

And the Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, a leading Islamic Republican member of Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council, said of the return of the bodies, "Such important political issues should be discussed in the Revolutionary Council and it is the Revolutionary Council that should decide."

Khalkhali claimed there were "at least 20 more bodies, reduced to ashes in the wreckage." He said these bodies were "pulverized and crumbled into dust when touched."

He also showed reporters a map, retrieved from one of the five helicopters left by the raiders, showing five strategic spots including the airport, which he maintained the Americans intended to bomb in preparation for the rescue operation.

According to this plan, Khalkhali said, the Americans intended to seize Amjadieh Stadium to the north of the U.S. Embassy and use it as their command headquarters.

"The attack was much larger in scale and more sinister in intent than the Americans are willing to admit. They intended to destroy the Islamic republic in collaboration with their fifth column."

There are indications that they also nursed sinister designs for the house of Imam Khomeini," added Khalkhali.

All Iranians who have visited the staging site insist there were additional bodies there. Some officials speculate the alleged bodies are of Iranian and other non-U.S. mercenaries of "shadowy background" that Carter does not want to admit having recruited.

"We have found a great number of watches, pendants, wrist chains, rings and other personal objects that bear names, blood group particulars and other identifying clues. We will let the world know later," says a senior Iranian diplomat.

He also claimed that documents retrieved from the U.S. aircraft have given the government excellent leads on U.S. secret agents in Iran and "U.S. sympathizers that Washington thinks can be helpful in a crisis."

Carter, in a report to Congress made public yesterday, said that eight Americans were killed in the operation and that "no United States armed forces remain in Iran."

A reliable clerical source says a few American hostages might be retained in the U.S. Embassy. The reason, he explains, is "the galvanizing effect of the presence of the spies on Tehran's citizens."

The militants, he says, are reluctant to lose their position as the focus of the huge marches past the "nest of spies."

Since the attack Friday, the government has taken stringent security precautions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where three senior U.S. diplomats, including Charge d'Affaires Bruce Laingen, are being held in "protective custody."

"If the U.S. wants to play the game like this, we are ready to oblige," says a senior Iranian diplomat. Pressed for detail on what the security precautions are, he snapped back, "The Americans will find out if they pull another stupid Tabas."

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
28 April 1980

Article by Ex-CIA Agent Outlined an Embassy Raid

From Times Wire Services

WASHINGTON—Six days before President Carter tried a rescue raid into Iran, a retired CIA agent published a plan for such a raid that appeared similar to the aborted scheme.

Miles Copeland, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency's political action staff, outlined a plan in an article distributed by the Independent News Alliance that called for the setting up of a staging area within helicopter range of Tehran.

He said that at this base, or at a field headquarters, a CIA operative and a communications assistant would monitor the operation, keep Washington informed and sound a "wrap it up" (cancellation) signal if things go sour anywhere along the line.

U.S. officials said Friday that the commando landing in a remote desert location several hundred miles southeast of Tehran was only the first stage, and that the move into Tehran was called off after mechanical troubles developed in rescue helicopters. Eight servicemen were killed in an aircraft collision as U.S. forces were withdrawing.

Copeland, who was at the CIA in the 1950s when a CIA-assisted operation was mounted to save the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—now in exile in Egypt—from a coup, said in the article that Carter had not told him anything about White House plans.

But he said the article had been read by his former colleagues in the government who had agreed that he should publish it.

Copeland said that from the staging area within helicopter range of Teh-

ran, the rescue force would move to a "penultimate position," given the code name of "PP," close to the embassy where the eventual attack would be launched.

A commando force known as "Team A," looking like Iranians, would move in around the embassy and pose as protesting militants.

An explosive diversionary move would be the signal for the attackers to storm the entry points and for agents among the Iranian "students" inside the embassy to activate an anesthetization process—using a non-lethal gas that would temporarily disable the hostages and their captors.

Three helicopters bearing Iranian army markings would land near the embassy to pick up the groggy hostages and some remaining Iranian "students" under supervision of Team A.

Meanwhile, "Team B," masquerading as Iranian soldiers, and perhaps actually being anti-Tehran Iranians, would have taken control of all communications into and out of the compound, as well as elsewhere in Tehran.

The helicopters would fly the hostages to a safe haven where they would either be flown out of Iran or would be taken out overland by friendly Iranians if the air rescue was not possible, he said.

The plan outlined by Copeland envisaged using Qashgai tribesmen, Iranian officers training in the United States and agents recruited from among Iranian militants. The operation would be staged so as to appear to have internal Iranian origins.

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NEW YORK TIMES
27 APRIL 1980

WASHINGTON, April 26 — Officials closely associated with the attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran acknowledged today that the operation was one of the most difficult ever attempted by the United States military. But they asserted that the mission had been worked out with painstaking care, including the use of paramilitary forces infiltrated into Teheran in recent months.

The forces, which were said to have entered Iran using forged foreign passports, were to assist the 90-member commando team in its effort to storm the American Embassy in Teheran and free the 50 hostages there, the officials said.

Military experts in and out of Government have begun to raise questions about key aspects of the mission.

Why did the Administration rely on such a small force for such a difficult military operation?

Why was the mission aborted when the American forces still possessed five working helicopters for use in the rescue operation?

Even if the force had been able to get to Teheran, how did the Administration expect to be able to free the hostages and get them out of Iran without major loss of life?

Congressional Hearings Expected

Although Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, has already called the mission "nothing short of a disaster," the Administration so far has escaped wide public criticism. But White House and Pentagon aides expect to come under heavy fire during the next few weeks, if, as expected, the Senate and House armed services committees hold hearings.

Anticipating this, officials emphasized that the Administration's rescue mission had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and every other senior military officer involved in the operation. According to the officials, the overall commander was an Army major general, James B. Vaught. An Air Force general, Philip Gast, the former chief of the American military advisory mission in Teheran, was also involved in commanding the mission, they added. The ground commander was Col. Charlie A. Beckwith of the Army.

Although some high-ranking military officers expressed doubts over whether a 90-member force could succeed in freeing the hostages, officials close to the mission said that the Administration had earlier considered using an even smaller military team for storming the embassy grounds in Teheran. The officials said that the most important planning goal in the mission was to avoid detection and that this required a minimum number of troops as well as helicopters and transport aircraft.

Officials Describe Painstaking Plan Of Military and Agents Sent to Iran

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

Special Procedures Required

The priority placed on avoiding detection, officials said, also forced the military team to work out extraordinary procedures, such as flying helicopters at night over long distances without radio communications and refueling without lights. One official said that when planning for the mission got under way last November "for two months nobody thought it was possible."

Another said the desire to avoid detection was an important factor in deciding to launch the helicopters from the aircraft carrier Nimitz in the Arabian Sea rather than using a base on land, which might have led to detection of the helicopters by the Soviet Union and other nearby powers.

In a briefing for reporters today, a senior Administration aide said that in retrospect a larger force of helicopters would have enabled the mission to proceed after the American team lost three of the aircraft in the initial leg of the mission from the Nimitz to the airstrip 200 miles south of Teheran. But the official said that even adding two additional helicopters to the original force of eight would have created serious new logistical problems.

Apart from the helicopter issue, there were questions about how the American team was actually going to move into the embassy compound and then leave with the hostages. Officials said the actual assault on the compound required the help of American agents provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and some special forces provided by the American military who were gradually infiltrated into the city early this year.

Landing Area for Helicopters Located

These agents, working with Iranians opposed to the existing Government in Teheran, are said to have laid plans for the assault on the embassy by locating a secure landing area for the helicopters outside Teheran. The American agents purchased trucks and other vehicles with which to transport the commando team to the embassy from the helicopter landing area, they said.

The rescue plan, according to the officials, called for the helicopters to arrive at a landing area near Damavand, a mountainous region east of Teheran, early yesterday morning. During the day, the helicopters and the commando team were to remain hidden at the landing area.

Yesterday, officials said, the commando team was to be moved into Teheran aboard the trucks provided by and driven by the C.I.A. and Pentagon officers. The first stop, they added, was to be a warehouse on the outskirts of Teheran where last-minute briefings for the commando team were scheduled.

Following the briefings, the commando team was to move to the embassy in the trucks.

Officials said that a detailed attack plan for attacking the embassy had been prepared, based mainly on American blueprints of the buildings on the compound and extensive, last-minute reconnaissance. The placement of electric and telephone lines had been pinpointed, they said, and individual commandos had the responsibility for cutting these lines.

One official said that once the militants guarding the embassy had been "neutralized" and the hostages collected the helicopters would have been called in from the mountain base outside the city. The helicopters, each able to carry about 40 passengers, were supposed to evacuate all the commandos, the hostages, the American paramilitary units and the Iranian agents, less than 200 people in all.

The officials said that if it proved impossible to land the helicopters at the embassy, the Americans were to have moved to the Amjadieh soccer stadium, located a few hundred yards from the compound, where they would then be airlifted out.

From Teheran, the helicopters were to fly to Desert Two, officials said, an abandoned airstrip in a remote area west of Teheran to rendezvous with the six C-130 air cargo planes flown into the country on Thursday. At this point, they said, all the helicopters were to be abandoned and everyone was to have flown out of the country aboard the C-130's.

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WASHINGTON STAR
27 APRIL 1980

Secrecy Surrounds Elite Army Unit Trained for Commando Operations

Officer Told Wife: 'I'll Be in the Desert'

New York Times News Service

FAYETTEVILLE, N.C. — From the moment of its birth 29 months ago behind the locked gates of a converted military prison at nearby Fort Bragg, secrecy has surrounded the government's elite Blue Light antiterrorist unit, a portion of which apparently participated in the rescue attempt in Iran Thursday.

That secrecy was in effect yesterday just as it was two years ago when Vice President Walter F. Mondale, Adm. Stansfield Turner, the director of Central Intelligence, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, made a predawn flight here to watch a 200-man unit demonstrate the storming of a plane seized by terrorists.

And Blue Light's veil of security was still drawn tight nine days ago when a Forces officer attached to the unit disappeared from sight here after telling his wife simply, "I'll be in the desert."

Pentagon sources have said that about 90 members of Blue Light, also called the Delta Team, took part in the ill-fated mission that left eight Americans dead at a remote air strip in the Iranian desert. But officials here have declined to disclose details of Blue Light's training and deployment.

Because Fort Bragg is headquarters for the Army's Rapid-Deployment Airborne troops and the command center for the Army Special Forces troops that frequently work with the CIA in clandestine operations, this is a military town that is accustomed to confidential operations. However, what goes on behind the green-slatted fence at the Charlie's Angels compound has been an object of obsessive curiosity here.

The nickname, taken from a popular television show, is a tribute to Col. Charlie A. Beckwith, the combat-hardened commander of the Blue Light unit. Beckwith, a stiff-necked six-footer with a reputation for daring, was last seen here in public about five weeks ago at an officer's funeral. In the aftermath of the Iranian raid, he and his unit have become the Defense Department equivalents of nonpersons here.

"How did you get that name?" said Rep. Charles Rose 3d of Fayetteville, a Democratic member of the House Intelligence Committee who has worked closely with the antiterrorist unit, when asked about Beckwith. Army spokesmen at Fort



COL. CHARLES BECKWITH

Bragg concede only that there have been persistent "rumors" that an antiterrorist unit is based here, even though the State Department and the Army acknowledged the existence of Blue Light at Fort Bragg almost two years ago.

Most of what is known about Blue Light comes from the reporting of Fred Bost, a retired sergeant major who is the military writer for The Fayetteville Times. His accounts and congressional and military sources available to The New York Times provided the following history of the unit:

Blue Light was formed around November 1977 as a result of government concern that the United States lacked the capability to carry out missions like the rescue by German commandos of 86 hostages from an airliner seized by terrorists

in Somalia. Beckwith was given command of the unit because of his experience as commander of an earlier Project Delta, a Green Beret operation in Vietnam in 1965-66.

Although based here, the Blue Light unit was not under exclusive Army control. "It is a military unit responsible to the National Security Council and it works through the Department of Defense as a program of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Hodding Carter 3d, chief spokesman for the State Department, confirmed in 1978.

After February 1978, the unit, its size variously estimated at from 180 to 300 men, drew volunteers from all services but depended heavily on Army Special Forces troops and training methods. Those methods, including 36-mile marches in full gear, were severe enough to draw criticism of Beckwith's methods, according to military sources. He reportedly told volunteers who had already passed very advanced training: "You've got to prove yourselves again."

"They picked people who were highly intelligent, in good physical condition, and who'd keep their mouths shut," a military source said.

The training for Blue Light troops ran the gamut of antiterrorist activities, with an emphasis on rescue rather than on fighting, according to the congressional source.

The deployment Monday of the Seventh Special Forces Group for training at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida may have provided a cover for or been associated with the Blue Light operation. The Fayetteville Times reported that at about the same time, five anesthetists and several doctors at the Womack Army Hospital here also apparently joined the Iranian mission. Their disappearance led to the officially unexplained shutdown of the hospital's surgery unit.

The Blue Light unit first came to public notice when the recently completed \$1.5 million stockade here began busting with activity even though its prison population had dwindled to about 15. It was subsequently confirmed that an additional \$1 million had been spent in converting the stockade into a tightly secured antiterrorist training center.

Little is known about the exact details of that training, but in a town where the military is a major industry, faith in the secretive unit remained unshaken. "If Blue Light was involved, any argument that the mission failed because of a Mickey Mouse or Keystone Kops element is ludicrous," said an aide to a prominent local politician. "They're the super elite of the elite."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
26 April 1980

THE PLAN

Raid Team Had Hoped to Surprise Hostage Captors in Ground Assault

By George C. Wilson
and Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writers

Had the hostage rescue plan worked, the key step called for heavily armed U.S. troops to board vehicles outside Tehran in the dead of night and then race through the city's streets to take the embassy compound by surprise.

The helicopters would not have swooped into the compound under the aborted plan until after the hostages were safely in the hands of the rescue party.

Pentagon and White House officials broadly hinted yesterday that the United States had help inside Tehran in determining the exact moment to strike.

Presumably, the hostages at that moment would have been guarded only lightly by the militants. The planning and repeated rehearsals over the last several months convinced the would-be rescuers that once inside the embassy compound their work would be easy.

"The team itself was convinced that that was the part of the mission of which they were the most confident," Defense Secretary Harold Brown said at his Pentagon press conference yesterday.

Although Brown did not specify the basis of this confidence, other military sources said it rested on absolutely reliable intelligence information on when to hit the embassy and what the situation would be there at the time.

The 90 troops in the specially trained U.S. "Blue Light" rescue team were armed with nonlethal chemical agents to incapacitate the militants, but they were not depending on their use.

Under the rescue plan, the hostages would have been assembled by the troopers, picked up by helicopter and deposited at an undisclosed airstrip outside Tehran where six C130 transport planes would be waiting for them, propellers turning.

The rescue team, the helicopter crews and the 53 hostages would have climbed into the C130s and flown out

of Iran, leaving the helicopters on the ground behind them.

Three separate bases in Iran were mapped out for the operation. One was near Tabas, for refueling the helicopters; a second far enough outside Tehran so the helicopters approaching the city would not be detected; and a third for the escape by C130 transports.

Months ago, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had studied a plan calling for the rescue team to land directly inside the compound by helicopter. But as Air Force Secretary Hans M. Mark disclosed publicly last month, this idea "just wasn't feasible."

The revised plan called for the troops to sneak up on the embassy in vehicles rather than crash directly into the compound, as was the case in the raid against North Vietnam's prison camp at Son Tay in 1970.

Government officials indicated that the vehicles for the raid had been covertly deployed near Base Two outside Tehran. U.S. troops would have stayed there the first night of the operation and then mounted the raid on the second night—which would have been last night in Washington.

There were also suggestions that the 90-member Blue Light unit Brown talked about publicly yesterday had some backup. It appears that others—

numbers and identities unknown—were deployed ahead of time at Base Two. They were said to have been in the process of being extracted when the White House announced the raid early Friday morning.

Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) raised the possibility of Iranians secretly helping the would-be American rescuers, stating: "There might be a fifth column that we have developed in or around the embassy that was going to help us."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
26 April 1980

Behind the Scenes in Planning the Hostage Rescue Attempt

By Martin Schram
and Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writers

When President Carter summoned his top national security advisers to the Cabinet Room Friday, April 11, it was to act upon a daring rescue plan with which they were already familiar.

The plan had been drafted in secrecy in the Pentagon just after the U. S. Embassy in Iran had been seized and Americans taken hostage. It had been refined and simplified several times since then. And at every step, the president and his advisers had been fully briefed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones.

On April 11, the president wanted to review the details once more, and to review the changing situation he felt might make it advisable to put the secret rescue plan into effect.

Attending were Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and national security affairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Yesterday, with the once-secret rescue effort now aborted and very public, administration officials outlined the factors that had led Carter to act.

All diplomatic efforts to free the hostages had failed, administration officials said, and there was no reason to believe that the hostages would be released in the foreseeable future.

Carter and his advisers had concluded that unrest and divisions within Iran, plus unrest between Iran and Iraq, were endangering the safety of the hostages.

The day before Carter's April 11 meeting, a spokesman for the militants at the Embassy had warned on NBC's "Today" show that they would "destroy" the hostages if Iraq attacked Iran. Iraq was a vehemently anti-American country with which the United States had severed diplomatic ties.

The statement apparently weighed heavily upon the president. In a comment just three days ago, Carter told a group of editors and broadcasters, when asked if he would be willing to "jeopardize" the lives of the hostages to end the crisis, that the hostages already were jeopardized.

He cited some "disturbing" statements made by the terrorists. For instance: If Iraq invades Iran, this would be a puppet of the United States, and the hostages would be executed.

And he added: "There was not any immediate counterstatement made by either Khomeini or the government officials."

On April 11, there were other concerns that administration officials now cite as reasons for opting for the rescue effort, as opposed to some other, less risky, military step. The United States always had the option of trying to halt Iran's international commerce by mining its harbors or instituting a naval blockade.

But American officials say they were as concerned about the drawbacks of mining or blockading as were some of the vocal critics outside the government. Either step could add greatly to tensions in the Persian Gulf and unite the Islamic world against the United States.

And the officials felt the approach of summer was a compelling factor in attempting the rescue effort now, for two reasons:

First, temperatures would rise with the coming of summer, making the helicopter and C130 transport takeoffs more difficult and more costly of fuel.

Second, the operation had to be conducted under cover of night (two nights, actually, with the intervening daylight hours to be spent largely in lying low and trying to avoid detection.) The hours of night were growing shorter.

That Friday, April 11, meeting adjourned with the president giving tentative approval to begin the operation. The following Monday, the same group of officials reviewed the details, and Carter gave his final approval for the rescue plan.

* * * *

This week, with the rescue operation about to begin, two developments shook the highest officials in the U.S. government.

On Sunday, The Washington Star published a commentary in which Miles Copeland, a former CIA official familiar with Iran, presented a detailed plan to rescue the hostages. One administration official complained that the next day the story was "picked up and carried in Iranian newspapers as though it was the official American rescue plan."

Then, he complained, Israeli intelligence put out a story to the Israeli press saying that there had been an increase of U.S. air activity in the region, and they believed the United States was preparing to run a rescue effort.

On Thursday morning, just about the time Carter was meeting with Shimon Peres, chairman of the Israeli opposition Labor Party, eight huge RH53 helicopters took off from the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz.

"We were very conscious of the fact that we did not want to appear tense or anxious," said one of the few senior White House officials who knew of the plan. So the president tried to keep to his daily schedule, and so did we.

Throughout the operation, the president was apprised of the progress of the mission by telephone calls from Jones, who was, in turn, in contact with the rescue party in Iran. Carter could have spoken directly with the field commanders. "But the president made a decision that he did not want people in the field to be distracted by having to serve as play-by-play and color announcers," one official said.

At midday, Carter was told that one helicopter "has gone down." The president and his top assistants tried to go about their business. Later, word came that it had just made a forced landing, and that the mission was still proceeding.

Then word came that a second helicopter had turned back to the Nimitz with mechanical problems. Then, with the rescue party on the ground in Iran, in Desert One, the president was told that a third helicopter would not function.

The president sat at his desk in the unpretentious study adjacent to the Oval Office as he listened to Jones on the other end of the phone. He was told that the top field officers in Desert One had argued among themselves about whether to try to continue the mission with only five helicopters—one fewer than the plan required. They recommended that the plan be scrubbed.

The president listened. At 4:45 a.m. he gave the order officially ending the rescue mission.

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One assistant who was present recalled that Carter appeared clearly disappointed as he gave the order. "But at least there were no casualties," the president said after hanging up the phone. "And there was no detection. It could have been worse."

The president and his advisers had feared that the Soviets might have detected the operation and told the Iranians. But that had not happened. They still hoped that the mission could begin anew in the very near future.

An hour or so later, the president took another call from the Pentagon command point. As he listened, his face fell noticeably, according to one official who was there. He looked up from his telephone.

"There has been a serious problem... an accident."

Eight Americans had been killed.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A14THE BALTIMORE SUN
26 April 1980

Tragedy in the Desert

Nothing fails like failure. As a firestorm of criticism engulfs President Carter, the wisest response to the abortive rescue mission in Iran should be one of reserved judgment. The nation's heart goes out to the eight servicemen whose bodies were left in flaming wreckage on the Iranian desert, and to the hostage families whose emotions once again are gripped with dread. But the nation's head must remain coolly focused on issues—both old and new issues—that will determine the future course of this crisis.

One bleak fact cannot be avoided: The U.S. position in Iran and in the world is immensely more difficult than was the case before the president's fateful decision. This position should not be worsened by the fruitless venting of frustration and disappointment.

Mr. Carter's first duty to the nation is to present as detailed and candid an accounting of the incident as the safety of the hostages in Tehran permits. An essential will be some explanation of how a mission obviously authorized and planned at highest level could turn into such a logistics disaster. Until this matter is resolved, public faith in the military and intelligence establishments will be sorely tried.

Even more important must be a forthright discussion by the president of crucial policy questions. Did he consider all the ramifications of a failed mission before he ordered the rescue operation? Did he anticipate the reaction of U.S. allies, who had grudgingly undertaken economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran on the understanding that the U.S. would not take precipitate military action? Did he even contemplate the consequences of a successful mission as it would affect the future allegiances of a humiliated Iran?

As the country waits for answers to these and other questions, a key factor should be kept in mind: Of all the military options open to the president, the launching of a rescue operation was probably the least provocative. Had the mission worked as planned, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the White House that it had a good chance of working, most of the hostages would have been rescued without many or any casualties. This might well have created even more internal turmoil in Iran, at least for a while, but it would have entailed only a fraction of the dangers involved in a naval blockade and/or the mining of Iranian oil ports.

Canada's Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said yesterday that when he was warning earlier in the week against American military action in the Persian Gulf, he was not intending to exclude a rescue mission. The official silence of France and West Germany may betoken a similar feeling despite hostile reactions in the European press.

While the timing of the rescue mission had obvious drawbacks, so far as U.S. relations with Western Europe are concerned, the administration's defense is at least worthy of consideration. Iran's internal situation

was deteriorating, in Washington's view, to the point where the safety of the hostages was becoming more uncertain. With the nights growing shorter and the summer heat of the Iranian desert creating greater operations difficulties, the president felt he had to act now or bide his time for months. Perhaps, too, he felt that a rescue mission, whatever its results, would reduce the clamor for more aggressive military actions—actions of a kind that had aroused fears of a world war in many Western capitals.

The administration's lack of consultation, either with U.S. allies or members of Congress, is another major matter that ought to be examined dispassionately. We believe this country would be obligated to inform European NATO members of a naval quarantine against Iran, for example, because their economies are even more dependent on the flow of Persian Gulf oil than is the American economy. But the planning of a rescue mission whose chances of success rest so heavily on the element of surprise is not the kind of action any country has to share with any other. As for consultation with Congress under the War Powers Act, we view this as a gray area. Mr. Carter would have been wise to advise a very small inner circle on the Hill. But he probably was not legally obligated to do so.

Although cool appraisal is preferable to emotional reaction at a moment of defeat and despair, this should in no way anticipate a positive judgment of the administration's record in this incident. From the beginning of the Iranian crisis, this newspaper has counseled patience for two key reasons: 1) patience offered the best hope for the eventual safe release of the hostages; 2) longterm U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf require a viable relationship with Iran and all the other major oil powers. If the crisis can somehow be resolved without bloodshed between America and Iran, an eventual reconciliation will be that much easier. Moscow's designs run in opposite directions.

We regret that President Carter found it necessary, in his judgment, to take action. His own earlier statements had warned that a rescue operation might not be feasible and might endanger the lives of the hostages. That earlier opinion has now been proven correct—once. But while we feel the nation's interests and the hostages' interests have been damaged by the failed rescue mission, we believe the Carter government has every right to keep all options open.

At a moment when it is tempting to criticize the United States, the world should remember that Iran is the country that has broken international law by imprisoning diplomats and Iran is the country that has broken every code of civilized conduct by playing with the lives of 50 human beings in the most sadistic way imaginable. Critics of the rescue mission—at home and abroad—must keep in mind that Iran is the provocateur and the potential catalyst of war.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1LOS ANGELES TIMES
25 APRIL 1980

Soviet Bloc Can't Fill Iran's Trade Gap, U.S. Says

By OSWALD JOHNSTON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The Carter Administration, in a show of unconcern over a reported trade agreement between Moscow and Tehran, said Thursday that the Soviet Union and its allies will not be able to make up for Iranian trade lost because of economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

At the same time, Administration officials dismissed warnings by critics that the current hard-line approach to the hostage crisis might drive Iran into the arms of the Soviets.

"We have no evidence that economic sanctions will result in a major increase in trade between Iran and the East Bloc," State Department spokesman Tom Reston said. "Transportation capacity between Iran and the Soviet Union is limited. The Soviets do not have the economic resources to replace goods Iran had been importing from the West."

Another Administration official, discussing the possibility of U.S. actions inadvertently pushing Iran toward closer ties with Moscow, said, "We think Iranians are well aware of the hazard involved in too close an association with the Soviet Union."

Reston, in his separate statement, referred to the post-World War II occupation of part of northern Iran by Soviet troops as a "sobering experience with the Soviets which we hope the Iranian leadership has not forgotten."

A main source of State Department nonchalance Thursday in reaction to Tehran's announced trade deals with the Soviets is the universally low regard U.S. intelligence analysts have for the Soviet road and rail transport system.

"The Soviet rail system is a source of bottlenecks even when things are running smoothly," one official explained.

The main rail link between Moscow and Tehran is a single-track transcaucasian line skirting the mountains but crossing the equally forbidding mountains of Azerbaijan. It has been badly maintained on the Iranian side since the fall of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, intelligence specialists say, and as a result a major bottleneck has developed on the frontier between the two countries.

"The last time anyone studied the satellite pictures, there were uncounted miles of backed-up railroad cars unable to move on both sides of the border," one official said.

To this is added the fact that the goods Iran stands to forfeit from the West as a result of sanctions are for the most part spare parts and other finished products that are either not available in the Soviet Union or are produced there in low quality and inadequate quantities.

The Soviets want to buy natural gas from Iran, in part because it has in the past formed a link in an elaborate barter arrangement with Western Europe that gave Moscow a source of hard currency.

Last month Soviet-Iranian negotiations toward a new gas supply deal fell through because the Russians refused to meet the Iranians' stiff price—to be paid in hard currency. The Soviets on Wednesday were reported close to a new agreement on Iranian natural gas.

At the bottom, officials here see no likelihood that Iran will let itself be driven into trade deals in rubles or other soft currencies no matter how much they feel threatened by the prospect of Western trade sanctions.

Other officials likewise expressed skepticism that Iran's announced agreement to sell 100,000 barrels of oil a day to Romania would ever meet

Iran's declared objective of getting paid \$35 a barrel in hard currency.

"We assume Romania will try to work out a barter arrangement," one specialist on East Bloc economics said, noting that Soviet Bloc countries as a rule seek to "pay" with goods wherever possible in their external trading accounts because they have little hard currency.

"Iran can price the oil at \$35 a barrel, but what would they really be getting in return? You need to look at the real value and quality of the goods they get in return," the U.S. specialist said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 27NEWSWEEK
5 May 1980

The Plan: How It Failed

On a cool night in the Iranian desert, the American commandos had all but given up hope. One of the six big RH-53D helicopters, a vital part of their mission to rescue 53 American prisoners in Teheran, sat on the salt flats of the Desert One base area, hopelessly crippled. Back in Washington, Defense Secretary Harold Brown used a bright red "secure" telephone to call Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national-security adviser. "I think we have an abort situation," said Brown. Brzezinski rushed to Carter's hideaway office with the bad news: the commander of the rescue operation recommended that it be called off. Jimmy Carter mulled it over for just seven minutes, then announced simply: "I approve his recommendation."

The rescue mission aborted in flames and death when one of the big Sea Stallion helicopters collided with a C-130 transport plane on the ground while maneuvering to refuel. The evacuating Americans left behind a battlefield scene of burned, junked and abandoned equipment—and the bodies of eight marines and airmen. Their planning had been ingenious and their preparation meticulous. But the 180 rescuers—90 commandos and an equal number of air crew—were undone by an improbable run of bad luck. One by one, three carefully prepared helicopters had dropped out of action. More than 40 Iranian civilians had blundered into the Desert One camp as the American troops were arriving—and at least two had escaped with the momentous news. Then came the evacuation and the tragic, wasteful fireball that killed eight men and badly burned four others after the mission had been written off.

Mountain Hide-out: The Carter Administration was understandably sparing with the details of what would have happened next if the mission had not been aborted at Desert One. But sources told NEWSWEEK that the plan called for a ground assault on the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and on the Iranian Foreign Ministry less than a mile away, where three American diplomats had been cooped up since the start of the embassy siege. After refueling at Desert One, the helicopters were to have flown to a mountain hide-out east of Teheran to wait out the daylight hours. The C-130s would

leave Iran and later return to a separate base area outside the capital. The next night, the troops would drive to Teheran in vehicles "pre-positioned" by someone—perhaps U.S. intelligence agents or pro-American Iranians. The rescuers apparently expected to attack when the militants holding the embassy had relaxed their guard; there was speculation that the Americans intended to use nonlethal gas to neutralize the embassy guards.

Once the militants were overwhelmed and the U.S. hostages secured, the plan called for helicopters to land in the embassy compound and lift all the Americans out to a nearby airstrip where they would board the C-130s for the flight to freedom. It seemed safe to assume that jet fighters from the carrier Nimitz, which had launched the helicopters from the Arabian Sea, would have flown to Teheran to provide air cover for the departing transports.

Secret Meetings: It was a bold plan, designed to hit Teheran unexpectedly—from the ground instead of the air and from the east instead of the west, the line of flight from friendly air bases in Turkey and Egypt. Jimmy Carter gave the order to go on April 11, and every morning thereafter, Brzezinski convened a secret meeting of senior mission managers, including Brown, Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, CIA director Stansfield Turner, White House aides Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell and Gen. David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The commandos had been selected within weeks after the embassy was seized last Nov. 4. The identity of the surviving raiders was still secret late last week, but sources said the team was drawn from the Blue Light unit at Fort Bragg, N.C., an anti-terrorist detachment set up in 1977. The commander of Blue Light is Army Col. Charles Beckwith, a Green Beret veteran of cross-border operations in Vietnam. Beckwith himself commanded the rescue party on the ground in Iran, reporting to the overall mission commander, Army Maj. Gen. James Vaught.

Delta Project: The difficult, unorthodox mission was nothing new to Colonel Beckwith. A big, bluff man known for his shouts of "Press on" in battle, Beckwith has spent most of his career in the shadowy world of "special warfare." Because of the secret na-

ture of his work, the Pentagon will divulge little information about him; according to one old chum, Charles Mohr of The New York Times, "even his middle name is classified." In Vietnam, he once commanded the Delta Project, a force of Vietnamese, Cambodian and ethnic Chinese mercenaries recruited by Special Forces and paid by the CIA for irregular missions.

* * * *

Fiery Collision: At Desert One, the American commandos were preparing to evacuate when frustration turned to tragedy. Moving into position to refuel, one helicopter rose 15 to 20 feet into the air and began to taxi around a troop-carrying C-130 toward a tanker plane on the other side. In the darkness, the helicopter pilot apparently was unaware of how close he was to the troop carrier. While banking sharply to the left to complete the turn, the helicopter's rotor blade slashed through the fuselage of the C-130 at precisely the point dividing the crew and cargo compartments. The C-130 was neatly sliced in two. The commandos in back managed to rescue an Air Force cargo master pinned in the wreckage by the helicopter's rotor. Then they bolted out the rear door just before their transport and the helicopter burst into flames.

The five Air Force crewmen in the cockpit of the C-130 never had a chance. The three Marine crewmen in the back of the helicopter also died, but the pilot was thrown clear and was among the four men badly burned. The fire set off ammunition aboard both aircraft. As explosions and shrapnel ripped through the night, Colonel Beckwith ordered crewmen to evacuate the remaining four helicopters, which were brimming with fuel and liable to explode in a chain reaction. In the dangerous circumstances, the rescue team did not pause to destroy the helicopters, but piled into the remaining C-130s and took off for Egypt. Later, Pentagon officials admitted that some classified equipment and documents may have been left behind as well—possibly including the plans for taking the embassy in Teheran.

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Burn Treatment: Marine Maj. James H. Schaefer Jr. of Los Angeles and three other injured American servicemen were flown to Ramstein Air Force Base in West Germany, where U.S. State Department and intelligence officers supervised a tight ring of security. For twelve hours, the two marines and two airmen underwent intensive treatment at Landstuhl, the base's topflight medical center, by a team of burn specialists. The hospital declined to report on their conditions, but one staffer said the men had suffered serious injuries. "It must have been one hell of a bang," said a medic. "Those boys really got it." When they were fit for travel, the patients were dispatched to the Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas, for extended treatment.

* * * *

Assault: In their public damage-control statements, Administration architects of the abortive rescue mission refused to outline their specific plans for taking the Teheran embassy. At a press conference, Brown went no farther than to disown the idea of assaulting the embassy directly with helicopters—a noisy, tricky maneuver in the middle of downtown Teheran that would have endangered hostages and rescuers alike. Privately, U.S. officials admitted that a ground attack against the embassy was intended—but they would not elaborate on how 90 American commandos could overcome about 150 armed militants who reportedly had wired the compound with explosives.

The most forthcoming senior official would say only that Carter had given strict orders not to initiate combat with Iranian forces, but that the Americans would have fought back if challenged. Whether friendly Iranians were to play more than a supporting role in the operation was open to conjecture. Ohio Sen. John Glenn suggested that

certain Iranian leaders, distressed by the growing power of the embassy militants, had agreed to "look the other way" and perhaps even provide the assault trucks and other equipment. Emerging from a classified briefing from Brown, Oregon Sen. Robert Packwood spoke vaguely of some "other arrangements in the streets" in support of the U.S. assault.

Impossible: As far as it got, the rescue mission succeeded in totally surprising Iran's revolutionary government. When the first reporter called the Defense Ministry for comment on the raid hours after the U.S. team had been evacuated, the duty officer replied: "No, that's absolutely impossible. If it had happened, we would have picked it up on the radar." Trying to recoup, the military command quickly announced that its pursuing jet fighters had forced the American aircraft to the ground. Rumors swept the country that hundreds of "marines and CIA agents" still were prowling about the desert. President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, returning to the capital from a tour of the southern oil fields, diverted his plane over the American landing site for a personal inspection. Later, he told journalists that U.S. commandos left behind "will be arrested—if they are there."

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 23

NEWSWEEK
5 May 1980

PERISCOPE

Eavesdropping on the Iranians

There was at least one secret reason for Jimmy Carter's failure to break diplomatic relations with Iran until early April, five months after U.S. hostages were taken in Teheran. During most of that period, U.S. intelligence used electronic eavesdropping devices to intercept messages between the Iranian Embassy in Washington and the Foreign Ministry in Teheran. As a result, the White House gleaned some sensitive information from Iran and acquired a working knowledge of how the Khomeini regime's representatives were perceiving events in Washington.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 13

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
5 MAY 1980

Tomorrow.

A LOOK AHEAD FROM THE NATION'S CAPITAL

Newsgram

2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

In the wake of the bungled hostage-rescue attempt in Iran--
Carter is the big loser--both as a political figure and as a world leader.
Rallying around the President in a time of crisis won't last long this time.

Carter is likely to keep his hold on the Democratic nomination, but a re-election victory against Reagan and Anderson in November will be tough now.

Dealings with Congress will get rocky. A Capitol Hill search for villains in the Iran fiasco is bound to rub dirt in Carter's wounds.

Failure of Carter to consult Congress before the strike will be the opening for another round of attempts to rein in the President's powers.

There will be plenty of other losers--and some winners, too.

U.S. military--An equipment failure in an operation so long in the planning makes the brass look inept. Congress will hunt for scalps but . . .

In the end, more money may be voted to improve military readiness.

U.S. intelligence--Was there faulty data on the weather near the Iranian staging area? Probably not, but Congress will check intelligence anyway.

Beef up the Central Intelligence Agency's undercover arm? Possible.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12TIME
5 May 1980

Debacle in The Desert

Carter's mission to rescue the hostages goes down in flames



Two lines of blue lights etched the outlines of the remote landing strip. Suddenly flames illuminated the night sky, then gradually flickered out. On the powdery sands of Dasht-e-Kavir, Iran's Great Salt Desert, lay the burned-out hulk of a lumbering U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft. Nearby rested the scorched skeleton of a U.S. Navy RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter. And in the wreckage were the burned bodies of eight American military air crewmen.

A few hours later, in a display of whipped-up outrage, the Iranian air force dispatched American-made F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers to blast the ruins of the charred aircraft and to disable four other undamaged Sea Stallions abandoned by the U.S. Ironically, as the rubble bounced, one Islamic Guard patrolling the site was killed and two others wounded.

The fire and the fury dramatized the dimensions of a new American tragedy—the inability of the U.S. to extricate 53 American hostages held by Iranian militants and the unstable, faction-torn government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In a startlingly bold but tragic gamble, President Jimmy Carter had ordered a courageous, specially trained team of American military commandos to try to pluck the hostages out of the heavily guarded U.S. embassy in Tehran. The supersecret operation failed dismally. It ended in the desert staging site, some 250 miles short of its target in the capital city. And for the world's most technologically sophisticated nation, the reason for aborting the rescue effort was particularly painful: three of the eight helicopters assigned to the mission developed electrical or hydraulic malfunctions that rendered them useless.

One of the many ironies of the entire mission was the fact that the C-130s were heading for a remote spot in the desert that the Iranians had feared might some day be used by U.S. forces. Indeed, they even had a map of the spot. It was discovered in the papers of Mahmoud Jaafarian, a pro-Shah counterinsurgency strategist who was executed after the revolution a year ago. Jaafarian was actually trying to burn the map when he was seized by the revolutionaries. Jaafarian told his captors that the staging site had been secretly built by the CIA with the Shah's knowledge, for possible emergency use. The Iranian air force proposed destroying the site, suspecting it might contain hidden navigational gear that could guide landing American planes. But so confused was the Iranian government that nothing was done about the matter. When an Iranian officer insisted upon a decision, he was told by a senior official: "The Americans must know the site is discovered. They won't ever consider using it."

Now the worst was over, but there were still great worries: Would the emotional militants at the U.S. embassy carry out their threats to kill the American hostages once they learned that an attempt had been made to free them by force? Would the mobs in Tehran go on any new rampage? How would the allies react? What about Soviet leaders? Just how much of the secret rescue plans could still be protected—and who might yet be hurt if they were not?

The President and his men moved into the larger Cabinet Room and sat down to a dinner of sandwiches. As they talked about limiting the damage, they were joined by Turner, who had been following the unfolding events from his CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. While Carter telephoned some foreign leaders and key members of Congress, Vance directed his staff at the State Department to get ready to inform the relatives of the hostages. The meeting ended at midnight, but each participant returned to his own office to work on into the night.

* * * *

The aftermath of the mission that had come to a bloody and unsuccessful end in an Iranian desert left conflicting feelings high in the ranks of the Administration that planned it. Some State Department officials felt that the whole venture had been badly timed—that it should have been either launched months ago, or postponed until later in the spring, after the U.S. had determined the success of the sanctions imposed by its allies. Said Richard Helms, former CIA chief and onetime Ambassador to Iran: "The timing is peculiar. You spend so much effort getting your allies to take some other line of approach. And just when you seem to be succeeding, you pull this caper."

But Carter's top aides remained confident that the mission had been well worth trying. "Nothing ventured, nothing gained," said one. "I have no regrets. If we could replay history, I would do it again."

Carter now has to rely even more on the power of economic sanctions to force Iran to give up the hostages. But the President made it clear in his extraordinary address to the nation on Friday morning that he is not about to rule out resorting to arms against a nation that ignores international law and defies the world.

EXCERPTED

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CIA AND JOURNALISTS

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ON PAGE A-22

NEW YORK TIMES
29 APRIL 1980

Letters

Reporters Who Spy

To the Editor:

My knowledge of the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency is insufficient to judge if the use of reporters in intelligence work is either useful or fair. However, The New York Times's April 14 editorial "Journalists Are Not Spies," criticizing Adm. Stansfield Turner, the director of the C.I.A., for suggesting such use, is a disgrace.

The Times has been rather consistent in defending people like Daniel Schorr. It is also the paper which published Seymour Hersh's disclosures of confidential intelligence information. Mr. Hersh is the reporter who, at a recent conference sponsored by Accuracy in Media, said with reference to national security: "The bottom line is that it is up to us. . . . It's your guy's job to keep secrets; it's our job to find out."

The New York Times is saying, in essence, that it is intolerable to suggest that reporters might be asked to spy on other countries, but it is quite in order and desirable for them to spy on their own country.

VICTOR ALIN

Wayne, Pa., April 17, 1980

WORCHESTER GAZETTE (MASS.)

12 APRIL 1980

Reporting for the CIA

Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, displayed a remarkable lack of understanding of the press this week when he told the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington he couldn't see why news organizations would object to their employees working at the same time for the CIA.

"I am sorry," Turner was quoted as saying, "I don't understand the connection that you make between serving your country and being free. I think you can do both."

Serving the country by freely informing its people is the goal of the American press. It is precisely for that reason that reporters and editors don't want to be on the payroll of the government — any government — while they are trying to report the news.

This is one of the distinctions between our system and that of the Soviets.

It is essential for foreign governments and citizens to be absolutely certain American reporters are not an arm of the American government. This is difficult enough without having the head of the CIA talking about enlisting newsmen in intelligence gathering.

Because the press is free and not

affiliated with the government, there is a vast amount of information freely available to anyone who wants it here.

Foreign intelligence agencies are said to have a relatively easy job gathering information about the United States because newspapers, magazines, radio and television make so much information available to all. If the CIA wants to know what reporters find out, they can read American publications and listen to American radio and television.

Turner said he has approved using American journalists to gather information three times, but the arrangements were never completed. He is entitled to ask journalists to cooperate, although George Bush, who directed the CIA in the mid 1970s, specifically prohibited using journalists to gather information.

If Turner feels such connections to be proper, it is incumbent on the journalistic profession, as organizations and as individuals if approached, to make it clear just where they stand.

Serving the country isn't the same thing as serving the CIA.

The best way for journalists to serve America is to report information fairly, clearly and independently — to everyone.

CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. VA.)
16 APRIL 1980

Serving two masters

IT IS EASY to say, as many have said, that whether a journalist wishes to be recruited for CIA work should be left up to the individual journalist. But what of the millions who rely upon the journalist to be independent, untouched by even "good" influences?

For that matter, what of the journalist's employer? Shouldn't he have a voice in the decision? More is involved here than an individual's right to use his free time as he sees fit. In most known cases, the CIA has engaged the services of foreign correspondents sent abroad at their employers' expense. This puts the matter in a different light.

Aside from the employer's right to resist paying the travel expenses of CIA agents, there is the matter of the objectivity the employer has a right to expect from writers sent abroad. Will the CIA point of view creep into commentary written by CIA writer-spies?

Very probably, we would say. Moreover, there is the more frightening possibility that commentary would be tailored to accommodate CIA programs. Human nature, we suspect, would make it impossible for a spy to ignore opportunities thus opened to him.

Stansfield Turner, the CIA director, implies that the news-gathering community is unpatriotic when it opposes efforts to merge the function of spy with the function of news reporting. He is surprised by the hostility of editors, publishers, and writers' organizations.

This is the shortsighted view of a man who obviously does not perceive that informing America of what is happening in the world — without the hand of government, without even the appearance of conflict, is itself a patriotic function deserving of special mention in the Constitution. It is a patriotic job the press cannot do if its writers are spies.

RALEIGH NEWS and OBSERVER (N.C.)
16 APRIL 1980

Spying, reporting don't mix

CIA Director Stansfield Turner says it would be naive to think that other nations assume that foreign journalists have no associations with intelligence agencies. Well, if foreign governments had any doubts, Turner and President Carter have assured them that the CIA indeed will use journalists as spies if the situation calls for it.

Turner has disclosed that he personally approved the use of journalists for covert activities on three occasions. It is beside the point that the three operations never got off the ground. When members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors challenged him on the policy last week, his response showed that he had little regard for the serious consequences of the policy. "I don't understand why you think if you accept an assignment from me that you are no longer free," he said.

The CIA policy has several serious implications for the news media and the American public.

First, it is crucial that journalists operate independently of government. Journalists, of course, talk to CIA agents and they often trade information within bounds. But having journalists on the CIA payroll is something far different.

How can correspondents on the CIA payroll maintain that their reporting of U.S. activities is unbiased, particularly if the topic is the CIA itself? How is one to know, for that matter, that such correspondents will not file deliberately misleading reports to serve some secret CIA end?

By extension, the CIA policy casts doubt on all foreign correspondents. Since the CIA is quite properly squeamish about identifying CIA operatives publicly, no one can know which correspondents may have been coopted and which have not.

Second, by confirming the CIA's willingness to use journalists as

agents, Turner may encourage other countries to place more restrictions on reporters than they would otherwise. Intelligence agencies say that American journalists have been valued as operatives because they have contacts in foreign governments and because they can ask questions without arousing suspicion. It is unlikely, however, that foreign officials give reporters secret information, since journalists generally publish what they learn.

Further, if foreign governments believe the CIA uses reporters as spies, their contacts in government are likely to be weakened. Reporters may no longer be able to ask questions without arousing suspicion if other governments wonder whether they are not what they represent themselves to be.

Finally, to say that the CIA policy threatens the independence of the press is to say nothing of the fact that it may actually endanger the lives of American foreign correspondents. Reporters routinely remain behind in areas of conflict after other Americans have been evacuated. And, if some journalists are CIA agents, even those who are not might be in greater jeopardy than otherwise. It should not be forgotten that the militants who seized the American embassy in Tehran seek to justify their actions by claiming that their hostages are spies.

The press obviously has self-interested reasons for opposing policies that may fetter journalists in their efforts to gather the news. But the public has a stake in the issue as well. The independence of the press is protected by the First Amendment not to serve the special interests of the news media but to assure the free flow of information, which is essential for democracy to function. To that end, news from other lands, as well as that from home, must be reported fully and unvarnished.

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FORMER EMPLOYEES IN THE NEWS

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501380001-7

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 9THE NATIONAL GUARDIAN
30 April 1980

Interview with ex-CIA agent Philip Agee

Phillip Agee, a former CIA agent, is fighting the U.S. State Department's illegal revocation of his passport in Hamburg, West Germany. Author of "Inside the Company: My Life with the CIA," and other writings on the U.S. intelligence gathering system, Agee has been hounded by the federal government for several years because of his divulgence of CIA secrets.

In the following interview, conducted by Guardian correspondent Phil Hill in Hamburg, Agee comments on current attempts to draft a new CIA charter and to ease legislative restraints on the agency's activities.

There's a lot of talk recently about "unleashing" the CIA. To what extent has CIA covert action actually been unleashed over the past five years?

Not much at all—legally. But secret intervention diminished somewhat, I think, because of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 which requires the President to certify that he has personally approved all covert action operations. He is also obliged to inform four committees in the House and four committees in the Senate.

There are around 200 people on these committees, so the large number of people makes it almost certain that important operations will not be kept secret. The amendment prevents operations from going forward because officials are afraid they will be leaked or revealed. And there are a number of cases where that is exactly what is happening. So the CIA is fighting as hard as it can to repeal Hughes-Ryan. And when I say CIA I just don't mean that particular agency but the whole national security lobby in Washington.

Was any attempt made by the administration during the past five years to initiate covert action under the Hughes-Ryan procedure?

Sure. The agency and the congressional committees have never denied that covert actions have continued; in fact they have admitted that they have. The CIA director even admitted in Senate testimony there had been exceptions when the President did not notify the committees "in timely fashion" of certain covert actions. It's impossible to say how many operations—small or large—were undertaken in the past five years, but there's no doubt that they have continued.

Do you think that Hughes-Ryan has been a factor in the failure of the U.S. to intervene in Nicaragua or Iran, for example, to prevent the overthrow of friendly regimes?

Well, we know that actions have continued, but we also know that high-level officials at the CIA have complained that the requirement to notify eight committees has severely impeded their possibilities for engaging in certain types of operations.

I think there's an element of truth in the claim that the amendment has made covert action more difficult, but only for fear of exposure. I also don't think that anything short of overt military intervention would have saved regimes in Nicaragua or Iran. The uprisings in both those countries occurred despite all that the CIA and U.S. military have done over the years to support those regimes. Those movements show how effective popular opposition can be, no matter who or what is on the other side.

Then the movements were getting too strong to stop. Wasn't Vietnam the first example of that, and wasn't it also Vietnam that caused the restrictions to be placed on the agency in the first place?

We shouldn't forget that what the CIA was doing to "stabilize" Nicaragua and Iran it was also doing in Vietnam during the 1950s. It was the failure of those operations in Vietnam that led to the overt military intervention in the 1960s. The main thing illustrated by Vietnam, Nicaragua and Iran is that there are ways to defeat secret intervention and both covert and overt support for repressive regimes.

To what extent is the Afghan guerrilla movement a creation of the CIA and to what extent is it a genuine indigenous movement?

There's no doubt that there was real opposition to the changes begun in April 1978 when [Noor Muhammad] Taraki took over the government. These changes, such as the emancipation of women, land reform and literacy programs, were certainly of great value, but they were opposed because they attacked the traditional power of certain groups in Afghanistan. This is something which the CIA would certainly take advantage of, if only because Taraki was a communist.

I can't say if covert support for the rebels started prior to the Soviet intervention, but if I had to guess I would say it started in 1978, through Pakistan, most likely. Neither the Soviets nor the Afghan government has, so far as I have seen, given any concrete evidence of outside support to the rebels prior to the Soviet intervention. But it's important to realize that the CIA has traditionally worked with refugees in order to support counterrevolutionary movements—in Eastern Europe, in Vietnam in the 1960s, Cuba in the 1960s, etc.


Is it possible then that the CIA has just managed for once to latch onto a genuinely popular movement in Afghanistan?

I don't support the Soviet intervention certainly. I think it

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was a serious mistake on their part. There was certainly opposition to the programs that began in 1978, but it's impossible to say what the effect of outside support has been for this opposition. The unfortunate thing, I think, is that these reforms were not sufficiently sold to the Afghan people in order to prevent the traditional feudal powers from having the success they had.

Now the other part of the Afghan question is of course the geopolitical one, and it is there, I think, that there has been an overreaction from Washington. President Carter has been following the surge of nationalism following the Iran embassy takeover. You might even call it chauvinism on his part—that and his own seemingly hopeless position in the reelection campaign at that time—were key reasons for his seizing on Afghanistan to puff himself up even more. He's using the Afghan situation for domestic political reasons. I don't believe that the Soviets are marching toward the Persian Gulf from Afghanistan.



Philip Agee.

If the hostage question is solved soon, do you think that the U.S. would be able to use the argument that it and Iran are more or less on the same side against the Soviets to gain a foothold in Iran again?

They probably will try that approach. But I don't think the CIA will find Iran a fertile field for conducting operations. The chances are a lot of their contacts were killed or left during the revolutionary period, or just after the fall of the shah. I would think it would be very difficult for them to recruit Iranians of any real importance to work for them in the near future. One possibility is if there's a civil war in Iran, then the CIA might be able to provision one side or another.

The recent developments concerning your passport are related to the hostage situation in Iran, aren't they? What's the story there?

The passport business arose because I had proposed that one possibly quick solution might be for the Iranians to accept a substitute for the shah. This was when he was still in the U.S. Perhaps they might accept the CIA's files on its operations in Iran since the 1950s as a substitute for the shah.

It seemed to me that a very quick solution to the hostage crisis might be available. I spoke with the militants in the embassy in Tehran from my flat here by telephone. I have a little booklet which is made for American businessmen who travel overseas that has the numbers and addresses of all U.S. embassies and consulates. So I had the embassy phone number in Tehran and I just dialed it direct from here in Hamburg. Someone answered the phone and I said "is this the American embassy in Tehran?" He said, "no, this is the nest of spies." And I said, "well, my name is Philip Agee and I want to speak to someone there about an idea I have." And he said, "oh, we know your name and, as a matter of fact, I read your book."

So I told them about the idea of accepting the files as a substitute for the shah. They said they'd think about it. And on the very next day, a Sunday, an officer from the U.S. consulate here came over and delivered a letter saying my passport had been revoked. Obviously they worked very fast on it. I don't know whether it had to do with the phone call, whether they had monitored it. But it was very fast work, and for them to have the consul come over here on a Sunday means they were pretty hysterical.

What happened eventually with the proposal to substitute the CIA files for the shah?

I got a call back from the Tehran embassy on Christmas morning. They told me they had considered the idea and thought it was a good one, that it had possibilities, but that they wanted the shah. They also said they already knew what the CIA had been doing in Iran for the past 30 years.

You mean they knew about the CIA activities because of the files in the embassy?

No, they said the farmers know it because of their poverty, the intellectuals know it because of their imprisonment, the religious community knows it because of repression and the students know it because of their slain comrades. So they said, "we don't really need the files to know what's been going on here. We want the shah."

I thought if they got the files they could show the day-in, day-out links between the CIA and SAVAK, [the Iranian secret police under the shah], how all the money came for setting up the shah and SAVAK in the 1950s, where all the training originated, how the equipment got there. But they weren't so interested in these details. They wanted to put the shah on trial.

Were you prepared to go to Iran to help them if they did get the documents?

I had no plans to travel to Tehran and I hadn't been invited, contrary to press reports planted in the states. I wouldn't go to Tehran while the hostages were still being held. But I think it's very important for Americans to understand why all this happened. The core of the problem is the CIA's work with the shah and SAVAK over many years. If in the 1980s this kind of activity is revived or expands into other countries, there will surely be strong reactions eventually. And no one should be surprised either when the next round of fury and hatred for the U.S. breaks out in another country.

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What about the legislation in Congress now to make the naming of CIA agents a crime? Would that affect your work?

The bill wouldn't affect me very much. They're trying to prevent other ex-CIA people from making revelations in the 1980s and 1990s. Other people already know how to spot CIA cover positions. It's quite easy to do. They call this the "anti-Agee bill," but as I said, it wouldn't affect me.

It would have a big impact, though, on the people in Washington working with the Covert Action Information Bulletin. They use perfectly unclassified information—public records—to name names; and it's pretty clear that where the bill affects non-CIA people it would be unconstitutional. If the bill does pass, my colleagues in Washington might go to court immediately to try to get it ruled unconstitutional. The reason the CIA wants that legislation so badly is that they've found out in the past five years that it's possible for just a few people to do a lot of damage to their activities. They exaggerate somewhat, of course, about what we've done to them, but we have had an effect, I think.

What other legislative efforts are there to help the CIA get back to business as usual?

The main attempt over the past few years—in addition to the Hughes-Ryan repeal and the naming names bill—has been the idea of enacting a charter for the agency and for the FBI as well. The purpose of the charter legislation is supposedly to prevent the abuses of the past, but in reality it would authorize the CIA to do practically everything it did before. So there is a real danger in the 1980s of Presidents using the agency as before.

What do you think activists in the U.S. should be doing now to stop these attempts to "unleash" the CIA? What should be the main focus of activity be?

There ought to be a campaign to sustain the Hughes-Ryan amendment. The whole movement to rehabilitate the CIA as an arm of clandestine intervention ought to be opposed. I'm not really familiar enough with the situation in the U.S. to know if these efforts could succeed or not—and by succeed, I don't mean just in terms of defeating particular bills, but rather as a way of raising consciousness, of using the issue for political education.

I've always said that the main concern is not really with the CIA, but with the people who run the U.S.—The CIA acts as their instrument—these are the people who run the multinational corporations, who own the banks, who control the traditional political process, the professionals who service all of them and the military-industrial interlock.

This relatively small group of people have a need for the CIA and what it's been doing over the years. And until changes occur in the U.S. in terms of political power and economic control, there will be a need for the CIA from the point of view of this small minority. But the CIA issue is a very useful one because it leads directly to the more basic questions. I think people should work on it from that perspective.

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ON PAGE **A-27**

NEW YORK TIMES
27 APRIL 1980

TERRORIST TRAINING IS LAID TO 3 BY U.S.

Grand Jurors Link Some Deaths to
Project Allegedly Established
for Explosives Schooling

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25 — Federal agents arrested Frank K. E. Terpil, a suspected international arms dealer, on Friday after a Federal grand jury returned an indictment that accused him of shipping explosives abroad, conspiring to commit murder and training terrorists in Libya.

The indictment charged that Mr. Terpil and two other Americans conspired to supply explosives to Libya while teaching other people how to make explosives in a terrorist-training project. As part of this, the grand jury said, the three arranged to have ashtrays, lamps, alarm clocks, flower vases, refrigerators, television sets and radios turned into bombs with concealed explosives.

The indictment said that "one or more of these bombs killed several Libyans" and injured three Americans who were involved in the terrorist training project. The deaths and injuries were accidental, according to Assistant United States Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr.

Accused in Manhattan Case

The 40-year-old Mr. Terpil, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, was arrested last December in Manhattan, where prosecutors said that he had tried to sell 10,000 machine guns to undercover detectives. The Manhattan District Attorney, Robert M. Morgenthau, said that Mr. Terpil had sold \$3.2 million worth of arms and other goods to former President Idi Amin of Uganda. Mr. Terpil was released in \$100,000 bail and is awaiting trial in that case.

The indictment returned Friday mentioned only Libya, not Uganda. Indicted with Mr. Terpil, but not arrested, were Edwin P. Wilson, described as the president of Consultants International, a consulting and marketing organization, and Jerome S. Brower, president of an explosives manufacturing company in Pomona, Calif.

In an interview last month at his home in McLean, Va., Mr. Terpil acknowledged selling military products and other items to Libya and Uganda, but he insisted that he had not violated any laws.

Mr. Barcella said that Mr. Terpil was arrested about noon at the Secret Service Training Academy in Beltsville, Md., where he was trying to sell some of his products.

The arrest was made by agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. A Federal magistrate ordered Mr. Terpil held in \$100,000 bail. He is to be arraigned next Friday.

The magistrate issued a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Wilson, who was believed in North Africa or Europe. The Government said Federal investigators had notified Mr. Brower's lawyer of the indictment and expected him in court next Friday.

The indictment said that Mr. Terpil had used his association with the C.I.A. to recruit someone to murder a former member of the Libya's ruling Revolutionary Council, Umar Abdullah Muhayshi. Mr. Terpil and Mr. Wilson were said to have offered to pay the assassin \$1 million and, according to the indictment, Mr. Wilson delivered \$30,000 in expenses. The killing was not carried out, Mr. Barcella said.

The indictment also said Mr. Terpil and Mr. Wilson acted as Libyan agents without notifying the State Department. It added that the three men distributed payments in cash and, on other occasions, through bank accounts in Switzerland in an effort to conceal payments for work done in connection with the training of Libyan terrorists.

They also hired "numerous American citizens" and shipped high explosives on commercial cargo aircraft to conceal the nature of their activities from Federal authorities, the indictment said.

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ON PAGE **B-8**

WASHINGTON STAR
26 APRIL 1980

2 Ex-CIA Aides Indicted For Libya Terror Plan Role

From News Services

A federal grand jury has indicted two former CIA employees on charges they conspired to smuggle explosives to Libya for a terror training project and to plot the \$1 million assassination of a Libyan defector, it was disclosed yesterday.

The grand jury, which returned a sealed indictment Wednesday, also charged a California explosives manufacturer with lying under oath to cover up the conspiracy.

The three are charged with supplying the explosives for the program, for use in such household items as ashtrays, lamps, alarm clocks, flower vases and boxes of tea.

The indictment was made public with the arrest in Beltsville, Md., of Frank Terpil, 42, a former CIA employee also alleged to have sold the Ugandan government of Idi Amin more than \$3 million in surveillance and special weapons.

The indictment was kept under seal for two days while federal authorities tried to locate one of the men, who still has not been found. The other ex-CIA official, Edwin Wilson, 52, is believed to be out of the country. Wilson's lawyers declined comment yesterday.

Also named in the 10-count indictment was Jerome Brower, president of J.S. Brower and Associates, an explosives manufacturer in Pomona, Calif., who allegedly lied to the grand jury about his sales to Wilson and Terpil.

The indictment charges Wilson and Terpil conspired to sell the Libyan government explosives and timing devices and to hire demolition experts "necessary to make explosive devices and to teach others how to make explosive devices in a terrorist training project."

Wilson and Terpil allegedly shipped hundreds of pounds of explosives to Libya in 1976 and 1977.

The indictment said "one or more of these bombs killed several Libyans and injured three American employees" of Wilson, but did not elaborate on the circumstances. Sources said the explosion was an accident at a terrorist training site.

It is alleged the two men conspired to use their CIA association to hire an assassin to murder Umar Abdullah Muhayshi, a former member of the Libyan Revolutionary Council. Muhayshi had defected to Egypt.

The two ex-intelligence agents, in seeking to hire an American as an assassin, sought to leave the impression "that the planned murder was sponsored and supported by the CIA or some other government's intelligence agency," according to the charges.

Sources said the American rejected the \$1 million offer when, in a meeting with Wilson and Terpil in Geneva, he learned the United States was not behind the plot.

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ON PAGE **B1-5**

THE WASHINGTON POST
26 April 1980

3 Indicted In Terrorist Aid Scheme

2 Ex-CIA Agents Accused of Sending Supplies to Libya

By Laura A. Kiernan
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have been indicted for conspiracy, along with the president of a California-based explosive firm, in connection with the operation of a secret training school for terrorists, financed by the Libyan government.

The former CIA employee, Edwin P. Wilson, 51, of Upperville, Va., and Frank E. Terpil, 40, of McLean, were also charged by the grand jury with recruiting an American citizen in 1976 to assassinate a former member of the Libyan Revolutionary Council for a \$1 million fee.

Federal prosecutors contended at a court hearing yesterday that the alleged murder plot, which was never carried out, was among the services the two men provided to the Libyan government. The target of the alleged assassination plot had been involved in an unsuccessful attempt in 1975 to overthrow the government of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi, the prosecutors said.

Law enforcement authorities believe that Wilson, a retired CIA operative who runs a small Washington consulting firm, is now in Libya or Europe. The U.S. Attorney's office here obtained a bench warrant for his arrest shortly after a U.S. District Court grand jury returned the 10-count indictment Wednesday. The indictment was unsealed yesterday.

Terpil was arrested by federal agents yesterday afternoon at the U.S. Secret Service training academy in Beltsville, where he was attending a law enforcement trade show. U.S. Magistrate Lawrence S. Margolis yesterday ordered Terpil held on a \$100,000 cash bond.

The third man, Jerome S. Brower, 60, president of J.S. Brower and Associ-

ates of Pomona, Calif., is scheduled to appear voluntarily in the U.S. District Court here Friday for arraignment on the conspiracy charge.

Brower is also a consultant on explosives to the joint House-Senate Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), which is working on antiterrorism legislation, federal sources said yesterday.

The indictment charges that Wilson, Terpil and Brower conspired to ship a variety of high-powered explosives, explosive boosters, electric blasting caps and other hazardous materials to Libya in connection with the terrorist training project.

As part of the conspiracy, the indictment alleges the men recruited American citizens, some of whom were former military weapons experts, to construct explosive devices in Libya and teach others the assembly process.

The indictment says the three men claimed they were working on a minefield clearing project in Libya, and used cash or concealed money received and paid out in connection with the terrorist training project in Swiss bank accounts.

According to the indictment, explosive devices were hidden in a variety of commonplace items, from alarm clocks, television sets and attache cases to ashtrays, lamps, flower vases and a gift box of tea.

The grand jury alleged that in July 1977, some of those bombs killed several Libyans and injured three Americans employed by Wilson in an explosion near Tobruk in Northeast Libya.

The indictment charges that Wilson, Terpil and Brower knew when they arranged for the shipments of explosives that they would be used to kill and injure people or set to destroy buildings and vehicles.

Federal laws prohibit transportation overseas of explosives that are intended for illegal use, exportation of certain explosives without a license are charged with conspiring to violate those laws, and with actually violating them.

Wilson and Terpil were each also charged with illegally acting as and transportation of hazardous materials that pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety. All three men are charged with conspiring with the Libyan government, and with conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder in connection with the alleged assassination plot.

Brower was also charged with two counts of making false statements to the grand jury in connection with its investigation of Wilson and Terpil.

The indictment unsealed yesterday followed a two-year investigation by the U.S. Attorney's office in Washington, along with agents from the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The investigation began in 1976 when the CIA received information that some of its former officers were allegedly involved in selling explosive devices and other materials overseas, according to published reports.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner fired two mid-level agency employees, who the reports said, had introduced Edwin Wilson to firms that supply sensitive equipment to the intelligence agency.

Wilson, once described as a John Wayne look-alike, retired from the CIA in 1971. A former Marine, he is reportedly an explosive expert and logistics specialist who once worked as a foreign intelligence expert for the Navy.

Wilson and his wife own a huge farm in Upperville, Va., where they raise horses and cattle.

Various law enforcement sources have described Terpil as one of the world's leading dealers in weapons, explosives and other devices, which he allegedly has sold overseas since 1975.

At Terpil's bond hearing yesterday Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella told the federal magistrate that Terpil had signed a \$3.2 million contract with Uganda's former head of state, Idi Amin, to provide, among other things, exploding attache cases, guns, electronic equipment and "a variety of other draconian sounding items."

Barcella told the court that Terpil allegedly had boasted to police in New York about his dealings with Uganda, and told them of poisons being used on test subjects and targets there.

Barcella, who conducted the investigation along with Assistant U.S. Attorney Carol E. Bruce, FBI agent William Hart and Special Agents Richard Pedersen and Richard Wads-

worth of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, alleged that some of Terpil's tales were like Ian Fleming novels. But some of the information was true, Barcella said.

Terpil and another arms dealer, George Gregory Korkala, were arrested in New York on weapons charges in December.

A communications specialist who left the CIA in 1971, Terpil eventually posted a \$100,000 bond in New York and was released from custody. Terpil told court officials he has been the head of marketing for a firm called Technology Transfer, located on Connecticut Avenue in Washington.

Terpil and Brower are scheduled to appear before U.S. District Court Judge John Pratt Friday.

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ON PAGE 18

PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
25 APRIL 1980

High Court Ends Snepp's Fight to Keep Royalties

The Supreme Court has denied Frank Snepp his last chance to stave off an order that he pay the royalties from his book "Decent Interval" (Random House) to the federal government for violation of a CIA secrecy agreement.

The Court on April 14 refused without comment to grant Snepp a rehearing to present arguments his lawyers said should have been heard in advance of the Court's landmark February 19 decision against Snepp. Supreme Court rehearings are very rare.

As a result of the Court's final move, Snepp must write a check to the Treasury Department for about \$118,000 in a "constructive trust" for the government's use by the end of May. That figure represents only domestic sales.

Snepp's American Civil Liberties Union lawyers argued that the Court had overstepped its bounds when it issued an unprecedented order for the "constructive trust" without even taking oral arguments in the matter.

The case had been appealed to the Supreme Court from a Court of Appeals, which had upheld part of a District Court decision against Snepp. Lawyer Mark Lynch argued in the written appeal for rehearing that the "constructive trust" issue had been dropped at the Appeals Court level and therefore the Supreme Court overstepped its constitutional authority "by issuing an advisory opinion on a controversy which does not exist between the parties."

Lynch also argued that the Court didn't consider an argument that there was no legal authority for the CIA to require the secrecy agreement that Snepp signed. And, Lynch said, even that agreement was superseded by another one that Snepp signed when he resigned from the agency in 1976.

Lynch said there is no "statutory authorization for the CIA's system of prior restraint," raising the question of whether the agency can impose a "requirement of prepublication review of all writings as a condition of employment with the agency."

The brief also argued that "it is fundamentally unreasonable to place the power of censorship in the hands of those who may be criticized and embarrassed by publication." And further, the brief said, "the CIA's prepublication review process applies only to writing and not to speaking. Snepp

must forfeit his royalties because he wrote a book, "yet if he told exactly the same story to a journalist . . . he would face no penalty."

In Snepp's view, the Court's final action has ironic consequences. "I'll be working for the U.S. government once again," he told PW in an interview after the ruling.

Snepp now must take his royalties from escrow and pay the government. Still, he said, he will continue promoting the book. The weekend following the court ruling he left for London and Paris to promote European editions even though all his royalties will continue to go to the U.S. Treasury.

Snepp also faces confiscation of his income from two of three other books he has either written or planned. Two of them already have been sold to his publisher, Random House, whom Snepp compliments for helping him out financially during the protracted court proceedings over "Decent Interval."

A completed manuscript titled "Convergence of Interest" could also be enjoined under the Court rulings, Snepp said his lawyer told him. Although the book is fiction, the plot has the CIA involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Snepp said he still is negotiating with Random House on that book, and that he and his lawyers have plans for using that book to publicize their contention that "for the first time an author has been forced to submit his imagination to censorship."

The two books Random House has bought, he said, include another fiction work that is still "a glint in my eye," and that also deals with the Kennedy assassination, and a nonfiction work based upon his court case, titled "Ir-

reparable Harm," a phrase taken from the government's contention that publication of "Decent Interval" caused irreparable harm to national security. That book is scheduled to be delivered to the publisher August 1, but Snepp acknowledged some slippage, "given myriad problems in simply eating."

Random House has aided by pushing ahead some of his advances on the new books under contract, and journalist friends have helped out with loans.

One of his problems in keeping speaking engagements, Snepp said, is that his speeches all have to be extemporaneous. He is seeking clarification from the CIA, he said, but as it now stands the CIA's strictures on his writings appear to cover notes or outlines for speeches.

As he reads his injunctions, Snepp said, the nonfiction work must and will be submitted to the CIA for review. He indicated he will make a stand on the fiction works, but wouldn't say how.

HOWARD FIELDS

SAN JOSE NEWS
8 APRIL 1980

High court ruling stalls book by ex-CIA worker

By Stephen C. Gruber
Staff Writer

A stack of galley proofs and a dust cover lying on a table in a small room in the backyard of his Los Altos home are the only tangible reminders of Wilbur C. Eveland's book about the Near East and his employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA and a U.S. Supreme Court decision known as the Frank Snapp case are standing between Eveland and publication of the book, titled, "Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East."

Eveland, who worked for the CIA as a contract employee during the Eisenhower administration, said Friday that the book contains no information that would damage this nation's security.

The CIA, on the other hand, says it has the right to review the book before it is published because of an agreement Eveland signed in 1957.

Eveland said he asked for a copy of the agreement but he hasn't gotten it yet, even though he started trying a year ago. He agrees he probably signed some agreement midway through his five years with the CIA, but he doesn't recall exactly what he was agreeing to.

The book was on the verge of publication two weeks ago when Eveland heard from the CIA, which asserted its right to review the book prior to publication.

He believes he has the right to go ahead with the book, but he doesn't want to become enmeshed in the same legal battle that cost former CIA agent Frank Snapp all the profits

from his book about the CIA.

Snapp had signed an agreement with the CIA that essentially gave the CIA the right to reject any publication by Snapp about his CIA experiences. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a "constructive trust" could be imposed on Snapp that would prevent him from making any money from the book, Eveland said.

The CIA's demands didn't come in time to prevent the publisher, W.W. Norton & Co., from distributing galley copies of the book to reviewers. The book already has been reviewed in this week's issue of Publisher's Weekly.

CIA spokesman Herbert Hotu said the CIA reviews transcripts for classified information, "but we don't take out anything critical of the agency just because it's critical."

Hotu said the CIA did not insist that Eveland change his publication schedule. Eveland, however, said he wants to know before the book is published if the CIA has any objections to it in order to avoid the penalties imposed on Snapp.

The book covers the history of the Near East and Middle East from 1918 to the present and blames the United States for many of the problems there.

Eveland spent 1950 to 1975 either working in the Near East and Middle East or, as he describes it, "commuting there."

Five of those years were spent with the CIA as a loaned employee from the National Security Council when Eveland, 61, worked with governments on such items as military arms agreements.

After leaving government service, he worked with several construction firms and oil companies to obtain foreign government clearances for projects.

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CHARTER LEGISLATION
(WATCH OUT NEXT WEEK)

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NEW YORK TIMES
1 MAY 1980

Intelligence Agency Charter Faltering in Congress

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 30 — The likelihood that Congress will pass comprehensive legislation this year to codify some legal restraints on the national intelligence agencies seemed to lessen today.

The House Intelligence Committee refused to follow a recommendation by its chairman that it ask the full House to delay adopting a measure meant to encourage more covert intelligence operations by the Central Intelligence Committee so that the measure could be included in intelligence charter legislation.

Meanwhile, the Senate Intelligence Committee postponed until tomorrow the start of formal consideration of a charter bill that has already been extensively altered.

Pressure to 'Unleash' Agencies

A basic issue since January has been whether to try to pass a comprehensive bill that would give a new authorization to the national intelligence effort, set some restrictions on it and sweep aside some existing laws and restraints that the Central Intelligence Agency sees as inhibiting it from acting effectively. Strong forces in both the Senate and House favor

merely passing measures to "unleash" to intelligence agencies.

The 171-page intelligence charter was introduced last January by Senator Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky. After the charter ran into opposition from both the Carter Administration and some members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, it was rewritten into a much shorter proposal that would not require the President to give the intelligence committees of Congress prior notice of covert operations in all cases.

But days have passed without enough Congressional agreement to permit making the new text public. Some conservatives want no charter at all, and some liberals now believe that too many concessions have been made to the Carter Administration and the intelligence agencies, some Senate sources said.

At a meeting of the House Intelligence Committee this morning, the chairman, Representative Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts, at first argued that the committee should ask the full House to postpone acting on a measure passed by another committee that would reduce the number of Congressmen eligible to receive secret intelligence reports.

When it became apparent that a majority of the committee was more eager to act to unencumber the C.I.A. than to protect their legislative prerogative, Mr. Boland withdrew his suggestion and no vote was taken.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted on March 12 to change a 1974 law, known as the Hughes-Ryan amendment, that made it possible for a total of eight Congressional committees to receive secret reports about C.I.A. covert operations abroad. The Foreign Affairs Committee voted that only the House and Senate Intelligence Committees should receive such briefings and voted its own version of a formula that would permit the President to avoid giving prior notification of such covert operations.

The Foreign Affairs Committee bill said the President might defer giving the intelligence committee such reports "for the shortest practicable period" if he certified that this deferral was "essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States" or was essential to avoid "unreasonable" risk to personnel or of the revelation of intelligence methods.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A13

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 May 1980

House Panel Yields On Separate Bill on CIA Covert Actions

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

In a move that seemed to weaken chances for a new charter for the CIA, the House Intelligence Committee decided yesterday not to try to block enactment of a separate law governing covert agency operations.

Several members voiced misgivings over the adoption of piecemeal bills to strengthen the CIA's hand, but the committee was plainly unprepared to recommend a bill of its own for covert activities.

The proposed new rule for the CIA's covert operations, providing for much more secrecy, was adopted last month by the House Foreign Affairs Committee as part of this year's foreign aid legislation.

It would restrict reports to Congress about covert actions to the House and Senate Intelligence committees and allowed the president to avoid prior notice whenever he deems it essential.

Yesterday was the deadline for intervention by the House Intelligence Committee before the foreign aid bill moves to the House floor.

Rep. Edward Boland (D-Mass.) suggested that the committee seek a delay of four to six weeks so it could report out its own rule for covert actions as part of a "scaled-down charter" for the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

He said he was confident the committee could have a charter ready by then.

The Republicans disagreed. Rep. J. Kenneth Robinson (R-Va.) said he and the four other GOP members of the 14-man committee did not feel it possible "to report out a revised charter within a certain time."

Comprehensive charter legislation has been bogged down since its introduction in the Senate in February, partly because of the Carter administration's opposition to a prior-notice rule for covert actions. The Senate Intelligence Committee has been attempting to come up with a scaled-down "mini-charter" that would resolve this and other issues, but markup sessions have been repeatedly delayed.

On the House side, several Democrats on the Intelligence Committee complained that the exceptions to prior notice, which the Foreign Affairs Committee approved March 12, were much too broad.

In the end, however, the committee agreed without formal vote, on a proposal by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) to write a report posing no objection to the separate law but reminding the House at the same time that the Intelligence Committee may come up with another version later as part of a charter.

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ON PAGE 12A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
1 MAY 1980

Freedom of information

An 'unshackled' CIA is dangerous

To the Editor:

I commend the editorial of April 23 titled, "Unshackling the CIA won't give it intelligence."

As a victim of CIA spying, I testified recently before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence against Senate Bill 2284, which would have legalized the abuses prohibited in the original CIA charter. The proposed limiting of dissemination of information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) would give the CIA an opportunity to protect itself from the embarrassment of revealing its mistakes, its illegal activities and its failure to properly evaluate intelligence material.

It was through information obtained under the FOIA that much of the CIA's illegal and unconstitutional activities in the past were revealed. Yet even this material, when we received it, was so extensively censored that some pages were completely blank to protect the rights of informers and agents.

It is truly an Alice in Wonderland concept to think that the rights of informers engaging in illegal activities need to be protected by the blanket of national security while the rights of Americans and organizations

openly exercising their constitutional privileges should be violated and kept hidden by the intelligence agency.

The files we obtained on Women Strike for Peace included Xerox copies of our own newsletters, correspondence and even notices of "White Elephant" sales.

The bills before the Senate would continue to allow the CIA to spy on American citizens and engage in fishing expeditions that would authorize surveillance of innocent Americans and could involve burglarizing their homes, reading their mail, infiltrating their organizations or bugging conversations.

All of this illegal activity could be done under a section which states — "Counterintelligence... activities may be directed against United States persons concerned, only on the 'basis of facts' or 'circumstances' which reasonably indicate that the person is or may be engaged in clandestine intelligence activity." If a person inadvertently spoke to someone the CIA had targetted as suspicious, that person could be a victim of surveillance without his knowledge.

An "unshackled" CIA resulted

in the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran and his replacement by the shah, whose denial of human rights was the catalyst for the holding of hostages today.

The role of the CIA in Chile, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; to name a few, are all examples of an unshackled agency that cannot forget its World War II Office of Strategic Services origins.

The CIA's drug-pushing program, which resulted in at least one death we know of, and the poison testing program in cities should have resulted in the arrest and conviction of those agents guilty of the crimes. We have no way of determining whether such acts continue to be carried out, and if the CIA continues unshackled, we will never know.

The editorial properly states that "The primary mission of the Agency is not covert operations... it is to gather intelligence, to analyze it and disseminate it to those who need it." The American people should not accept anything more.

ETHEL TAYLOR
Women Strike for Peace
Bala Cynwyd.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-18

NEW YORK TIMES
30 APRIL 1980

Seoul's Intelligence Chief Pledges An End of Political Surveillance

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, April 29 — The newly named acting director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency said today that his organization would no longer be used for political surveillance or be allowed to interfere with government.

In announcing plans to end the practices that prevailed during the rule of the late President Park Chung Hee, the acting director, Lieut. Gen. Chon Too Hwan, said, "The agency's main function will in the future deal with undercover activities relating to collection of anti-Communist intelligence, and its past interference with government and other organizations will be stopped."

The general's statements, made to reporters, were prominently displayed in South Korean newspapers, as they were the first authoritative comment on the political activities of the agency, which was established in 1963.

Soon after its inception, the agency won notoriety both at home and abroad. It was accused of kidnapping South Korean students from West Germany in 1967 and of abducting Kim Dae Jung, a prominent opposition politician, from a Tokyo hotel in 1973. According to testimony at Congressional hearings in Washington, the members of the agency's staff harassed South Korean citizens living in the United States opposed to the Government of President Park, who was assassinated last October.

Watch Kept on Many Groups

Here in South Korea, the organization's agents routinely watched over various departments of the Government as well as private organizations, including churches, universities, newspapers and business bodies. Although the law governing its activities limits its functions to the overseeing of state security, it was flexibly applied to permit the harassment

and jailing of opposition politicians, clergymen, writers and journalists opposed to the authoritarian rule of President Park.

"A time has come," General Chon said today, "for the agency to make a fresh start as an organization modest and loyal to the people and dedicated to the nation's security."

The 49-year-old army general, who also heads the Defense Security Command, South Korea's powerful military intelligence-investigative unit, was appointed two weeks ago to serve concurrently as acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

His comments to Korean reporters came several hours after he dismissed two deputy directors of the agency. So Jong Hwa, a former Deputy Minister of Interior and a nonpolitical figure, has been appointed the new deputy director.

Agency to Be 'Streamlined'

General Chon said he was "streamlining" the agency, which has thousands of men and women on its payroll, and reorganizing it. He said its numerous departments, which sometimes overlap, would be merged and simplified.

Military sources said that General Chon had been chosen to purge the agency because he has emerged since December as one of the country's most powerful men. He rose to prominence after he arrested Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, who was then the Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander, on Dec. 12 on the ground that General Chung had not acted swiftly enough to arrest President Park's assassin, Kim Jae Kyu.

General Chon today strongly denied that his holding of the two most sensitive intelligence posts might affect the Government's plans for liberalizing the political system following the death of President Park.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 31THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
1 May 1980

An Australian Bank Faces Many Charges In Fiction-Like Case

**Nugan Hand Chairman Found
Dead, Accused of Stealing;
A CIA Link Is Alleged**

A WALL STREET JOURNAL News Roundup
It has all the elements of a fictional thriller: The chairman of an international banking company is found dead under questionable circumstances. The bank goes into insolvency and the new chairman charges the late chairman with misappropriating millions of dollars. Investigators hear tenuous—and unproven—allegations that the bank associated with drug dealers and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The bank is the Cayman Islands-registered Nugan Hand Bank of Sydney, Australia. The bank is part of Nugan Hand Ltd., which is in the hands of provisional liquidators and which was the main company in the Nugan Hand International Group. The bank had operations in Australia, Hong Kong and West Germany and representative offices in about 10 other locations in Southeast Asia, Europe and the Americas, including three resident representatives in the U.S. Nugan Hand Ltd. recently changed its name to Nuhan Proprietary Ltd.

The former chairman, Francis J. Nugan, 35 years old, was found dead in his car Jan. 27 on a lonely road outside Sydney, with a bullet wound in his head and a rifle beside his body. Weeks later, with an audit under way in Australia, the bank's Hong Kong company stopped taking deposits and repaying customers. In Singapore, authorities arrested a local official of Nugan Hand on suspicion of conducting banking business without a license. And authorities in Malaysia are making preliminary inquiries into the group's activities there.

In Sydney, the late Mr. Nugan's partner and the current chairman, Michael Hand, told an inquest into Mr. Nugan's death that the late chairman had misappropriated "several million dollars" from the bank and that he had also made loans of \$3.3 million to persons and groups whose identity isn't known. "I'm advised by solicitors and accountants that there is little chance of recovering any of these moneys," the former American Green Beret officer stated in an affidavit.

"The company is insolvent and unable to pay its debts as they fall due," he said.

The provisional liquidators are expected to present their findings to the Supreme Court in the Australian state of New South Wales June 27. Meanwhile, that state's Corporate Affairs Commission has confirmed that one of the matters it's looking into is whether Nugan Hand Bank was involved in funneling CIA funds into Australia. Among the items found on Mr. Nugan's body was the business card of Washington, D.C., attorney William Colby, a former CIA director. In Washington last week, Mr. Colby confirmed that he had done legal work for Mr. Nugan but said that was the extent of their relationship.

At the inquest, a lawyer representing two

insurance companies that had insured Mr. Nugan's life said the position in which Mr. Nugan's body was found indicated that he couldn't have shot himself as the police who found the body had assumed.

In the past, Nugan Hand Bank has been affected by publicity from allegations of marijuana trafficking against a Nugan family-owned fruit-packing business in Australia. But a New South Wales government commission didn't find any evidence of a link between the company and the drug business.

Nugan Hand's operations in the U.S. were limited to "trade services" for companies interested in foreign joint ventures, according to former U.S. Army Gen. Edwin Black, who acted as the company's representative in Hawaii. There was also an office in Washington, D.C., headed by retired U.S. Navy Adm. Earl Yates, and a president of U.S. operations, Donald Beazley. Mr. Beazley told a reporter he resigned from Nugan Hand more than two months ago and thinks the company today is "inactive" in the U.S.

Gen. Black said by telephone from Honolulu that the company isn't doing any business currently in the U.S. but added, "I haven't received any instructions from Sydney."

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4PM-TERRORIST ATTACKS;420

4CIA SAYS ANTI-US TERRORISM ON INCREASE

4BY ANN BLACKMAN

4ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - MORE AMERICANS WERE KILLED OR HURT BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS LAST YEAR THAN ANY ONE TIME IN THE LAST DECADE; THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORTS.

THE CIA ALSO SAID HOSTAGE ATTACKS; SUCH AS THOSE IN IRAN; COLUMBIA AND LONDON; ARE PART OF A GROWING TREND OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN WHICH AMERICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND BUSINESSMEN ARE PRIMARY TARGETS.

"OFFICIALS AND BUSINESSMEN; ESPECIALLY INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE SYMBOLS OF WESTERN POWER AND WEALTH; ARE STILL PRIMARY TARGETS" OF TERRORISTS; THE REPORT SAYS. "TOURISTS AND OTHER PRIVATE CITIZENS ARE VICTIMIZED ONLY INCIDENTALLY; FOR EXAMPLE; AS PASSENGERS ON A HIJACKED AIRLINER."

THE REPORT; FINISHED THIS WEEK AND TITLED "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1979;" SHOWS ALSO THAT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS HAVE INCREASED IN RECENT YEARS; WHILE THE NUMBER OF FIREBOMBINGS DROPPED OFF CONSIDERABLY.

FIGURES SHOW THAT WHILE THERE WERE FEWER ATTACKS ON AMERICAN CITIZENS AND THEIR PROPERTY IN 1979 THAN THE PREVIOUS YEAR; THERE WERE 12 DEATHS; MORE THAN ANY YEAR IN THE LAST DECADE.

IN IRAN; 53 AMERICANS HAVE BEEN HELD SINCE LAST NOV. 4. IN BOGOTA; COLOMBIA; NEARLY 50 DIPLOMATS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EMBASSY WERE SEIZED LAST FEBRUARY BY LEFTIST GUERRILLAS AND 11; INCLUDING THE U.S. AMBASSADOR; WERE NOT RELEASED UNTIL THIS WEEK.

IN LONDON WEDNESDAY; IRANIANS SEIZED THEIR NATION'S EMBASSY AND HELD HOSTAGES.

AND U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN ADOLPH DUBS WAS KILLED FEB. 14; 1979; IN KABUL; THE AFGHAN CAPITAL. DESPITE U.S. PLEAS FOR NEGOTIATIONS; AFGHAN POLICE SHOT THEIR WAY INTO A HOTEL ROOM WHERE DUBS WAS BEING HELD HOSTAGE. THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS KIDNAPPERS DIED IN THE GUNBATTLE.

1 of 2

ASSOCIATED PRESS

- CIA - Terrorism -

THE CIA REPORTS THAT BOMBINGS ARE THE MOST PREFERRED METHOD OF TERRORIST ATTACKS; ACCOUNTING FOR 40 PERCENT OF ALL TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

OTHER TERRORIST INFORMATION; MADE AVAILABLE BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM; SHOWS THAT ASSASSINATIONS ARE THE SECOND MOST FREQUENTLY USED ATTACK METHODS. THEY ARE FOLLOWED; IN ORDER; BY ARMED ATTACK; LETTER BOMBING; KIDNAPPING; FIRE BOMBING; HOSTAGES; SNIPING; HIJACKING; AND THEFT OR BREAK-INS.

ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE REPORT SHOWS THAT AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN ARE THE MOST FREQUENT VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS. ONE REASON FOR THIS; THE CIA SAYS; IS THAT SOME LARGE CORPORATIONS PREFER TO COMPLY WITH TERRORIST RANSOM AND PUBLICITY DEMANDS RATHER THAN FOLLOW THE "NO CONCESSION" POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

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
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ON PAGE 2

WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL
FAMILY WEEKLY
27 April 1980

PRO AND CON

*Should Congress Have Prior Notice
Of All Clandestine Activities
Of the C.I.A. Overseas?*



PRO Senator Richard G. Lugar (R.-Indiana)



No covert activity conducted by the C.I.A. may proceed without Presidential order. The President should inform specific leaders of the Congress of his covert activity orders prior to the beginnings of such activity. I recommend that the majority and minority leaders of both Houses and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees should be informed by the President, as opposed to the full membership of as many as eight committees, the current requirement. C.I.A. covert activity is the responsibility of the President, but prior notice to key Congressional leaders is an appropriate Constitutional check and balance.

CON Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director, C.I.A.

Certain facets of intelligence collection are by their very nature risk-taking ventures. By risks, I mean that either the lives and reputations of individuals are at stake and/or that the prestige and position of the U.S., with respect to other nations, could be endangered. We must also recognize that rigid statutory requirements for full and prior Congressional access to intelligence information will have an inhibiting effect upon the willingness of individuals and organizations to cooperate with our country. (From Admiral Turner's testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as suggested to be used by the C.I.A.'s Director of Public Affairs, Herb Hetu)



*If this is not terribly current
its because the requested it many
weeks ago.*

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THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
27 April 1980

Fear for defector's life prevents spy testimony

By Alice Siegert

Bonn correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

BONN—West Germany's biggest spy catch of the decade has turned out to be almost useless — he can't testify against Communist spy suspects for fear he'll be killed.

When Werner Stiller, an assumed name, crossed the Berlin Wall in January, 1979, and began talking to West German intelligence officials, he was hailed as the most important defector in years.

However, perhaps a dozen or more of the 180 spy suspects Stiller named will escape unpunished because his information can't be used in court.

STILLER, AN officer of the main intelligence administration in East Berlin, gave the West information of the structure of the East German security apparatus and vast network of agents and informers it uses to silence critics.

His defection was considered a major blow to the highly effective East German intelligence service, which years earlier had managed to plant a spy in ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt's office.

Stiller was sentenced to death in absentia by an East German military court, and a special squad was sent to bring him back, dead or alive.

He underwent surgery on his face and vocal cords to change his appearance and voice. Through a slipup, newspapers reported that he had testified at a Dusseldorf spy trial. Further public testimony had to be ruled out to keep his new identity secret.

"IF HE SHOWS up in public his safety no longer is guaranteed," said Manfred Schueler, state secretary in the

chancellery. "He's in acute danger."

Kurt Rebmann, chief federal prosecutor, said, "When weighing the requirements of the state against the safety of the man, safety must have priority."

Stiller named about 100 persons in West German industry, scientific institutions, and political life who are believed to have worked for the East Germans. Several managed to get away before they were identified.

Stiller said the East Germans are saving hundreds of millions of marks annually through industrial espionage. The Soviet Union most likely benefits, too, because East Germany's intelligence agency cooperates closely with the KGB, the Soviet espionage service.

At present, 30 proceedings against spy suspects are pending, and some may have to be quashed unless the state is able to produce enough evidence without Stiller's testimony.

THE MOST prominent suspect is Friedrich Cremer, 59, a Social Democratic legislator in the Bavarian state assembly and mayor of Lengfurt. The prosecution is seeking a two-and-a-half year sentence for Cremer.

His defense attorney, former Interior Minister Hermann Hoehcherl, argues that unless Stiller testifies at his trial in Munich and furnishes proof, Cremer must be acquitted.

However, an official of the chief prosecutor's office in Karlsruhe said if a witness is not available there still is the possibility of reading a deposition from Stiller in court.

Whatever happens to Cremer and the other suspects, it seems West German authorities are more concerned about saving Stiller from his pursuers than about the future of these trials.

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ON PAGE A14

THE WASHINGTON POST
26 April 1980

Anthrax and Arms Control

LAST MONTH an international conference meeting in Geneva to review the provisions of the 1972 pact banning biological warfare was thrown into disarray by the announcement in Washington of an apparent violation by the Soviet Union. The alleged incident—involving an outbreak of deadly anthrax bacteria and the death of about 1,000 people—had taken place 11 months before, but government spokesmen maintained that the timing of the announcement was coincidental. Sufficient evidence to justify a public statement, they said, had just been received and analyzed.

But then an anonymous intelligence official was quoted in The New York Times as saying that the timing of the announcement was "no accident." His comment lent force to the opinion that the announcement had been fueled by anti-arms-control sentiments inside the government, perhaps by those who wished to sabotage negotiations to limit chemical warfare. The eleventh round of these negotiations just happened to be taking place at the same moment and in the same city as the biological warfare conference.

For more than 50 years, it was generally held that chemical and biological warfare should be controlled by a single treaty. The two were not separated until 1971. But the subsequent development of bioengineering and recombinant DNA techniques further blurred the already thin line between them. Thus, eventually, truly effective control of either biological or chemical warfare will require treaties governing

both. And, like the biological convention, the atmosphere surrounding the chemical warfare talks has been soured by repeated—but still unconfirmed—allegations that the Soviet Union has used chemical weapons in Laos, in Cambodia and now in Afghanistan.

The chemical warfare talks are important not only because of the subject under discussion, but also because they are the only bilateral arms-control negotiations to have survived the post-Afghanistan freeze in U.S.-Soviet relations. As such, they provide a useful channel—though not the only one—for communication between the two superpowers. A disintegration of the talks would make it all the harder to eventually reestablish broader arms-control efforts.

The government is reportedly still waiting for a Soviet response to its questions about the anthrax incident. The story has disappeared from the front pages, and perhaps the Soviet Union is hoping that it will be forgotten in the press of other events. Or perhaps the U.S. government would just as soon have it be forgotten. But finding the truth about possible Soviet use of biological and chemical weapons is still vital. It is important for the survival of the biological warfare convention and of the chemical warfare talks. It may tell us a great deal about Soviet intentions and respect for international obligations. And, by revealing whether the timing of the anthrax announcement was accidental, it may tell us something important about the prospects for other arms-control negotiations.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A22THE WILMINGTON EVENING JOURNAL
25 April 1980

Once again, a warning

WHEN THE CHIEF OF the Central Intelligence Agency forecasts a vicious turn to the world's petroleum situation, we should consider the warning seriously. The global oil picture is grim enough already, thank you.

CIA director Stansfield Turner told senators at a hearing on Tuesday that the Soviet Union will be transformed from net exporter to net importer of oil within about a year. That was the nub of Adm. Turner's testimony and it is enough to justify his posing what he called the cardinal issue of "how vicious the struggle for energy supplies will become."

Two dramatic events this week demonstrate how grim that struggle already is.

One was how, denied Iranian oil except at \$35 a barrel, Japanese tankers headed to sea in search of other suppliers. Another was how Turkey, which many observers have long believed to be at the geographic center of global strategic considerations, appears to reject such sanctions against Iran as proposed by President Carter. The New York Times service reported that senior officials in Ankara said the first consideration in determining Turkey's attitude toward Tehran was oil.

As the output of the Soviets' own oil fields declines, and the Mideast exporters for one reason or another decrease the exploitation of their fields, Adm. Turner told the Senate Energy Committee, there will be "another potentially destabilizing ingredient" in the Mideast situation. Economic disruption will be averted, he said, only if the United States and other importers exercise "stringent policies" of conservation.

These papers have pleaded and argued for years — often in the face of ridicule from those who denied the existence of serious problems —

in behalf of conservation as a major tool in resolving our energy dilemma. It is at least slightly encouraging that despite an apparent temporary abundance of oil — including gasoline inventories at an all-time high in March — soaring prices for the commodity have imposed one form of conservation.

Last week, as the example, the Highway Users Federation released results of a Gallup poll which indicated that gasoline price increases in the past year have changed the driving habits of 87 percent of all car owners.

The figures show a considerable adjustment. Seven out of ten motorists report driving less now than they did a year ago, mostly by reducing weekend and social driving. Twelve percent of those surveyed said they have cut out vacation driving altogether. Of those who drove alone to work a year ago, one out of five said someone in their families has stopped solo auto commuting, and of this group three out of four are pooling rides and about one out of six has switched to public transportation.

Nothing in that report implies a final solution to the energy problem. If everybody who could carpool did carpool, it still wouldn't be a complete answer; if everyone who could use public facilities were willing to do so, the transit system couldn't handle the job.

But at least partial answers are developing and they had better develop more quickly. Adm. Turner warns that an oil importing USSR will have to make "extremely painful" economic, military and political choices to avoid a sharp economic decline. Those wouldn't necessarily be painful only to the Soviets. They could involve a certain amount of pain, or at the least discomfort, for us. For that reason, it becomes even more urgent that we reduce our dependence on Mideast oil.

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CHARTERS

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THE WASHINGTON POST
8 May 1980

Baker Is Wary of Riders On Any CIA Bill in 1980

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) said yesterday that he fears any legislation affecting the CIA this year could turn into a "Christmas Tree" bill if it is brought to the Senate floor.

Baker said he favors a limited measure repealing the current law governing the CIA's covert operations, but he has not determined whether even that can be safely steered through the Senate without getting festooned with controversial amendments.

The Senate minority leader told Democratic colleagues last week that he was opposed to bringing any charter legislation for the CIA and the rest of the U. S. intelligence community up for a floor vote.

Elaborating on his position to a reporter yesterday, Baker said that "If you put that charter on the floor this session, it will take an eternity."

He predicted that it would be bogged down by attacks from all sides, both from senators "who think the CIA has been decimated" in recent years and from those who think the controls in the proposed charter are too weak.

Baker said he was confident that passions will be less pronounced next year, after the elections are over.

Partly as a result of the GOP leader's stand, the Senate Intelligence Committee has put aside its effort to enact even a streamlined charter. It is

concentrating instead on an oversight bill that would repeal the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment and confine reports about covert operations and other intelligence activities to the Senate and House Intelligence committees.

Baker said, however, that "It may be that we can't do that this year, either." He said the oversight bill also "is liable to look like a Christmas tree before we finish with it."

The Intelligence Committee yesterday was scheduled to continue marking up the oversight bill, but then postponed the meeting, apparently in an effort to get its members to refrain from adding riders before the measure gets to the floor.

Sen. John H. Chafee (R-R.I.) has been seeking to add an amendment making it a crime to disclose the names of CIA operatives working abroad. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) has served notice that he wants to prohibit the use of American journalists, clergy and academics as secret intelligence agents.

Baker said senators from both parties had come to him to express their reservations about a floor fight. There have been reports that Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan also wanted a delay until next year, when Reagan might be in the White House. Baker, however, said neither Reagan nor anyone in his campaign had spoken to him about the matter.

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ON PAGE I/12

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
8 May 1980

Intelligence charters and fashion

Proposed legislation to grant U.S. foreign intelligence agencies clear authority for their secret business and to codify proper legal restraints upon it has died in the Senate. A similar piece of legislation concerning the FBI's domestic counter-terrorism program limps along amid growing congressional indifference. Reforming, [and, by reforming, strengthening] the intelligence agencies has lost its political appeal.

In the mid-1970s, drafting "charters" for these agencies was exciting stuff for congressmen and their staffs. Americans, after Watergate, had discovered that James Bond might really be G. Gordon Liddy in disguise. And the lengthy congressional investigations of the FBI, CIA, and others had revealed to the remarkable shock of legislators that espionage involves injury and betrayal and that it can and did get out of hand.

But times have changed. Legislators have discovered that the Soviets have intelligence agencies, too, and that they cannot be counted upon to be kind to our interests. The cycle of reform and reaction has become so tightly squeezed that the curve doubles back on itself before Congress can respond to it. So all that distress, all those ugly secrets revealed in Senate committee rooms to the TV cameras, all the revulsion has left this legacy: We may very well end up with precisely the same laws we began with.

The pity is that some legislation, no matter what one's view of James Bond and the KGB, would have been useful. One of the problems that showed up during congressional investigations was that the statutory basis of the intelligence agencies' activities was murky at best. Deliberately so. After World War II, when espionage became institutionalized, it was believed that the less said about the business the better. So laws were written with heroic ambiguity.

But the result of this, in time, was twofold: The agencies paid little attention to the law and they became vulnerable as a consequence. The "intelligence charter" idea could have resolved this problem. It could have given some assurance that the rule of law held true

even in the clandestine world of spies and counter-spies. And it could have provided the intelligence agencies with a clear and forceful grant of authority that would protect them from purges in the future.

Though the opportunity for reforming and strengthening the foreign intelligence agencies has been lost for now, Congress may still act on one remaining legacy of the post-Watergate investigations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been working on a similar "charter" for its own domestic intelligence work—the effort to protect against domestic terrorism by lunatic groups whose only power comes from random violence. The FBI strongly supports the idea of such a charter to clarify its authority. A remarkable degree of cooperation has developed between the FBI and civil liberties groups fearful of government intrusion into legitimate political activity. While some differences remain over precise language and approach, much has already been agreed upon.

However, the luster is off such reforms. As it was with the foreign intelligence charter, supporters of vigorous investigation sometimes forget that what made the Bureau subject to the excruciating inquisitions of the 1970s was the ambiguity of its legal powers and the absence of due regard for constitutional restraint. From the civil libertarian point of view, to fail to act now is to throw away the last good chance of legislative reform. From the point of view of supporters of a strong FBI, defeat of its charter leaves it in the same perilous position it was in before Watergate, unprotected against improper demands upon it and vulnerable to insult and injury every time the political climate takes a sharp turn.

The purpose of the charters—one failed, one with still a chance of survival—was to moderate the effect upon the agencies of the inevitable swings of opinion about the dangers this society faces from within and without. Unfortunately, the latest change of wind threatens them. Methodical intelligence reform is no longer fashionable, which is all the more reason to go ahead with it.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
8 MAY 1980

'Oversight' of the CIA is all the more needed now

It was in September, 1976, that Jimmy Carter, the Democratic candidate for President, declared in Dallas:

"The CIA has spied on our people. The FBI has committed burglaries. This is a time for change in our country. I don't want the people to change. I want the government to change."

Two years later, Sen. Frank Church, who had been chairman of a Senate select committee which made 96 recommendations for changing the way U.S. intelligence agencies operate, recalled the French proverb, "The more things change, the more they remain the same." The Idaho Democrat already feared that "reforms have been delayed to death." Unfortunately, Sen. Church turned out to be all too prescient. The congressional attempt to write a legislative charter, specifying the scope and limits of U.S. intelligence activities and the congressional and executive restraints on and oversight of those activities, has collapsed.

What happened? Is it simply that the impulse to reform ran out of steam? Not simply that, but that surely in part. There also has been a change in the public's perceptions of the world, in response to very real changes in the world. The fall of the shah of Iran and the rise of the fanatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and several other instances in which American interests are perceived to have been damaged by uncontrollable events abroad, have given cachet to the idea of "unleashing" the CIA.

As Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D., Del.) observed to a spokesman of the American Civil Liberties Union during hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence a few weeks ago, "Let me tell you, something, fellas. The folks don't care. . . If you had a referendum on whether to 'unleash' the CIA, more than 50 percent of the people, not knowing what 'unleash' meant, would vote 'yes.'"

The CIA and its friends also deserve credit — or, if you will, discredit — for the demise of reform. The CIA may not have understood the forces bubbling beneath the surface in Iran, as its director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, conceded. It may have failed to forecast that "a 78-year-old cleric who had been in exile for 14 years would be the catalyst that would bring these forces together, and that we would have one huge volcano — a truly national revolution." It was quite successful, though, in exploiting domestic public opinion to defend itself against attempts to forbid it, through legislation, to engage in the abuses that brought so much discredit upon itself and so embarrassed the American nation.

The Carter administration also is accountable for the Congress's failure to enact a charter of legislative restrictions on CIA covert activities and infringements on the rights of American citizens. Running for office, Mr. Carter demanded restraints on the CIA. In office, Mr. Carter called for loosening the "unwarranted restraints" — "unwarranted" meaning, among other things, the requirement that the CIA give Congress "prior" notice of its covert activities and that the president approve them personally.

The Republicans also must not be forgotten. The death-knell of reform was reportedly sounded when Minority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee advised the Senate Select Committee that the GOP would oppose any comprehensive bill this session. Sen. Baker presumably hopes that Ronald Reagan will be elected president in November. Mr. Reagan is even more opposed than Mr. Carter to restraints on the intelligence agencies.

Does this mean that the CIA can go back to doing business at the same old stand? Not necessarily. One reform antedates the 1976 Church committee report. That is the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment, which requires the president to approve all CIA covert operations, large or small, and permits eight congressional committees to receive reports on them. With a detailed legislative charter, that would be more committees than necessary; without, it is a necessary check on the agency.

A move is now under way in the Senate to approve a stripped-down bill, limiting oversight to two congressional committees and requiring the CIA director to inform them in advance of "significant" activities as he defines "significant." That's what the CIA would dearly like to have. It is not what it should get. If comprehensive reform is out of the picture now and for the near future, the limited reform of congressional oversight must remain. The CIA's primary mission is to gather intelligence. "Unleashing" it to repeat its former covert fiascos can only distract it from concentrating on improving that capability.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
8 May 1980



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THE NATIONAL GUARDIAN
7 May 1980

Congress ready to 'unleash' CIA

By BETSY STONE
Guardian Bureau

Washington, D.C.

Formal consideration is underway by the Senate Intelligence Committee of legislative proposals to "unleash" the CIA.

The committee has dropped its original plans to draw up a comprehensive charter regulating foreign intelligence. Instead, it now appears determined to quickly send to the Senate floor a shorter proposal that will require less debate—and therefore all the sooner grant the CIA the powers it wants.

This development has heightened fears that many of the reforms imposed on CIA activities in the 1970s may be tossed aside. Proposals now under consideration would "authorize the CIA to do everything it did before" the institution of reforms, according to former CIA agent Philip Agee.

The primary measure under consideration is a shortened version of the proposed National Intelligence Act of 1980—also known as the CIA charter. This plan was introduced in the Senate Feb. 8 by Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.), head of the intelligence committee. An identical bill was introduced in the House by Rep. Edward Boland (D-Mass.). Other subsidiary bills are also being considered.

REFORMS

Controversy on the proposed bill has centered on the 1970s reforms, particularly the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. This amendment, passed in 1974, mandates that eight congressional committees must be notified of the CIA's covert operations before they take place and that the President must give personal approval.

Other questions are focused on the use of clergy and journalists as operatives, on the potential for release of CIA documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and on punishments being prescribed for CIA agents such as Agee who divulge information gathered while acting as operatives.

Last week, Huddleston announced that the panel had agreed to the Carter

administration's demands to release the intelligence agency from its obligation to give Congress prior notification of covert activities.

THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT

Under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, no covert activity may take place "unless and until" the President finds it is important to national security and reports the undertaking "in a timely fashion" to the appropriate committees of Congress. The CIA maintains that the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requires that it report to too many congressional members.

In practice, however, the administration has been supplying prior notice under a 1978 Carter executive order which requires only that the Senate and House intelligence committees be kept informed of "any significant anticipated activities." Carter now wants to keep even that clause from becoming law.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner is also pushing that perspective. In testimony before the Senate intelligence committee last February, Turner said prior notice is "unnecessary and unwise." He then presented an administration proposal that the two intelligence committees be informed of CIA undertakings "in a timely fashion." This has been construed to mean that the committees be informed after the fact of a covert operation.

Turner admitted in the hearing that the CIA has not been notifying Congress completely about its operations. Weeks later, however, he retracted this admission, claiming his statements had been "seriously misrepresented in the press."

'NATION'S SECURITY'

Turner again stirred up controversy when he acknowledged that he had approved the use of clergy, reporters and academics—"on very limited occasions"—in recent years. Internal CIA regulations adopted in 1977 prohibit the use of such operatives.

CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci later

claimed that Turner had only waived the prohibition in three operations, none of which were ever carried out.

On April 12, however, Carter endorsed the use of journalists as CIA operatives overseas. He told a group of editors and broadcasters at the White House that such action might be necessary in "extreme circumstances" where "our own nation's security may be threatened."

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Although the FOIA allows the CIA to withhold documents that would disclose sources and methods or endanger the national security, the CIA insists upon further limitations. It has proposed that all the agency's operational and technical files be kept beyond the reach of the FOIA.

The Justice Department initially showed signs of concern over the CIA's effort to win exemptions from the FOIA. It called the proposals "vastly overboard," and in stark contrast to the spirit and philosophy of the act. Guidelines offered by the department in early April, however, would empower both the FBI and CIA to block court review of "certified secrets."

Despite the strong congressional push for a more openly interventionist foreign policy, the intelligence committee's proposal is not without its opponents. Within the Congress, some have advocated more piecemeal legislation. Under consideration, for instance, are the so-called Moynihan Bill, which includes many provisions similar to the National Intelligence Act, and a bill introduced by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.). Aspin claims his bill provides restraints that "will prevent a return to 'the good old days'... while at the same time recognizing that our intelligence services cannot be expected to operate in a goldfish bowl like some social service agency."

Outside of Congress, there is more far-reaching opposition. Numerous church organizations and representatives of newspaper and academic associations have protested the paid use of members of their

CONTINUE



professions for intelligence gathering. And, on March 24, leaders of 150 organizations sent a letter to Congress protesting current proposals to exempt the CIA from the FOIA. The letter charged that the proposals "represent a radical change in government policy which would damage serious historical and journalistic research and the conduct of informed public debate." Signers included the American Historical Association, the U.S. Catholic Mission and many organizations affiliated with the Campaign for Political Rights, a national coalition of over 80 groups committed to ending the abuses of U.S. intelligence agencies.

CLANDESTINE INTERVENTION

Some activists have called for even broader opposition to the charter and to the closed manner in which it is being considered. "There ought to be a campaign to sustain the Hughes-Ryan Amendment," urges Agee. "The whole movement to rehabilitate the CIA as an arm of clandestine intervention ought to be opposed."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 26THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
7 May 1980

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Preserving Intelligence

The Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday started marking up the "mini-charter" to regulate United States intelligence agencies, having abandoned its four-year quest to enact a comprehensive package of legal constraints. In the wake of events in Iran and Afghanistan, the committee apparently decided that now is not the time to encumber our intelligence agencies with a long list of thou-shall-nots.

The new charter is a welcome improvement over the cumbersome proposals advocated by Senator Walter D. Huddleston and others. Gone are most of the confusing legal restrictions. Instead, the bill would likely make it easier for the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake operations abroad by limiting congressional oversight to just the Senate and House intelligence committees; the CIA has complained that the current requirement to report to eight committees has made foreign intelligence sources more reluctant to cooperate for fear of a leak.

The retreat on a comprehensive charter can be interpreted as an admission by Congress that intelligence operations are the responsibility of the Executive Branch and should not be governed by extensive legislated mandates. A series of presidential directives has already brought tighter control of the agency, for instance banning any plan of assassination and restricting investigations of U.S.

citizens. These reforms ought to be sufficient to curb the much-overblown abuses by the CIA. The most serious of these, you may recall, were the assassination plots against Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, neither of which came to anything and both of which had a half-baked quality closer to a pipe dream than an earnest operation.

There are of course endlessly debatable details, such as whether the CIA should ever indulge in journalistic cover, or whether the Freedom of Information Act needs to be reformed to give a greater impression of security to agents abroad. But the CIA doesn't need to close down until these questions are settled once and for all.

What is now urgently required is a concerted effort to improve our intelligence operations, which in the past have shown themselves to be woefully deficient. The worst of the abuses was far less serious than the CIA's failure to accurately assess the size and speed of the Soviet strategic arms build-up in the late 1970s. The CIA needs to upgrade its interpretation function, and the White House needs to take the lead.

Now that the Congress has given up the effort to write a law covering every conceivable contingency that an intelligence agency might face, there would seem to be a greater chance to do something about the real problems of the CIA.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1THE WASHINGTON STAR
7 May 1980

Senate Panel Agrees to Relax CIA Restrictions

By Lisa Myers

Washington Star Staff Writer

The Senate Intelligence Committee agreed yesterday to relax certain restrictions on the CIA but require that Congress be notified in advance of virtually all covert activities.

The proposal, approved 11-0, would overhaul the congressional intelligence oversight framework by reducing the number of congressional committees to which covert operations must be reported from eight to two.

The CIA would be required to notify those two committees — House and Senate Intelligence panels — prior to undertaking any covert activities except in "extraordinary circumstances." In that event, the president could fulfill the "prior notification" requirement by informing eight members of Congress — House and Senate Democratic and Republican leaders and the chairmen and ranking Republican on the two intelligence committees.

In even more extraordinary circumstances, the president could invoke his constitutional powers and not inform anyone in Congress before a covert operation was launched. But he would be required to notify Congress "in a timely fashion" of the activity and explain why prior notice was not given.

The administration supports the plan, authored by Sen. Walter Huddleston, D-Ky.

Committee Chairman Birch Bayh, D-Ind., criticized current oversight procedures, which the administration claims have hampered intelligence operations, as "outdated and unduly burdensome." But he emphasized that in return for repeal of the Hughes-Ryan act, which imposed the multiple reporting requirement, it was essential that the CIA provide full access to information and rigorously adhere to the prior notification requirement.

Bayh also reiterated his determination to draw up a comprehensive CIA charter in the next Congress.

The limited four-page bill revamping oversight procedures seems to be all that is left of the broad 171-page charter that was introduced last year. The charter was torpedoed by election year politics as well as strong disagreement between the administration and key members of Congress over certain provisions.

In fact, because of continuing discord, Bayh and Huddleston want to drop proposals that would free the CIA from disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act and require criminal penalties for those

who divulge classified information such as the names of CIA agents.

The committee is slated to decide today whether to limit the bill to oversight, as Bayh and Huddleston wish, or include these other two provisions, as favored by Sen. John Chafee, R-R.I.

If the bill is not restricted to a single issue, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., said he will offer an amendment to ban CIA use of working journalists, clergy and academics. He also would forbid agents from using any of those professions as a cover.

Moynihan accused the Carter administration of being "confused and even incoherent" on whether it is acceptable to recruit journalists for intelligence purposes. CIA Director Stansfield Turner modified an absolute ban imposed by former director George Bush to permit the use of journalists with his personal approval. Subsequently, he approved the recruitment of journalists on three occasions. But he said that in none of the cases was the relationship consummated.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 1THE WASHINGTON POST
7 May 1980

Senate Panel Votes for Intelligence Oversight Bill

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

With a fragile consensus that started falling apart before the meeting ended, the Senate Intelligence Committee voted yesterday to approve a bill giving Congress statutory oversight authority over the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Despite warnings that any riders dealing with other issues would doom chances of enactment this year, committee Republicans promptly pressed for the addition of a measure that would make it a crime to disclose the names of U.S. intelligence operatives working abroad.

Sen. John Chafee (R-R.I.) won a preliminary skirmish on that question by a vote of 7 to 4. The committee then agreed to resume the debate today with still another amendment authored by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).

The oversight measure, prefaced with loopholes demanded by the administration, would establish a general rule of prior notice to the Senate and House Intelligence committees of significant intelligence activities. It also would require the submission of any after-the-fact information that the committees require.

The bill also would permit the president to hold back reports to Congress whenever he felt national security demanded it.

CIA general counsel Dan Silver told the committee during the markup session that the president could be expected to exercise this authority only in exceptional circumstances demanding the tightest secrecy. But he emphasized that "the administration" attributes a great deal of importance to the provisions of the bill acknowledging that the president has that power.

Intelligence Committee Chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) offered the bill as the only remnant of a comprehensive charter for the intelligence community

that has a decent chance of passage in light of election-year pressures and widespread disagreement over other proposed controls on the intelligence agencies.

"The time has come for us to stop studying and start acting," he said of the four-year effort to adopt a new rule of law for the CIA and the other agencies.

Sen. Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.) agreed that it was too late to press for a full charter. "Time has run out," he said. "It's a tragedy, but it's a fact."

At present, the oversight authority of the two congressional intelligence committees is set down only in congressional resolutions, which do not have the force of law, and in a 1978 executive order, which the president could revise if he saw fit.

The only law requiring reports to Congress is the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment governing the CIA's covert actions and requiring reports about them to as many as eight congressional committees. The bill approved yesterday, on a unanimous voice vote, would repeal the Hughes-Ryan rule.

The bill calls, in general, for the disclosure to Congress of all intelligence activities, but only "to the extent consistent" with the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief and "to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information and information relating to intelligence sources and methods."

Apparently, those caveats could also be used to restrict the flow of information about "any illegal intelligence activity" which the bill also covers. Silver, however, declined to comment on that point, telling a reporter that he hadn't considered that possibility.

On a roll call vote of 7 to 4, the committee adopted a proposal by Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) requiring the intelligence agencies to inform

the two committees of any "significant intelligence failures," but again subject to the overall conditions the administration insisted upon.

Chafee then moved to add on a measure that would make it a felony, punishable by five years in prison and a \$50,000 fine, to disclose the names of any U.S. intelligence officers or operatives who have been working overseas within a 10-year period before disclosure.

Bayh warned that such riders would have to be referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, where they could become bogged down in fresh controversy.

The committee, however, voted 7 to 4 to take up Chafee's proposal today. Moynihan also announced that he intends to press for another rider that would prohibit the government from using American journalists, academics or clergy as spies and from letting intelligence agents pose as members of those professions.

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NEW YORK TIMES
7 MAY 1980

Senate Committee Votes to Limit Supervision of C.I.A. to 2 Panels

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 6 — A Senate committee voted today to give the Central Intelligence Agency the legislative measure it wanted most: a limit on Congressional supervision and knowledge of its operations to the two intelligence committees.

Then a plan by liberal members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to deny the agency other items it had sought came unglued when a Republican member moved to take up and to expand upon a C.I.A. proposal that would make it a crime to disclose the identity of intelligence agents and sources.

The committee leadership seemed to have temporarily lost control of the panel but will attempt to reassert that control tomorrow, when the committee is scheduled to meet again.

An already complex parliamentary situation seemed to become more complex in the course of the day.

Consideration of Charter Dropped

The committee chairman, Senator Birch Bayh, Democrat of Indiana, announced at a meeting of the panel that "the pressures of events" and a crowded legislative calendar had made it "impossible" to consider a proposed legislative charter for the intelligence agencies.

However, other sources said the decision to abandon the detailed charter came when Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., the Senate Republican Leader, informed the committee that the Republican leadership would oppose any such bill this year. Others said that Ronald Reagan, who opposes increased restraints on the intelligence agencies, had asked Senator Baker to take this step.

With the charter dead for this year, Senator Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, Senator Bayh and other advocates of closer legal restraint proposed a modification of a 1974 amendment that

has permitted as many as eight committees of Congress to receive top secret reports on activities of the intelligence agencies.

A short bill limiting "oversight" to the two select intelligence committees was passed by an apparently unanimous voice vote.

Senator Huddleston and others contended that other measures sought by the C.I.A. should be postponed until Congress could take up the full charter next year.

But Senator John H. Chaffee, Republican of Rhode Island, moved to take up a measure that would make it a crime for an official or former official to make public the identity of an intelligence agent. Senator Chaffee said he also wished to expand the provision so that non-officials could be tried for conspiracy or for abetting such a crime — a step that presumably could affect journalists.

Mr. Chaffee's motion passed by seven votes to four, apparently because some members Chairman Bayh could have counted on were no longer present. A vote on the measure itself was put off, tentatively until tomorrow.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, was forced to postpone until tomorrow a plan to introduce a proposal to make it illegal for the C.I.A. to employ journalists, clergymen or academics secretly as intelligence agents.

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NEW YORK TIMES
6 MAY 1980

Moynihan to Seek Curbs on Use Of Spies by Intelligence Agencies

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5 — Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan plans to propose tomorrow a flat legal prohibition against the secret use of journalists, clergymen or academicians as spies or informers for United States intelligence agencies.

The New York Democrat's proposal will also seek to prohibit intelligence agents from posing as members of religious, journalistic or academic institutions. Mr. Moynihan said that he would offer the proposals as an amendment when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets tomorrow to begin action on legislation affecting intelligence agencies.

Meanwhile, Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, said today that the Carter Administration had committed "a major breach of security" by disclosing to the news media details of the aborted plan to rescue American hostages in Iran.

Mr. Aspin charged that the disclosures by unidentified sources might have threatened the lives of Iranians who were secretly willing to help the United States and that they might discourage other foreigners from secretly cooperating with American intelligence officers.

The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded last week that a proposed legislative code, or charter, outlining both authorized and prohibited procedures and practices for intelligence agencies could not be passed in Congress this year.

When the committee meets tomorrow it will, at first, consider a drastically shortened bill proposed by Senator Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, who had been a chief advocate of the now moribund charter. The charter would have forbidden the Central Intelli-

gence Agency to use journalistic, religious and academic institutions as "cover" but would not have flatly prohibited the agency from using members of those institutions in covert intelligence roles.

Senator Moynihan said that "the issue of immunity of the press from intelligence activity, having been raised, must be settled." His proposed amendment would forbid any agency of the Government to hire, full- or part-time, any American citizen or alien with permanent residence status who "is a member of a religious, media or academic organization," if the relationship between the person and the Government "is to be concealed from public."

It also says that no employee of the Government shall "pose" as a member of such institutions "in order to conceal his true relationship with the department or agency employing him."

The White House has strongly opposed such flat protection for the "integrity" of the journalistic, religious and academic community. Administration sources have privately said that one reason for this position is that such a law would virtually restrict the intelligence agency's legally permitted "covers" to businessmen, and might hamper clandestine intelligence gathering.

Among the "disclosures" cited by Mr. Aspin were reports that American agents had been infiltrated into Iran by posing as European businessmen and hints that Iranian nationals were involved in the aborted rescue plan.

Such information, he said, was "clearly leaked to the press in an effort to save the Administration from looking foolish" by making the plan seem as plausible as possible to the public.

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ON PAGE A-36

NEW YORK TIMES
6 MAY 1980

Retreat From Intelligence

A charter for America's intelligence agencies died in Congress the other day. There will be no further attempts to define in law what our spies may and may not do and how best to be accountable. And that's not all; what Congress may still do on this subject is pointless or worse. Senator Huddleston and other charter-writers are not just stalled. They are retreating under attack from legislators who want more license and almost no accountability for the C.I.A.

A few years ago, the intelligence community was in rout, embarrassed by exposures of dangerous adventures in toppling or propping up governments, spying on law-abiding Americans and subverting American institutions. Congress demanded confidential notice of risky covert actions and tightened the Freedom of Information Act so legislators and citizens could learn more about what their agents had done in their name.

But before Congress could codify some balanced rules, to strengthen as well as restrain intelligence conduct, a reaction set in. Some legislators talked as though the sensible reforms already in place were to blame for events in Iran or Afghanistan. Congress was intimidated by the slander that it was "leashing" the

C.I.A. and Congressional supervision came to be called waffling on national security. C.I.A. charters were suddenly replaced by "C.I.A. relief bills."

And the Carter Administration, though pledged to openness, became inflexible about the terms of consulting with Congress. Central Intelligence Director Turner sanctioned the use of journalists as spies when he saw fit, and President Carter backed him up. Senator Moynihan's new bill to outlaw that practice is the first constructive move in some time on that subject.

We support — as part of a comprehensive charter — the C.I.A. request to reduce the number of committees entitled to intelligence briefings since 1974. And Congress would be right to make it a crime for present or former spies to identify secret agents. But most of the piecemeal legislation now being pressed is mischievous or worthless. To call it the "Intelligence Accountability Act of 1980" is to warp words.

Nor is there any justification for tampering with the Freedom of Information Act. Only in the unlikely event that the C.I.A. could demonstrate harm to the national security should Congress even consider disturbing that bulwark of accountability.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A22THE WASHINGTON POST
6 May 1980

Congress Closes on the CIA

FOR A WHILE in the mid-1970s, the exemption of intelligence activity from normal congressional oversight seemed near an end. But the impulse to change Congress' lackadaisical ways was never as strong and constant as the clamor over CIA abuses suggested. Institutional interests—the same ones that had privately cleaned out the CIA's worst abuses before the public became aware of them—were at work to minimize inroads into the old pattern of presidential control. The movement to make intelligence activities more a shared responsibility with Congress kept getting slowed by a gathering strategic concern.

So it was that the drive for a full-fledged congressional intelligence charter ran out of gas last week. Its breakdown was greeted with nearly as much relief by its friends, many of whom found it unacceptably weakened, as by its foes. Depending considerably on what the Senate Intelligence Committee does today, the charter impulse is likely to produce little more than a skeletal "Intelligence Accountability Act of 1980." Gone will be the elaborate do's and don't's intended to ensure that intelligence agencies stay within the confines of law, presidential direction and congressional awareness or consent. Gone, too, will be the protections for individual civil liberties that many supporters saw as the heart of the charter drive.

The residual consensus, however, is not without val-

ue—or promise. The legislators trying to make the changes had one high card: the president's distaste for the mid-1970s law requiring him to inform eight congressional committees of prospective CIA covert operations. In return for their reducing the eight committees to two, the administration agreed to inform the legislature of "all intelligence activities." There are loopholes in this general obligation to report—and in the specific obligation to report on covert operations. Against Congress' absolute power of inquiry is set the president's absolute power to defend the country. But the new language establishes in law for the first time that intelligence, like any other part of the national business, must be the joint coordinated responsibility of the executive and Congress. If this is only a victory in principle, it is a vital principle.

In retrospect, it was probably unrealistic for anyone to imagine that, with international tension aggravating a traditional dispute over the separation of powers, the problem of running a secret agency in an open society could be resolved by legislation. The likeliest possibility always was that the value of intelligence oversight would depend on the working relationship of the two branches. The new law, if enacted, offers some help in this regard. It does not assure that Congress will exercise oversight effectively. But nothing could. And it puts Congress in a better position to try.

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NEW YORK TIMES
6 MAY 1980

IN THE NATION

The C.I.A. Triumphant

By Tom Wicker

Over four years ago, after months of intensive investigation of the nation's intelligence agencies, a special Senate committee headed by Frank Church outlined a disgraceful record of assassination attempts, illegal activities, invasions of citizens' rights, manipulations of the press, unwarranted secrecy, waste and mismanagement — mostly by the C.I.A. and all in the pursuit of "national security."

The public demanded reform. Congress promised reform. Jimmy Carter, campaigning in the fall of 1976, pledged reform.

Last week, however, with the Carter Administration going limp on the sidelines and the public apparently indifferent, the Senate Intelligence Committee gave up the notion of a "charter" that would put into law what the C.I.A. could and could not do.

Not only did the committee abandon the charter. It began work on a bill that would actually give the C.I.A. more power than it has ever had to conceal its operations from the public, as well as better cover for invading citizens' rights.

How did this astonishing reversal come about? First, the reforming impulse ran out, the public losing interest and Congress turning to less controversial activities; and it was not until February 1978 that a charter bill was introduced. The C.I.A. and its fans promptly denounced the measure as too restrictive; and since then the agency has adamantly refused to compromise on major issues involved.

Beginning last fall, with the sudden flap over Soviet combat troops supposedly in Cuba, and sharpened by the seizure of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Congressional sentiment swung all the way around to support for "unleashing" the C.I.A. And the Carter Administration, which never did help much with reform efforts, seemed to encourage this new cold-war mood.

Finally, Republican Senate leader Howard Baker passed the word that his party did not want charter legislation this year — apparently figuring that a Republican Administration would have its own proposals next year. Senator Barry Goldwater, the senior Republican on the Intelligence Committee, also repudiated his support for the charter.

Senate supporters of the legislation, without much objection from the White House, then concluded that it could not pass, particularly since some liberals also opposed it for not putting sufficient restrictions on the C.I.A. So the charter was abandoned. Worse, some Intelligence Committee members, notably Democrats Walter Huddleston of Kentucky and Daniel P. Moynihan of New York, are proposing measures that would:

1. Repeal the law that now requires prior notice to Congressional committees before covert action can be undertaken abroad, and provide for prior notice only of "significant" intelligence activities — and not those if the President decides to ignore the rule for "security" reasons.

2. Set up no safeguards for citizens' rights but merely require intelligence agencies to act in accordance with guidelines established by their directors; if spying on American citizens is involved, the Attorney General would be required to approve and report such guidelines to Congress — but even this reporting requirement could be suspended if "security" required it.

3. Exempt the C.I.A. from most of the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, under which it now must release information about past and current activities — although the agency already has authority to withhold classified information; C.I.A. decisions under the new authority would not be challengeable in court.

4. Make it a crime for any current or former Government official to disclose information that might identify U.S. intelligence officers or operatives who have served abroad within the ten years before the disclosure.

This last provision may not appear to be aimed at the press but any reporter could testify as to how it will work in practice. If such a disclosure occurs, and if the "leaker" cannot be discovered by Government investigation, the reporter who wrote the story will be hauled before a grand jury and ordered to disclose the identity of his source. If he refuses, he will be jailed for contempt of court.

Senate liberals and organizations that supported the charter have not entirely given up hope that most of these proposals — which could turn the C.I.A. more nearly than ever into an "invisible government" — can be stopped, if there is sufficient public outcry. That would keep open the faint possibility that a "carrot and stick" effort might result next year, or sometime, in at least minimal protection of citizens' rights in a charter bill.

If the C.I.A. wants to be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, for example, a new Congress might require in return that it accept legislative restrictions against spying on Americans. Such an approach would depend heavily, of course, on which Administration is in power next year — another stopper for those who like to say it really doesn't matter who is elected President.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE II/6LOS ANGELES TIMES
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The Danger Can't Be Ignored

The prospects for a comprehensive charter for the Central Intelligence Agency are dim. The intelligence committees in the Senate and the House seem to have taken the view that what the CIA needs is not more control but less. Last Wednesday the House Intelligence Committee declined to back its chairman in a move to push for a charter. The next day the Senate Intelligence Committee gave up on the charter for the year, proposing instead a shortened bill to give the CIA more scope.

The setback for the charter is in part the result of election-year politics. Some Republicans in Congress believe that a Republican Administration could propose a charter next year more to the agency's liking; some Democrats fear being accused of voting for a stringent bill.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan are the CIA's best ally in the congressional struggle. The agency has been appealing to a vaguely based but strongly felt belief in Congress that the CIA has been fettered and that, if it hadn't been, the American position in the world would be better. There is no evidence for this belief, nor has the CIA offered any. It is true that the agency has been rocked and, some accounts say, demoralized by the series of events that began with the revelations several years ago of widespread illegal and questionable activities. The

low morale has continued under a series of directors whose guidance of the agency has been contested by its members. There are suggestions from serious observers that its current chief, Adm. Stansfield Turner, is contributing to its malaise.

Former CIA director William Colby argued—plausibly enough, we thought—that the agency would act more effectively and freely if it knew clearly what was permitted and what was prohibited. In any case, a charter would prevent its agents from the excesses they had fallen into in the past.

This is not to deny that a charter is difficult to write. Its authors have to give the CIA power to do the job without overdoing it. It was partly in drawing those fine lines that the attempt foundered.

One aspect of the short bill favored by the Senate is clearly sensible: The number of congressional committees to which the agency would have to report future actions would be cut from eight to two.

If Congress—which got no help, by the way, from an ambivalent Administration—is unable to write a charter this year, it will have to next year. The excesses of the past cannot be forgotten; the danger inherent in such secret power cannot be overlooked. It is not beyond the wit of Congress, in calmer times, to write a charter that promotes American security in ways consistent with American liberty. □

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A6THE WASHINGTON POST
5 May 1980

As Congress' Resolve Faded, so Did Proposed CIA Charter

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

They blew taps on Capitol Hill last week for the congressional resolve to "reform" the practices of America's spies and counterspies—a charter for the CIA.

It was more of a belated memorial service than a funeral. More than four years have passed since the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Frank Church (D-Idaho), concluded its unprecedented investigations of the nation's intelligence agencies with an uncontested catalogue of illegality, waste and mismanagement in the name of national security.

At the time, the CIA and the FBI seemed to have their backs to the wall. Citing "tactics unworthy of a democracy and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes," the Church committee laid out a record of government lawlessness over a 40-year period under both Democratic and Republican presidents.

The committee's reports mentioned CIA attempts to murder foreign leaders and literally thousands of covert actions carried out without any White House scrutiny.

At home, the reports chronicled a steadily expanding pattern—on the part of both the FBI and the CIA—of invasions of privacy, manipulation of the press and violations of constitutional and statutory rights.

Improprieties were found at every level—sometimes ordered by the White House, sometimes condoned by attorneys general, sometimes conceived by underlings who concealed their misdeeds from their superiors.

The Church reports draw scant mention in Congress these days. It is no longer fashionable to dwell on them. Ever since the investigations closed down, the Senate, and to some extent the House Intelligence committees, have been more concerned, as Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) recently put

it, with winning "the confidence and trust" of the intelligence agencies.

Last Thursday, the Senate Intelligence Committee gave up on the idea of a charter. But what was buried behind the closed doors of the intelligence committee had little resemblance to the explicit legislative controls and restrictions originally recommended by the Church committee.

The proposed charter for the CIA and the rest of the nation's intelligence community had evolved into a wide-ranging license for spying at home and abroad, legitimizing many of the activities the Church committee had criticized.

The charter fell by the wayside partly because it pleased no one, partly because the political impetus for reform had been lost, partly because

Commentary

the subject got caught up in election-year politics.

Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), the principal sponsor of the charter drive, had still been hoping at midweek to win enactment of a streamlined "mini-charter" in place of the 172-page bill he introduced in February.

But then the Republicans dealt a crucial blow. Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), according to several sources, let it be known that GOP stalwarts did not want any charter legislation to come up on the Senate floor this year.

"It's a bit of election-year politics," said one Senate insider. "The chances are good that there'll be a Republican president next year. Then they can get what they want."

That wishful sentiment fits in perfectly with the preferences of such groups as the 3,000-member Association of Former Intelligence Officers, which has been pressing for a charter that would given the CIA, not tighter controls, but a much stronger hand.

"Whatever you can get [from Congress] today is going to be less effective

than what you can get next year," says the association's legal adviser, John S. Warner. "And anything you get this year is going to take the sails out of what you might get next year."

On the other side of the fence, civil liberties groups are alarmed over what Congress still might do this year, let alone next. Although he has given up on even a "mini-charter," Huddleston is still pressing for a bill that would give the two congressional intelligence committees statutory oversight authority and at the same time endow the CIA with a greater measure of secrecy.

Huddleston's bill would do that by repealing the two most significant restraints on the CIA, both of them enacted before the 1975-76 investigations took place. One of them is the Freedom of Information Act, which has drawn loud complaints from the CIA ever since the agency was forced to comply with the law under a series of amendments Congress enacted in 1974.

Huddleston's last-ditch proposal would exempt countless CIA documents from disclosure, perhaps even newspaper clippings, which the agency has contended in at least one lawsuit are "intelligence sources." If the CIA has its way, anything withheld under this new FOI exemption will not be subject to court review.

The Huddleston proposal would also limit reports of covert actions and other "significant" intelligence activities to the two intelligence committees. It calls for prior notice of such undertakings, but the rule of advance notification is offset by a proviso that the Carter administration insist upon permitting the executive branch to withhold prior notice under a variety of circumstances.

On paper, at least, those same grounds—such as "due regard for the protection of classified information . . . from unauthorized disclosure"—could also be invoked under the bill to withhold information from Congress about "intelligence activities that are illegal."

CONTINUED

The impetus for reform began to dissipate in the winter of 1975-76, before the Church committee had even finished its work. Former congressman Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), who then headed a parallel House investigation, stated the problem succinctly: "It all lasted too long, and the media, the Congress and the people lost interest."

By the time the Church committee wrapped up its work in April 1976, months behind schedule, it was all they could do to win approval of a bill creating the permanent Senate Intelligence Committee that now exists. To some, it seemed a pallid response to all the assassination plots, burglaries, bugging and mind-bending that had come to light, but it was widely hailed on the Senate floor as a startling accomplishment.

It took more than 1½ years—until February 1978—to produce a bill. The 263-page measure was promptly denounced by the CIA's supporters as too restrictive in light of the "very few transgressions" that had been uncovered.

Although it fell far short of a number of the Church committee's recommendations, the bill, S. 2525, was soon downgraded to the status of a talking paper, another starting point for debate. The Carter administration, which had promised reform, was never even required to testify about it. Instead, an interagency committee composed of intelligence agency representatives began work on what one of them frankly called a "counterdraft" that would be sure to raise senatorial hackles.

By mid-1978, Church, no longer on the Intelligence Committee, saw that it was already too late. "Reforms have been delayed to death," he said then. "This has been the defense mechanism of the agency, and it could easily have been foreseen.... There is great wisdom in the old saying that the more things change, the more they stay the same."

The charter bill, Huddleston intro-

duced in February contained one concession after another for the intelligence agencies.

It would have authorized the CIA to carry out wiretaps and burglaries against law-abiding Americans abroad to obtain information the government thinks they might have. Other provisions would have made it possible for the FBI to use disruptive techniques and disinformation campaigns—reminiscent of its controversial COINTELPRO activities against domestic groups suspected of ties to foreign powers.

The bill is "the obverse of intelligence reform," protested the Center for National Security Studies, a privately funded critic of the CIA, in its newsletter, "First Principles." "S. 2284 reads the way we might imagine the Fourth Amendment to read if it were drafted by a committee of police chiefs."

American Civil Liberties Union spokesmen Jerry Berman and Morton H. Halperin testified, "The Carter administration and this committee have put before the public a bill which departs from nearly every significant principle of reform embodied in the recommendations of the Church committee."

The White House and the CIA were still unhappy with the bill, primarily because of the extent of congressional oversight required. Huddleston continued to bargain, expressing confidence until last week that agreement could still be reached on a mini-charter.

The oversight powers were diluted to the administration's satisfaction. Other outstanding issues—such as the extent of the inroads on the Freedom of Information Act and the claims of civil libertarians that their views were being ignored—were reviewed at a White House meeting last Wednesday.

Vice President Mondale, CIA Director Stansfield Turner, Huddleston, Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) and others attended. Some concessions by the administration on civil liberties issues were reportedly hinted at.

"The basic conclusion was to get on with it, to go into markup [on a mini-charter]," said one administration official who was present.

Then Huddleston went back to Capitol Hill and took readings on the chances there. According to several sources, the minority leader, Baker, informed both Huddleston and Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) that the Republican side wanted nothing resembling a charter this year.

Byrd reportedly concluded that the legislation was just too controversial and couldn't be passed this year.

Prospects on the House side, Huddleston found, were also bleak. He called the vice president and, according to a White House official, told Mondale, "Sorry, I can't do it."

Although it has said little publicly this year beyond complaining of "unwarranted restraints" on the nation's intelligence-gathering activities, the administration last Friday expressed its condolences—and a renewed interest in civil liberties.

"It's a damn shame," said one high-ranking administration official. "But if they're going to go forward with anything, then we're going to see if we can't put in some protections on civil liberties.... And we'll be back in there next year, assuming we get reelected."

Back in September 1976, candidate Carter said in Dallas: "The CIA has spied on our people. The FBI has committed burglaries.... This is a time for change in our country. I don't want the people to change. I want the government to change."

So far nothing has changed except public opinion. AFIO Chairman David Phillips, a former CIA officer who frequently travels about the country making speeches, reports: "The change in public attitude since Iran and Afghanistan has really been something. Now people say to me: 'Unleash the CIA? Great. That will solve our problems.'"

And it could also bring back some old problems.

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NEW YORK TIMES
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The Nation

In Summary

Loosening Curbs On the Spooks

A proposed charter spelling out do's and don'ts for United States intelligence agencies collapsed last week, and its backers "reluctantly" endorsed a measure that instead seems to allow tighter secrecy and greater freedom in intelligence operations.

The bill, not yet completed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, contains no prohibition against the use of journalists, clergymen and academicians as spies. It cuts from eight to two the number of Congressional committees that the Central Intelligence Agency must keep informed. It sets no strict controls on wiretapping and burglary, but instead relies on the heads of agencies — and on the Attorney General — to establish "guidelines" for avoiding violations of civil liberties.

That is a far cry from the statutory reform envisioned in 1977, when the White House began to push for a charter establishing a clear basis in law for (and in some cases, against) certain activities. What emerged last week was not a charter, but a brief collection of proposed changes to existing laws and regulations — including the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974, which was intended to broaden Congressional oversight.

Although events in Iran and Afghanistan have strengthened Congressional resistance to fettering the C.I.A. and other agencies, erosion of support for a charter had begun earlier. The Administration itself ultimately did not want to be bound in writing to certain procedures it follows in practice: for instance, giving Congress "prior notice" of significant covert operations. Furthermore, many in Congress feared political booby-traps might lurk in the complexities of a charter.

Senator Walter D. Huddleston of Kentucky, an intelligence committee Democrat who proposed a 170-page charter early this year, has since acknowledged these apprehensions by substituting a shorter version. But over the last several weeks he could not muster a committee majority for his scaled-down draft, either.

As it stands now, the committee's measure differs slightly from one supported by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, which critics have dubbed the "C.I.A. relief bill." The Moynihan plan would, for instance, place almost all operational files off limits to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The committee's bill would allow the C.I.A. director to make exceptions. Even such concessions could be eliminated, however, as the intelligence panel continues its work.

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4 MAY 1980

MEASURES TO SHIELD U.S. DATA CRITICIZED

Exemptions From Disclosure Laws
Are Included in Bills on Trade
Agency, C.I.A. and F.B.I.

By DEIRDRE CARMODY

The Federal Trade Commission authorization bill approved by a House-Senate conference committee last week would in effect exempt the agency from the Freedom of Information Act, which was set up in 1966 to give the public and the press access to Federal Government records.

"For the first time in the history of the Freedom of Information Act, we have an entire agency virtually exempted," asserted Jack C. Landau, director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

This and two unrelated actions by Congress, as well as a score of proposals, are worrying some press and consumer groups, which believe that the measures constitute a major effort to restrict access to Government records. Mr. Landau termed it "a movement to engage in the real mutilation" of the Freedom of Information Act.

The Senate Intelligence Committee last week took under consideration a new, shortened draft of a Central Intelligence Agency charter that many feel would further erode the Freedom of Information Act. The new proposal, a less stringent version of the 173-page charter introduced earlier this year, would exempt the C.I.A. from the major provisions of the act.

Exemption for F.B.I. Proposed

Another piece of proposed legislation would in effect exempt the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Freedom of Information Act.

Eight major press organizations have stated their opposition to the Freedom of Information exemptions in the draft of the Federal Trade Commission bill, which the full House and Senate are expected to take up this week.

The current form of the bill would permit the commission to keep secret all material submitted to it in connection with an investigation. Thus, in an investigation to determine whether a company had violated a civil or a criminal law, the commission would not be required to divulge any material submitted to it by the company in connection with the inquiry. Consumer groups and the press contend that these are details the public is entitled to know.

Under current law, the trade commission may divulge information that falls into the "trade secrets" category if it believes the information to be in the public interest. The new bill would remove the commission's discretion to disclose such information.

Concerned About Precedent

Press groups are concerned that the F.T.C. bill will provide a precedent for other agencies. If business information supplied to the trade commission is protected, they ask, will similar material turned over to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, for example, be exempted next?

Under current law, the Central Intelligence Agency is required to release information to the public and the press unless it is properly classified and its release would cause "identifiable damage to national security." The agency has frequently and successfully invoked this broad exemption.

The Senate Intelligence Committee is studying new categories of information that would be made exempt from disclosure. These include intelligence obtained by nongovernmental confidential sources, intelligence that would identify a confidential source and information about the design and deployment of technical systems.

The provision that may well draw the most protest, however, would prohibit a court from reviewing these exemptions. In other words, there would be no judicial review of an agency decision not to divulge this material.

Individuals' Requests Permitted

The new bill would still permit individuals to request access to unclassified information about themselves on file at the C.I.A.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation also is now required to disclose a wide range of information to the public and the press. Under the Freedom of Information Act, it has been required to give out information about the Rosenberg spy case, the assassination of President Kennedy and its surveillance of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. At the same time, the bureau may refuse to provide information that would interfere with a pending investigation, "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" or "disclose the identity of a confidential source."

Under two proposed bills, this information would be kept secret. One bill, proposed by Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of Utah, would decree that F.B.I. law enforcement records be kept secret for 10 years after the termination of an investigation or prosecution. A second bill, introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and supported by the Carter Administration, would permit the bureau to destroy all of its criminal investigation records 10 years after the termination of an investigation or prosecution.

In all, there have been more than 20 legislative proposals introduced in this session of Congress that would limit access to Government information. These range from the exemptions of entire agencies from the Freedom of Information Act to exemptions that would protect the confidentiality of specific projects.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
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The Jimmy Carter Desert Classic

President Carter's absurd lie about why he is now coming out of the White House to campaign does not obscure the truth, which is this: partly by incompetence and partly out of cynicism, Carter allowed the Iran hostage crisis to become the dominant issue of American political life. Carter was incompetent in permitting the television networks to set the agenda of political discourse. He was cynical in using Iran as an excuse for not going out on the campaign trail, where he might have to engage Senator Kennedy in open debate. Carter's tactic worked for six months, serving to divert attention from his many other failures. But lately Carter's failure to resolve the crisis has begun costing him support. And so, suddenly, the president has announced that he can campaign now because the crisis is "alleviated to some degree." Alleviated? Following our failed attempt to rescue them, the hostages have been dispersed around Iran, leaving them even more isolated and endangered than they were before. Meanwhile, the botched rescue mission has cost Carter his secretary of state, the unsettling of America's allies, and further diminution of America's reputation as a competent military power. It has also strengthened the influence of the Soviet Union and various radical forces in the world.

None of this is to say that we disapprove of a commando raid to rescue the hostages. In principle, we believe such a rescue attempt should have been made much earlier—as soon as the men and equipment were ready and the minute it became clear that Iran's rulers were unwilling to return the hostages forthwith. If another rescue attempt tomorrow appeared to have a reasonable chance of success, we would support it. Iran has committed an illegal act against the United States—an act of war, in fact—and the United States is fully within its rights to take military action against Iran if it chooses. A military action whose mission is liberation of innocent hostages needs no apology whatever.

But whether Carter's particular rescue operation on April 24 should be praised or condemned is beyond our ability to judge at this point. Too much about it is still secret for us to know whether it failed because of bad planning or simply bad luck. The only way the country ever will be able to pass judgment on Carter's decisions is for Congress to investigate the failure thoroughly. We concur with the administration that it had no obligation to inform Congress in advance of the operation. To protect security, it had an obligation *not* to let the word out to every committee chairman who might deem himself entitled to know. But now that the operation is over and a failure, the administration ought to disclose to relevant congressional committees the reasons why. If legitimate secrets are involved—if the CIA really has a psychogenic drug that could have

immobilized everyone in the embassy compound, or if there still are US agents hiding in Tehran—then the committees obviously should conduct their inquiries behind closed doors and then issue a sanitized report.

Up to now, however, the administration has refused to cooperate even with committees whose members normally have access to the nation's most highly classified information. The committees are being given no more information than administration spokesmen are disclosing officially to the press and public. Maybe there is a case to be made for keeping much of this information secret, but then the case should be made straightforwardly. In the meantime, the administration is unofficially leaking buckets of data to the press, seemingly to convince the public that but for the technical failure of some helicopters and an unfortunate crash in the desert, President Carter would have gotten our hostages out.

There are still too many questions about the operation that raise suspicions about its planning and its chances of success. Why were only eight helicopters sent on the mission when a minimum of six were required, and when the rule of thumb in military operations is that, with helicopters, you double the number to make sure you are safe? The Pentagon seems to be mired in contradiction when it says it allowed for a margin of risk in adding two extra helicopters to the mission, but then describes the onerous and unprecedented 500-mile journey and the difficulties of the terrain and atmosphere in which the aircraft had to operate. What about charges, leveled chiefly by military analyst Edward Luttwak, that President Carter personally pared the size of the rescue force to the bare minimum (and perhaps below) in order to minimize risks? What makes Carter and Defense Secretary Brown so confident that the rescue effort would have succeeded once the commandos got to Tehran? According to leaks, the force was to fly from the desert to mountains north of Tehran, land, hide overnight, proceed by truck to Tehran, gain entry to the embassy, disarm the terrorist occupiers, call in the helicopters, fly out to a rendezvous with C-130 transport planes, and then leave Iran. It seems to us that an operation with so many legs would be terribly vulnerable. Trucks or aircraft might be sighted in Tehran, as they were even in the desert. Equipment might fail, as it did on the trip's very first leg. How were commandos going to get into the embassy without a firefight, which would attract attention? How were they going to rescue the three US hostages at the foreign ministry? The questions go on and on. Why should we believe President Carter when he says this operation had a good chance of success? If the Senate Armed Services Committee, with full cooperation from the administration, concludes this was a well-conceived, adequately equipped operation that was merely the victim of fate, we'll believe. Otherwise, no.

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ON PAGE 9THE NEW REPUBLIC
10 May 1980

Sweating it out in Tehran.

Iran Diary, 1980

April 7. Yesterday the three American priests, two Iranian priests, the apostolic nuncio, Annibale Bugnini, and Archbishop Hilarion Capucci arrived at the embassy with mail and gifts for the hostages. I asked Capucci to see if he could give a hand in asking the students to talk with me. Capucci is the Maronite bishop whom the Israelis arrested for smuggling explosives and ammunitions to the Palestinians. Along with three American priests he has been chosen to celebrate the Easter religious services at the embassy, and he came yesterday morning, accompanied by Archbishop John G. Nolan, president of the Vatican Mission for Palestine. All black-veiled and dressed up in the ecclesiastical vestment, his dark tunic enriched by the golden chain with the pendant of precious amethysts, his right hand holding the Pastoral cane, he looked very confident of solving the hostage drama: one would say that he planned to leave Tehran with a couple of released hostages. But when I heard him over the telephone, his voice sounded crushed. He kept saying: "Catastrophique, c'est catastrophique."

All of the hostages were not shown during their visit. The priests were escorted by the students to three different rooms: in the first room were two of the American priests and Archbishop Bugnini; in the second room, one of the American priests and the two Iranian priests; in the third room, Archbishop Capucci alone. Then, in each room, they were joined by small groups of hostages. With the students and the Iranian TV constantly present, the visit went on for six hours. During those hours, the priests and the hostages exchanged rooms several times. Was this to confuse the visitors and prevent them from counting the persons who were permitted to see, or better to control everybody? Both things, probably, but the fact remains that none of the priests could count the hostages.

Archbishop Capucci alone met with one group of hostages when the other priests had left. There were nine or 10 in this fourth group. Capucci did not count them. Maybe he was too upset. These hostages looked rather depressed. (Only depressed?) I'm sure that the nine or 10 were the ones who have been kept for five months tied up in the embassy basement. Of course all the visitors, Capucci included, will say that no hostage is kept in the basement, no hostage is still tied up. When they see them, they are not in the basement and they are not tied up. But I know this from someone else who knows. Those in the basement are the people con-

sidered unmistakably spies, and some of them are or have been recently tied up because they attacked the students. I also know that one of these tried to commit suicide three times. The third time he was so close to death he was taken to the hospital. Did he die? Was he in the fourth group or not?

Maybe my main questions to Bani-Sadr shouldn't be about the hostages or the Soviet Union, two subjects that he knows nothing about. They should be: Mr. Bani-Sadr, don't you think that this story humiliates you even more than the Americans? Mr. Bani-Sadr, when I interviewed Bazargan last September he told me that Iran was impossible to rule because Khomeini wouldn't allow anyone to rule. You scorned Bazargan for those declarations and did everything in your power to eliminate him as prime minister. Aren't you now in exactly the same situation as Bazargan last September? Mr. Bani-Sadr, are you aware that a new verb has been forged for you, the verb "to Bazarganize," and that you are named the Bazarganized Bani-Sadr?; Mr. Bani-Sadr, is a new royal dynasty being created in Iran, the Khomeini dynasty?

After my ambassador called five or six times to establish a time for my interview with Bani-Sadr, Aboghasal Sadegh of the Foreign Ministry finally assured him that the date was still set for Friday, and promised to send a messenger to the hotel with news of the exact time. No messenger came.

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Oriana Fallaci

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8 May 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Hostage Rescue Try Wasn't Necessary

President Carter justified the disastrous Iranian rescue mission on grounds that deteriorating conditions inside Iran had placed the American hostages in greater jeopardy than they had been in. But the president's intelligence experts had reported just the opposite.

In other words, the fiasco that cost eight American lives, humiliated the United States and added to the hostages' danger was not necessary. And the president had been told that.

As recently as April 18, a secret intelligence report concluded that the continuing political turmoil in Iran posed no particular threat to the captives in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

"The situation in Iran is no better and no worse than six months ago," the report stated. It also warned that economic and military sanctions were not likely to gain release of the hostages.

Furthermore, though Pentagon spokesmen have denied any knowledge of a study showing that the rescue mission might have resulted in the deaths or injuries of nearly half the hostages and an even greater number of their rescuers, reliable sources assured my reporter Ron McRae that just such a "worst-case scenario" did exist.

It was hoped, of course, that all the hostages would have been brought out unharmed, while subterfuge and anesthetic gas would have enabled the rescuers to avoid any casualties if all went well. But the so-called "worst-case scenario" envisioned 20 casualties among the 53 hostages and 50 or more among their rescuers.

And while Carter has made much of the fact that no Iranians were harmed in the aborted rescue attempt, what he has chosen to ignore is that the "humanitarian" effort called for use of massive lethal force that could have brought death or injury to hundreds of Iranians. The main reason the Iranian people—for whom the president expressed such concern—were not subjected to bombing was that the mission was called off in its preliminary stage.

The helicopters that were to be used to evacuate the hostages and their rescue team were to be given protective cover by F14 fighter aircraft from the carrier Nimitz. Contingency plans called for the bombing of selected targets around the embassy compound to prevent reinforcements to the Iranian militants holding the embassy captives.

In short, the president's claim that the rescue mission was nonmilitary in character was, to put it mildly, disingenuous. Had the mission proceeded to its second and third stages, it might well have resulted in a bloody battle.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
8 May 1980

U.S. Rescue Try Fuels Suspicions in Iran

By William Branigin
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN—Last month's failed U.S. hostage rescue mission appears to be taking a domestic political toll in Iran, amid a crossfire of hints and charges that the U.S. commandos had Iranian collaborators.

Intentionally or not, American statements seeking to explain and justify the mission in its tragic aftermath have had the effect of arousing Iranians' suspicions of each other. Some Iranians now fear that the attempted rescue may result in a witch hunt against Western-oriented dissidents on charges of being linked to the United States.

In the flurry of domestic recriminations, controversies have sprung up over such subjects as the Iranian air force's strafing of the American aircraft abandoned at the desert landing site and the publication of a love letter in a Tehran newspaper.

Accusations have surfaced that elements of the Iranian armed forces may have cooperated with the rescue

mission. There have been signs that some Moslem clerical hardliners may try to use the raid to discredit moderate secular rivals.

If nothing else, leaks in Washington that people in Iran were involved in the rescue effort have contributed to intricate and imaginative conspiracy theories.

President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr has charged that clashes between leftists and rightists on Iranian university campuses before the mission, a wave of terrorist bombings in Tehran afterward and the continuing warfare between government forces and Kurdish guerrillas in western Iran were all part of a U.S. plot against the Iranian revolution.

In an apparent attempt to make political capital of the U.S. attempt by rallying public support for his programs, Bani-Sadr has charged that the goal of the operation was not to rescue the American hostages but to topple his government.

Bani-Sadr's clerical rivals, meanwhile, seem to be drawing a bead on some leading secular figures by dropping

hints that they might have been involved in the alleged American plot.

No names have been officially mentioned, although the religious supervisor of Iran's Interior Ministry, Ayatollah Mohammed Reza Mahdavi Kani, has said that four Iranians and three foreigners have been arrested so far in connection with the Tehran bombings.

"Supposing some top names were involved," he told a Tehran newspaper, "Even then it is not advisable to make their names public because of the country's prevailing situation."

One immediate effect of the U.S. rescue attempt has been to make Iranians even more wary than they have lately become about contacts with foreigners, especially Americans.

"I'm afraid to associate with my American friends," said a U.S.-educated Iranian banker. "Just the fact that I studied in the States means to many people that I'm a potential American agent."

Also apparently suspect in the wave of internal paranoia generated by the U.S. rescue mission are Iranian military personnel trained in the United States or who worked with American technicians or military advisers here. Suspicions that Iranian servicemen may have collaborated with the raid stem from the U.S. team's evasion of Iranian radar on the flight to the desert landing site and the Iranian attempt to destroy the U.S. aircraft soon after the rescue effort was announced by Washington.

Adding to the controversy was the death of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander who was among the first to arrive at the landing site after the Americans left.

Although Iranian officials initially said he was "martyred" while inspecting a booby-trapped helicopter, eyewitness reports indicated that he was killed when Iranian air force F4s strafed and rocketed the aircraft.

Critics of the strafing have charged that valuable documents and equipment were destroyed along with the aircraft and hinted that this may have been part of an effort to suppress information about the American plan.

Since then government and military officials have been at pains to justify the operation, but no one has directly accepted responsibility for ordering it.

In a local newspaper interview a day after the rescue mission was aborted, Bani-Sadr defended the bombardment on the grounds that American technicians had installed Iran's radar system and knew how to evade it if they wanted to reenter Iran.

"Since it was very likely that the United States would take some action to steal these helicopters, this order was issued," Bani-Sadr explained. "The purpose was to put the helicopters out of action so they couldn't be taken out of Iran."

Bani-Sadr's explanation was backed up by the chief of military joint staffs, Maj. Gen. Hadi Shadmehr, who claimed that the American commandos left a radio transmitter on in one of the helicopters to pinpoint the landing site for a later attempt to retrieve the aircraft.

Asked if sensitive U.S. documents had been destroyed along with the U.S. helicopters, Bani-Sadr said that if any existed they would not have been damaged "since this operation was only for putting the helicopters out of order."

However, the commander of the Iranian Air Force, Gen. Amir Bahman Bacher, told the newspaper Kayhan that the attack on the abandoned helicopters had not gone precisely according to plan.

"Unfortunately, some sensitive areas such as their gasoline tanks and engines caught fire when the helicopters came under fire," he said. "One was not damaged at all and could be flown."

Bagheri said he was appointing a team to investigate what Kayhan called the "suspicious death" of the Revolutionary Guard commander, who the paper said was rumored to have gained access to the plans and documents on the U.S. military plan.

Suspicions also have been stirred by publication in the Tehran newspaper Bamdad of a love letter addressed to "Arya." Although it can be a man's name, Arya also recalls the deposed shah's title of "Aryamehr," meaning "light of the Aryans."

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"My Arya, my unique, my summit, my glory," said the letter, published in Bamdad's personal messages column April 30. It asked in conclusion, "how should I know when I will join you?" It was signed, "Sacrificed for you, the red flower."

A leaflet distributed by Moslem fundamentalist followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini charged that the message was a secret code connected with a plot against Iran.

"Simultaneous with the American government's military invasion and its unsuccessful coup plot, fifth columnists and agents of SAVAK, the shah's secret police, are carrying out a wave of sabotage, disturbances and bombings in Iran against the Islamic republic," the leaflet said. "An espionage role is being played by embassies and new agencies and local devoted journalists. This information is exchanged through condolences, poems, announcements, etc. in codes to let their masters know what is going on here."

The broadsheet warned Iranians to beware of such imperialist tricks and to "play your revolutionary role accordingly."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
8 May 1980

Iranian Said to Have Warned of Storms

By George C. Wilson,
Washington Post Staff Writer

Decision makers were asking for trouble from sand or dust storms by launching the hostage rescue mission over the desert back country of Iran in late April, according to information brought to light in a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee.

Rep. Robert W. Daniel Jr. (R-Va.), a former CIA officer and pilot, told Pentagon witnesses that an Iranian air force general, Amir Hossein Ghoreishi, had informed him that late April was risky for the helicopter part of the mission because of sandstorms in southern Iran.

Although Daniel would not discuss what went on during Tuesday's secret committee session, he did confirm in an interview that Ghoreishi had made that point about the storms.

"He knows what he's talking about," said Daniel of Ghoreishi, a one-star general in the Iranian air force who is now in the United States and recently met with the congressman. "He said it was a well-established fact that the chances of these storms were increased by waiting until April 24 to launch the mission rather than earlier in the year."

The Pentagon has denied that it had expected an increased risk from sand or dust storms if the mission were conducted after March. As it turned out, one of the two would-be rescue helicopters turned back to the aircraft carrier Nimitz because of a huge dust storm and two others landed on the desert until the worst of it blew over. The mission was scrubbed for lack of enough helicopters.

In other developments yesterday:

- Chairman Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) of the Senate Intelligence Committee denounced leaks of details about the plan and demanded an FBI investigation in a strongly worded letter to Director William H. Webster.

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a formal report to the House Armed Services Committee about the first phase of the raid, revealing little new information.

- The Pentagon announced that

President Carter will deliver the eulogy for the eight servicemen killed in the raid at a memorial service in the Arlington Cemetery amphitheater tomorrow at 9:30 a.m.

- Two of the commandos burned in the raid were released from the Brooke Army Medical Center at San Antonio after a two-week stay.

Released were Marine Maj. John Schaefer of Los Angeles and Air Force 1st Lt. Jeffrey Harrison of Warren, Ohio.

Col. Basil A. Pruitt, hospital commander, said Staff Sgt. Joseph Beyers III of Charleston, S.C., remains in critical condition, and Marine Maj. Leslie Petty of Jacksonville, N.C., is in serious condition.

The fifth injured serviceman, Airman 1st Class William Tootle of Fort Walton Beach, Fla., was released last week from the Lackland Air Force Base hospital in Texas after treatment for a knee injury.

In making his demand for an FBI investigation of leaks, Bayh acknowledged that prosecutions rarely result but said "if we find out who's doing this and kick their rear end out of government, that's a good start." He said the leaks especially angered him because they obviously were coming from the same administration that complains Congress cannot keep secrets.

Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) of the House Intelligence oversight subcommittee voiced a similar complaint. He said details leaked by the administration could endanger any operatives left in Iran.

In their 22-page unclassified report on the raid, the Joint Chiefs confirmed that "classified material" had been left aboard helicopters abandoned on the Iranian desert near Tabas.

Retrieving the secret material, said the chiefs, "was determined to be too dangerous" for the helicopter crews and people in the C130 transports alongside. A giant fire was raging at the time as a result of a collision between a helicopter and a C130, setting off ammunition.

The chiefs revealed that the lead RH53 helicopter and the one flying alongside it, both landed during the dust storm and then took off again, making them late for the refueling rendezvous.

Adm. Robert Long, Pacific commander, said in Honolulu yesterday that fighting the dust storm, which was 3,000 feet high and 190 miles long, had left the helicopters in a near "state of exhaustion." They were supposed to fly on to a mountain hideaway the first night under the plan.

Staff writer George Lardner Jr. contributed to this article.

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES

IRAN :

SUN-TIMES (FIELD NEWS SERVICE)

WASHINGTON-ONE OF THE U.S. HOSTAGES HELD IN IRAN HAS TRIED THREE TIMES TO COMMIT SUICIDE; ITALIAN JOURNALIST ORIANA FALLACI REPORTS IN THE MAY 10 ISSUE OF THE NEW REPUBLIC MAGAZINE.

FALLACI WROTE THAT THE HOSTAGES WHOM THE MILITANTS CONSIDER TO BE AMONG NINE OR 10 "UNMISTAKABLY SPIES" AMONG THE 50 BEING HELD, ALMOST SUCCEEDED IN KILLING HIMSELF THE THIRD TIME AND WAS SO CLOSE TO DEATH HE WAS TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL.

FALLACI HAD GONE TO IRAN IN APRIL, BEFORE THE ABORTED U.S. ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE 50 HOSTAGES HELD IN THE U.S. EMBASSY AND THREE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. SHE HAD EXPECTED TO INTERVIEW PRESIDENT ABOLHASSAN BANI-SADR, BUT HE BACKED OUT BECAUSE OF AN UNFLATTERING INTERVIEW FALLACI HAD CONDUCTED WITH AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI. THE KHOMEINI INTERVIEW WAS WIDELY REVILED IN IRAN.

SHE SPOKE WITH ARCHBISHOP HILARION CAPUCCI, THE MARONITE CLERIC WHO WAS ONE OF THE PRIESTS WHO CELEBRATED EASTER SERVICES FOR THE HOSTAGES. FALLACI NOTED THAT NONE OF THE PRIESTS SAW ALL OF THE HOSTAGES TOGETHER, BUT THAT CAPUCCI ALONE MET WITH ONE GROUP OF NINE OR 10 AND REPORTED THAT THEY LOOKED RATHER DEPRESSED.

FALLACI SAID SHE IS CONVINCED THAT THESE NINE OR 10 COMPOSE THE GROUP THOUGHT BY THE IRANIANS TO BE SPIES AND WHO, SHE WROTE, HAD BEEN KEPT, SOMETIMES TIED UP, FOR FIVE MONTHS IN THE EMBASSY BASEMENT.

FALLACI WROTE THAT SHE LEARNED FROM ONE "WHO KNOWS" THAT "THOSE IN THE BASEMENT ARE THE PEOPLE CONSIDERED UNMISTAKABLY SPIES, AND SOME OF THEM ARE, OR HAVE BEEN, RECENTLY TIED UP BECAUSE THEY ATTACKED THE STUDENTS (MILITANTS HOLDING THE HOSTAGES)."

"I ALSO KNOW THAT ONE OF THESE TRIED TO COMMIT SUICIDE THREE TIMES," FALLACI CONTINUES. "THE THIRD TIME HE WAS SO CLOSE TO DEATH HE WAS TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL. DID HE DIE? WAS HE IN THE FOURTH GROUP (THE ONE THAT MET WITH CAPUCCI)?..."

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
8 May 1980

Iran Is Queried For Details on Alleged U.S. Spy

TEHRAN, Iran (UPI) — The Swiss Embassy in Tehran, which represents U.S. interests in Iran, has asked the Iranian government for information on an American woman reportedly held by revolutionary police on charges that she is a CIA spy, officials said today.

A spokesman for the embassy said information from "unofficial sources" identified the woman as Cynthia Dwyer, a free-lance journalist from Buffalo, N.Y.

In Buffalo, the woman's husband, John Dwyer, said he has received reports that his wife was arrested in Iran. He said he had not spoken to her since Sunday and denied she is a spy.

In Washington, the State Department said Mrs. Dwyer, who entered Iran April 15 and was to leave three days ago, had no connection with the U.S. government.

After the U.S. commando mission to rescue the American hostages was aborted, Islamic militants launched a campaign aimed at finding suspected spies, alleging that the United States had received help from within the country for the expedition.

The Swiss Embassy spokesman said the first word on the arrest of the woman came from the Iranian newspaper Kayhan and most of the details available so far had come from "unofficial sources."

"If this woman was arrested and her name is Cynthia Dwyer then, yes, we are trying to obtain a clarification," the spokesman said.

The Kayhan reported Tuesday that an unidentified woman was arrested in possession of "documents" proving that she was working for the CIA.

The newspaper said the police contacted the Foreign Ministry to report the arrest but did not hand over their prisoner to the ministry as instructed.

In a telephone call to the Buffalo Evening News on Sunday, Mrs. Dwyer said, "I don't think there's anything to worry about."

There has been no word about the woman's whereabouts since.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
8 May 1980

Pentagon Says Raiders Traded High Risk for Surprise

Report Tells Theory Of Aborted Mission

By John J. Fialka

Washington Star Staff Writer

The central theory behind the aborted raid to free the hostages in Tehran was that "a lean but adequate force that struck swiftly and unexpectedly stood a good chance of rescuing the hostages."

According to a 22-page report on the mission released yesterday by the Pentagon, considerable risks were taken by the raiders to achieve surprise. The original plans called for a force of only six helicopters for the entire mission.

"As mission planning was refined and more intelligence was gathered," the report says, two additional helicopters were added to adjust for an increased load and the reduced lift capability of helicopters in the warming desert air.

A more complete outline of the mission — which aborted after three helicopters failed — was outlined in a classified version of the report sent to the chairmen of the Senate and House armed services committees, which are investigating the failure of the raid.

The plan that began evolving within a few days of the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran placed great emphasis on "a surprise entry of the embassy with as little violence and loss of life as possible on either side," according to the report.

"The key to such a bold undertaking was surprise," the report says, asserting that a larger force "posed an increased danger of a fatal leak" that could have risked the lives of the hostages and the raiding force.

The use of helicopters was decided upon in the early planning stages as offering "the best prospects for success."

The helicopters, because of their limited range, required a refueling site and the planners, after examining satellite photographs and other intelligence data on an area about 100 miles in diameter, picked Desert One, an area of the Great Salt Desert that had a hardpacked floor. The area straddled a narrow, unpaved road.

The report says: "No other location could be found which would meet landing criteria and this risk was considered acceptable because of the calculated probability of very light nighttime traffic on the road."

An Iranian bus, loaded with 43 passengers, which appeared on the road as the first C-130 touched down, was the first event that was unforeseen by the planners.

The second unforeseen event, the report says, was "several nearly continuous areas of suspended dust" that caused great confusion among the crews of the eight CH-53D helicopters inbound from the carrier Nimitz. The dust eventually caused one helicopter to turn back.

A special weather forecasting group, assembled by the Pentagon, had been studying the weather on the helicopters' routes since early November, the report adds. After repeated practice forecasts, "by late February there was high confidence in the weather forecasting for the routes."

On April 24, the day of the raid, the forecast "called for nearly clear sky conditions, with high scattered overcast, good visibility and favorable winds." The report says that than "an exhaustive post-mission analysis of the forecast" found that it had been accurate except for the dust storms, which the forecasters had not foreseen.

The helicopters, which had taken off from the carrier Nimitz shortly before dusk, crossed the Iranian coast flying only 100 feet off the ground. They flew in four sections of two each, keeping radio silence. To their crews the layers of fine, suspended dust first appeared to be a "fog bank."

Once inside the dust storms, visibility soon degraded to the point where, as one pilot described it, it was like flying "inside a bowl of dark milk." The night vision devices worn by the pilots "compounded" their feeling of vertigo or dizziness.

Rather than break radio silence, the pilots of the first two helicopters decided to land and wait out the storm. The rest flew on, including the fifth helicopter, the one that carried the commander of the helicopter squadron.

Helicopter 5 became separated from the others in the dust. It also experienced a partial loss of instruments when a motor that powered a fan cooling the instruments failed. The cause was later traced to a cooling vent that had been accidentally blocked by cargo.

The plan called for the choppers to cross a mountain range undetected by flying low through mountain valleys. Without instruments, the Helicopter 5 pilot decided this would be impossible.

They reluctantly aborted, reversed course, found their way out of the dust and subsequently recovered aboard Nimitz with only minutes of fuel remaining.

At Desert One, the study says, six C-130s were waiting for the helicopters, keeping their engines running to avoid the possibility that one or more might not restart. Because another helicopter had had a rotor blade failure along the way, only six arrived at the site.

But the crew members of one of the arriving ships, Helicopter Two, had their own sad story to tell. A crack in a "jam nut" that was part of a backup hydraulic system had resulted in all of the fluid in the system being sprayed into the air out of the top of the aircraft. When the system ran dry, the system's pump burned out because it was supposed to be cooled by the absent hydraulic fluid.

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Although the helicopter could be flown on the main hydraulic system, the loss of that system in the air would make the helicopter's controls suddenly inoperable. There was no spare pump among the large number of spare helicopter parts brought along for the mission, the report says.

It adds: "Even if a spare pump had been available, there would not have been sufficient time to repair the source of the leak, replace and service the pump and still get to the forward location before daylight."

The crash, which cost the lives of eight air crewmen, occurred when the third helicopter was ordered to move away from a C-130 to provide room for the fourth helicopter to finish refueling.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
8 MAY 1980

Woman arrested in Iran

By Paul Taylor
Reuters

identified as journalist

TEHRAN — The American woman arrested Monday in Iran on suspicion of spying has been identified as Cynthia Dwyer of Buffalo, N.Y., according to the manager of the Tehran Hilton Hotel, where Mrs. Dwyer was staying.

Her husband, contacted in Buffalo, N.Y., said she was in Iran as a free-lance journalist.

The Swiss Embassy, representing U.S. interests in Iran, has formally asked the Iranian Foreign Ministry for information about Mrs. Dwyer, Ambassador Erik Lang said yesterday.

"Switzerland, as the protecting power, sent them a formal note this morning asking for information and the right to visit the woman," he said in a telephone interview.

The manager of the Tehran Hilton said that Revolutionary Guards arrested Mrs. Dwyer Monday night and took her from the hotel.

The guards said yesterday that they were holding her on suspicion of spying for the CIA, but the same guards said later that they had never arrested anyone and did not know Mrs. Dwyer's whereabouts.

In Buffalo, Mrs. Dwyer's husband, Dr. John Dwyer, said she went to Iran April 10 to work as a free-lance journalist. He said that when he tried to reach her yesterday, he was told that she had checked out of her hotel, leaving no forwarding address.

A Buffalo newspaper reporter said Mrs. Dwyer told him by telephone Sunday that she had visited with Iranian militants who are holding 50 American hostages.

Dwyer said his wife, who entered Iran through Turkey, was outspoken in her opposition to the policies of the CIA.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said that he did not know where Mrs. Dwyer was being held but that the ministry would make inquiries in response to the Swiss request.

The arrest came as Iranian leaders said they were intensifying the hunt for U.S. agents who might have been involved in the abortive U.S. commando raid in Iran on April 25. The raid was attempted to gain the release of the hostages who were then being held at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, a leading hard-line member of the Ruling Revolutionary Council, said at a news conference yesterday that the authorities had arrested an undisclosed number of people in the course of their investigation of the raid.

"It showed us that there are many hidden fingers of which we should be more aware," Beheshti said. He also accused foreign powers of provoking the continuing troubles in Iran's western Kurdish region, where autonomy-seeking guerrillas are fighting against government forces.

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NEW YORK TIMES
8 MAY 1980

Pentagon Reports on Rescue Effort But Senate Is Denied Some Details

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 7 — The Defense Department made public today a long report on last month's abortive attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran, but it declined to provide senators with information on how the mission was to have been conducted had it not been canceled.

The 22-page report, submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee, is the most extensive official description so far of the background and execution of the unsuccessful rescue operation. Pentagon aides said it was designed, in part, to answer critics who suggest that the raid was ill conceived and too risky.

In a memorandum attached to the report, Gen. David C. Jones of the Air Force, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "we are conducting a detailed review" of the mission, "identifying mistakes, lessons learned and actions required."

Testimony by Key Commanders

The report went to Capitol Hill as the Armed Services Committee held daylong closed hearings with the key participants in the operations, including the overall mission commander, Maj. Gen. James Vaught of the Army, and Col. Charlie A. Beckwith of the Army, leader of the commando team that was to have stormed the embassy compound in Teheran.

Senate aides said that General Vaught, Colonel Beckwith and other military witnesses had declined to discuss the whole mission, only the phase that was completed before the decision was taken to cancel the raid because of helicopter malfunctions.

The Pentagon's reluctance to discuss its entire plan for the operation annoyed some members of the committee. Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, is known to have complained that more details had been provided to the news media than to the Congress.

Other senators expressed annoyance over unauthorized disclosures to the news media on the operation. Senator Birch Bayh, the Indiana Democrat who heads the Intelligence Committee, called on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to begin an inquiry into the matter.

Bayh Letter to F.B.I. Chief

In a letter to William H. Webster, Director of the F.B.I., Mr. Bayh said it was necessary "to mobilize whatever forces are necessary to investigate and put an end of this destructive practice."

Aides said that Mr. Bayh, in particular, was concerned about news reports saying that the commando mission was to have been aided by intelligence agents who had covertly entered Iran weeks before the rescue attempt.

After the Armed Services Committee hearings, Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, praised the rescue

attempt, calling it "the best planned mission in my 40 years of military experience I've ever seen." But Senator Jackson seemed skeptical, saying that he had not been given sufficient details to determine whether the raid was "wise or prudent."

Senator John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, commended the "outstanding professionalism and uncommon courage" displayed during the raid, but also called for the formation of a new, antiterrorist command that "would include, under a single headquarters, all of the resources essential to the successful planning and implementation of such operations."

Senate aides said that Mr. Tower's proposal reflected concerns within the committee that the rescue attempt may have been hampered by a lack of cooperation among the various military units involved in the mission.

Size of Force Is Discussed

In its report, the Pentagon dealt with several issues that had been raised about the mission, including the question of whether a force of 90 commandos and a maximum of eight helicopters was sufficient to rescue the hostages. Stressing that "secrecy was paramount" in the operation, the report said that "a larger, more elaborate force, with its correspondingly larger supporting infrastructure, posed an increased danger of a fatal leak, which could have risked the lives not only of the rescue force, but of the hostages whom they were planning to free."

The report also defended the decision to rely on United States Navy RH-53D helicopters for the mission, reporting that their range and payload was suited for the raid and that their "familiarity as a fleet aircraft would help conceal their presence in Iran's nearby waters."

The report went on to say that "the pilots selected were the best and the crew composition was specially adjusted for this mission."

Question of Copter Maintenance

"In view of the flight conditions actually encountered during the night of 24-25 April, this experience paid off," the report asserted.

On the crucial question of helicopter maintenance, the report said that a "special clandestine procedure had been established within the naval aviation supply system" to insure that mechanics obtained parts in "a timely fashion without revealing the true purpose."

The helicopter crews, the report continued, arrived on the aircraft carrier Nimitz four days before the mission, adding: "By the time the mission was ready to launch, the crews were totally satisfied that they had not only the best helicopters available, but the best maintenance and the highest prospects for success at any point in their training."

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THE WASHINGTON STAR
7 May 1980

London and Tehran

The six-day siege at the Iranian Embassy in London ended with great credit to British authorities and to the skilled and brave men who broke the impasse. They saved all but two hostages, the victims having been slain minutes earlier by Iranian Arab dissidents pressing the grievance of their region against Persian rule. Four of the five terrorists died as a result of the shootout. There were no serious casualties among the Special Air Service commandos who stormed the premises.

Friends of Britain are happy to see London demonstrate such an effective deterrent to diplomatic terrorism in that capital. The SAS success, after patience had failed to end the siege bloodlessly, perhaps contains useful hints for other respectable governments dealing with attacks on diplomatic targets.

But this, regrettably, leaves out the Iranian government, which in the face of universal condemnation is still presiding over the most notorious diplomatic kidnapping of all. Prime Minister Thatcher's suggestion that Monday's victory for decency might improve the chance for ending the U.S. hostage crisis in Iran is, we're afraid, too hopeful.

It is difficult to keep track of all the ironies in the London incident, juxtaposed with the six-month captivity of more than 50 Americans in Iran. Iranian diplomats in London, after months defending the Tehran embassy invasion and the flouting of international law by their government, were themselves hostages in their own embassy. Iranian authorities, long attempting to blackmail the United States, vowed not to give in to blackmail in London. They proudly deni-

grated any thought of "surrender" or ransom, which they have demanded of Washington.

While disdaining any dealing with the Arab terrorists, beyond threatening to match them victim for victim, Iranian officials entrusted the fate of their embassy to one of the United States' strongest allies. The embassy was successfully penetrated and the remaining hostages freed, in a smaller version of what the abortive U.S. expedition aimed at doing in Iran.

Were the Iranians grateful to the British for breaking the siege? Not unanimously. The newspaper of the dominant Islamic Republic Party, representing the Shiite clergy, blamed the CIA and British intelligence for staging the London takeover as well as for blowing up the building to end it. (Iranian allegations of Iraqi involvement, more credible because of the neighboring country's hostility to Iran and Arabic identification, usually were accompanied by incredible charges of U.S.-Iraqi conspiracy.)

A country that enshrines the craziness fashionable in Iranian politics can hardly be expected to make reasonable connections between what was attempted in London and what has been done in Tehran. In London, the host government as a point of pride and honor comes to the aid of beleaguered diplomats and thus enhances its stature. In Tehran, the reverse holds true.

So the American hostages are untouched, for the moment, by the victory for civilization in the British capital. The enduring hope is that the message from the rest of the world, acted out in London and elsewhere, must eventually seep through.

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 May 1980

Bold rescue buoys London but Iran relations still cool

By Rushworth M. Kidder
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

London

Britain's self-confidence has received a welcome fillip from the successful rescue of most of the hostages held in the Iranian Embassy here.

In contrast to the failure of the American rescue mission in Iran last month, the lifting of the embassy siege in London after six days showed the British capable of far more than (in the self-deprecating phrase often heard here) "just muddling through."

As Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told a cheering House of Commons on May 6, the rescue operation "made all of us on both sides of the House proud to be British."

The 40 or so black-clad Special Air Service (SAS) troops who freed 19 hostages and killed four of the five gunmen came away almost unscathed after a brief but fierce attack. Two hostages were executed by their captors before the British assault, and three more were wounded during the shootings and explosions that marked the fray.

Apparently using specially developed stun grenades to temporarily blind and disorient the gunmen, the SAS troopers swooped from rooftops, on ropes, and reportedly blasted through the wall of an adjoining building in a well-coordinated, smartly planned raid.

Throughout the siege, the Iranian government communicated with the British through the British Embassy in Tehran — which, in accordance with European Community sanctions against Iran, has been slimmed to about half a dozen staffers. Yet even on the Muslim holy days, communications between the governments reportedly were good.

After the rescue, Iran's President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr sent swift thanks to Mrs. Thatcher. But although he described the "hostage-taking event at the Iranian Embassy" as "unjust," reports from Iran note that his phrasing seemed to argue away any

similarities between the London embassy siege and the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran last November.

Whether Britain can build a closer relationship — close enough perhaps, to mediate the Iranian-American dispute — is still unclear. The British will is there, however.

"I believe the way the operation was carried out in this country," said Mrs. Thatcher in the House of Commons, "will have an effect on the future position with regard to the American hostages in Iran."

But Iran-watchers note that a fundamental part of the equation — the balance of power in Iran's internal struggles between clerics, politicians, and students — remains untouched by the London embassy saga.

The official Iranian line remains that the American Embassy was a "nest of spies," while the London embassy was victim of a plot by the British, the US Central Intelligence Agency, and the Iraqis.

Will the freeing of the hostages improve British-Iranian relations? "One just has to be pessimistic in view of what they've said publicly," says a Western diplomat.

Iran-watchers here point out that Britain, after the United States, is public enemy No. 2 in Iran — "maybe even No. 1 1/2," says one. Anti-Shah Iranians bitterly recall the part played by Britain with the CIA in the overthrow of former Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953, when the Shah returned to power. Mrs. Thatcher's support of President Carter has not helped close the rift.

Nevertheless, says a British diplomat close to the siege, the Iranians "played it very straight."

"They could have been difficult," he said, and could have "taken a very antagonistic line" in order to forestall an unfavorable contrast between Britain's protection of embassies and Iran's lack of it.

Iran was much more helpful than other Arab nations who reluctantly consulted the British on the last day of the siege, the diplomat says.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A21THE WASHINGTON POST
7 May 1980

Iran Refuses to Compare Takeovers of Embassies

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, May 6—Iran went to great lengths today to stress its view that the freeing of its diplomats in London and the condition of the American hostages held here were in no way comparable.

President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh claimed the heroism of Britain's elite Special Air Services was a "victory" for Iran and Islam.

Bani-Sadr, in a second message to the British government, thanked Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher "for the steadfast acts of the police of your country" in this affair of the unjust hostage taking at the Iranian embassy in London.

A midday commentary on official Tehran radio insisted that the two cases involving diplomatic hostages were "as different as the earth is from the sky," and this evening Ghotbzadeh explained why on television.

"If a foreigner came to Iran and took over the American Embassy and asked for the separation of California from the United States that would not be acceptable," he said. That was his way of explaining why Iran ruled out the London terrorists' demands concerning the oil-producing province of Khuzestan, which has a large Arab minority.

Stressing the "irrelevant comparison" between the two cases, the radio commentary reiterated the now familiar theme that the seizure of the American Embassy here represented "the will of the oppressed nation against U.S. domination" and "demonstrated the ugly reality that hides behind the curtain of diplomatic immunity."

The Iranian government's and the London hostages' acceptance of their possible martyrdom — a constant theme in Shiite Islam, which is the state religion of Iran — "was finally

able to overcome darkness and ruin," the radio commentary added.

It insisted that unlike the case of the American hostages accused of spying here, the London diplomats had "no other duties but to represent their country" and "were taken hostage by a group of hired and deceived terrorists" in the pay of Iraq.

The official comment differed sharply from the anti-British attacks in Islamic Republic, the organ of the right-wing clerical Islamic Republican Party.

Setting the tone was its front-page headline, which ran a banner streamer charging the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence "mercenaries" were responsible for blowing up the Iranian Embassy in London.

The British Embassy, whose chancery was sacked and burned in November 1978, has also been under threat lately from the Marxist Fedaiyan guerrilla group.

Nonetheless, embassy sources said that two dozen Iranians called at the embassy to express thanks for the ending of the London siege, while an equal number telephoned.

President Carter praised the British government for what he called its responsible handling of the hostage crisis and its regard for human decency and international law, which he said contrasted with the "terrorist" attack on the U.S. embassy in Tehran Nov. 4.]

Meanwhile, a new wave of executions was announced by the revolutionary courts, bringing to about 300 the number of Iranians killed in this fashion since the revolution triumphed in February 1979.

The latest to be shot were seven men who were accused of plundering property, aiding Israel and mistreating of opponents of the now-deposed shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Judging by the description of the charges, many appeared to be members of the Bahai faith, a breakaway sect that Shiite Moslems consider apostate.

Another Bahai, Farrokhrou Parsa, the former minister of education from 1968 to 1974, became the first prominent woman politician sentenced to death by a revolutionary court. The only woman known to have been executed by the revolutionary court so far were prostitutes or brothel-keepers.

The official Pars news agency announced today that Revolutionary Guards in Tehran had arrested an unidentified American woman who had confessed she was a CIA agent.

Iranian media today revealed the assassination in the holy city of Qom of Hojatolislam Morteza Mahmoudi, chief assistant of Ayatollah Khazem Shariatmadari. Shariatmadari is the leader after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and has often opposed his policies.

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
7 May 1980

What's News—

World-Wide

BODIES OF U.S. SERVICEMEN killed in the Iran rescue bid were flown home. The remains were sent from Tehran to Zurich and placed on a plane bound for Dover (Del.) Air Force Base. The transfer appeared to be a victory for Iranian President Bani-Sadr against hardliners. In Tehran, newspapers reported that an American woman was arrested as an alleged CIA agent.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
7 MAY 1980

Iran claims arrest of woman in CIA

ASSOCIATED PRESS

Iranian authorities arrested an American woman who they charged was an alleged CIA agent, newspapers in Tehran reported yesterday, and three other foreigners and six Iranians were arrested in connection with a recent wave of bombings in Tehran.

The Muslim militants holding the U.S. Embassy, meanwhile, said they had completed the scattering of the U.S. hostages to a dozen provincial cities in Iran.

The American woman in the reported espionage case was not identified, nor were the nine other persons who were said to have been arrested.

The Tehran newspaper Kayhan reported that the woman was arrested Monday night, and it said that Iran's Revolutionary Guard, which apparently carried out the arrest, contended that it had documents to prove that she had worked for the CIA.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry reportedly asked that she be turned over to its custody.

In Washington, a State Department spokesman said he was unaware of the report and could not comment immediately.

In the past, the militants who seized the U.S. Embassy last Nov. 4 have claimed to have found documents in the compound that linked various Iranians, U.S. diplomats or others to U.S. intelligence activity in Iran.

The Tehran newspaper Ettelaat said that three foreigners claiming to be journalists and six Iranians were arrested in connection with a series of bombings in Tehran in recent days that have killed at least three persons.

The Revolutionary Guard in Tehran said it could provide no information about the three foreigners.

A total of seven West German journalists were detained in two groups last week — one group because it was

seen near the scene of a bombing — but all were released within days.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini claims that the bombings and other anti-government violence are the result of a U.S. plot against his government.

The 50 American hostages — and three U.S. diplomats in custody at the Iranian Foreign Ministry — are now in their 186th day in captivity.

The militants said they had sent a final group of hostages to the city of Kerman, 550 miles southeast of Tehran. They said they were dispersing their captives in order to thwart any new U.S. attempt to rescue them. According to the militants, small batches of Americans have now been sent to 11 Iranian cities — Tabriz, Shiraz, Mahallat, Mashhad, Jahrom, Isfahan, Najafabad, Arak, Qom, Yazd and Kerman — and some remain at the Tehran embassy.

The conservative Muslim Tehran newspaper Donya Iran said the hostages had been informed of the American rescue attempt and of the militants' renewed threat to kill them if the United States attempted any further military action against Iran. It said that word of the two developments frightened and upset some hostages, but that others were "indifferent."

In another development yesterday, the Los Angeles Times reported that former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance contradicted President Carter's assessment of the risks facing the raiders in the rescue mission.

Government officials say Vance privately disagreed with Carter's claim that the freeing of the U.S. hostages would have been the easiest part of the operation, the Times reported.

Vance quietly wrote a letter of resignation April 21, three days before the raid, and later said he could not support Carter's decision. He has not publicly outlined his specific objections.

Unidentified sources told the Times that Vance felt that freeing the hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran would have been at least as difficult as the other stages of the rescue mission, and possibly even more difficult.

But an unidentified White House official said Vance did not voice that disagreement during a secret briefing on April 16, when mission commanders, including Army Col. Charles Beckwith, met with the President and top National Security Council officials.

The President told reporters last week that "no one disagrees" with the "general consensus" that freeing the captive Americans would have been the easiest part of the operation.

Also yesterday:

- Tehran Radio reported that a firing squad executed seven men in Tehran's Evin Prison after they had been convicted of corruption and murder.

- In the central Iranian holy city of Qom, a senior aide to Ayatollah Sayyed Kazem Shariat-Madari was assassinated by three gunmen, who were then apprehended by police, the state radio said. Shariat-Madari, whose popularity in much of Iran rivals Khomeini's, was symbolic leader of anti-Khomeini agitation.

- Battles between government forces and Kurdish rebels continued in the Kurdish center of Sanandaj, and rebel forces shot down two government helicopters, the Iranian news agency Pars reported. The army reported 72 soldiers killed during the last two weeks in Kurdistan, where the rebels are fighting for autonomy from the Khomeini regime.

- The Tehran Radio said "armed men supported by the Iraqi puppet government" attacked a guard post on the Iran-Iraq border at Naft Shahr. Three attackers were killed, it said. Tensions between Iran and Iraq flared into border hostilities last month.

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
7 MAY 1980

U.S. woman arrested & admits CIA role: Iran

Tehran (UPI)—Thousands of chanting Iranian women demonstrated their support yesterday for Moslem militants holding American hostages, and an unidentified American woman was reported arrested on charges of being a CIA agent.

The Kayhan newspaper reported the American woman was arrested Monday night and taken to an office of the Revolutionary Committee, where she was "immediately interrogated." It said she was to be turned over to the Foreign Ministry but that the transfer had not taken place. The report said revolutionary

guards found "documents" proving that the woman worked for the CIA and that later she had confessed to being a CIA agent.

"Moslem students, we're behind you!" shouted the demonstrators as they marked Iranian Women's Day.

Meanwhile, the militants who have held the United States Embassy since last Nov. 4 said that they had completed the scattering of their 50 hostages to 11 provincial cities in Iran.

The militants said they had sent a final group of hostages to the city of Kerman, 550 miles southeast of Tehran. They said small batches of Americans have now been sent to Tabriz, Shiraz, Mahallat, Mashhad, Jahrom, Isfahan, Najafabad, Arak, Qom, Yazd and Kerman, and some remain at the Tehran embassy.

Three other American hostages have been held at the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Elsewhere, an Islamic revolutionary court sentenced to death the shah's first woman minister, Farrokhru Parsa, on charges of corruption.

Parsa served as minister of education in the cabinet of the shah's premier, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who was executed last year after a summary trial. She was arrested several months ago while hiding in a house in central Tehran.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR
7 May 1980

Most Hostages Now Are Near Soviet Border

By Raji Samghabadi

Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran. — The militants holding 50 Americans hostage said last night that the process of scattering the captives all over Iran had been completed, and it was confirmed that a majority of them are in cities within 60 miles of the Soviet border.

The militants have transferred most of their hostages to the cities of Tabriz, 60 miles from the Soviet Union, and Mashad, 40 miles from the frontier.

In Tabriz, the hostages are being kept in the former U.S. consulate. The location of the other detention centers is not known.

The other cities to which hostages were taken were Qom, Arak, Malla-har, Shiraz, Jahrom, Isfahan, Najafabad and Yazd, as well as Tehran.

Meanwhile this morning, Iranian government departments seemed engaged in a deliberate cover-up of the arrest Monday night of an American woman on the charge of being a CIA spy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Islamic Guard Command, the Islamic prosecutor's office and the Ministry of National Guidance conveyed the impression that someone had indeed been arrested, but no one would confirm the report.

The case came to light yesterday in a story leaked to the mass circulation daily Kayhan. The paper, without identifying its source, said Islamic Guards had found in the woman's possession documents proving her to be an American spy.

The paper also said that the "spy" had been turned over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A senior diplomat said: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no information whatsoever about the case, let alone custody of the spy."

The Ministry of National Guidance, which deals with foreign reporters, denied any knowledge. "I have read the news story like you. Speculative accounts say she is a reporter. But we have no record of any woman reporter's arrest," said Abolqassem Sadegh, director of foreign press at the ministry.

An insider in the clerical establishment said that since the aborted U.S. rescue mission, the government has grown more suspicious of foreign journalists.

Last week Islamic Guards arrested seven German journalists. They were charged with espionage and participation in bombings in Tehran. After two days they were set free and allowed to return to West Germany.

The clerical source said: "Journalists have a perfect excuse to go everywhere and poke into any business. We don't say they are all spies. But no one can deny the temptation of the CIA to recruit them either."

He then quoted CIA Director Stansfield Turner's recent comment that he had approved the recruitment of journalists on three occasions.

The government's nervousness about spies has increased as evidence has been found supporting the idea that the United States had a "fifth column" in Iran for the rescue mission.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
6 May 1980

Iranians Split In Reaction to End of Siege

By Raji Samghabadi
Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran's civil authorities and clerical establishment split today, as they have in almost every key foreign policy issue, over the daring commando raid that ended the six-day siege of its embassy in London.

President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh thanked the British government today and commended anti-terrorist troops for their spectacular raid.

But the militant clergy stressed their belief that the CIA and British intelligence had been behind the siege.

Jomhuri Eslami, the organ of the dominant Islamic Republic Party, the main organization of the orthodox Shiite clergy, accused the two Western intelligence agencies of complicity in a banner headline on its front page today.

The headline — "Iranian Embassy Blown Up in London" — was accompanied by a smaller headline that said the mission building was blown up by "the mercenaries of the CIA and British Intelligence Service" after they "despaired of all hope for Iranian surrender."

The newspaper also printed the British Embassy's denial of the paper's earlier charge that Scotland Yard and the British government were cooperating with terrorists holding hostages inside the Iranian Embassy.

The text of the denial, in which Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated her opposition to terrorism and support for the concept of diplomatic immunity, was expressed in a personal message to President Bani-Sadr.

The newspaper added to the denial the following commentary in bold type:

"Evidence and indications related to the role of the British police in planning the armed occupation of the Iranian Embassy are so adequate and clear that England is incapable of denying the charge in its entirety."

Other papers treated the story factually and even contained commendations of the British anti-terrorist squad: "Six days of suspense and fear end in Tehran and London," said the mass circulation afternoon daily Kayhan.

In an interview with the newspaper, an Iranian diplomat in London said Abbas Lavasani, an embassy press official member who was killed by the terrorists, "always looked forward to becoming a martyr of Islam." Beside this story on the last page was another, devoted to the history of the elite anti-terrorist force of the British armed forces.

"The SAS is the only force chosen for appallingly dangerous operations. It was the same group that wrested the embassy from the terrorists yesterday."

The paper praised the elite force as the only men "who dare attack under conditions which make defeat a catastrophe."

The Tehran Times, the only English-language daily here, was straightforward and non-ideological in its report. "Siege Over" said its front-page headline, and a smaller headline read:

"Six-day Iranian Embassy siege ends in blood, bomb explosions and flames."

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 May 1980

Inside the news—briefly

Hostage in Iran specifies 'spying'

Tehran, Iran

A statement by an American hostage detailing alleged US spy operations in Iran, India, and Pakistan was broadcast three weeks ago on Iranian television; an undubbed tape was made available to Reuters by his captors just this week.

S/Sgt. Joseph Subic Jr., who described himself as a Defense Intelligence Agency assistant in the defense attaché's office at the US Embassy, said in the broadcast that a C-12 plane fitted with a concealed camera was kept by the United States at Tehran's Mehrabad International Airport until April of last year.

Sergeant Subic said knowledge of the espionage operation was confined to the ambassador, the defense attaché's office, and Central Intelligence Agency officials. He also outlined what he claimed were the workings of an intelligence-computer area beneath the US Embassy's supply warehouse.

The sergeant expressed dissatisfaction with the way President Carter had handled the hostage crisis and said he had come to learn about crimes committed by the former Shah. He alleged that the Shah's government had been controlled by the US government.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 25THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
5 May 1980**Letters to the Editor****Comment on the U.S. Rescue Attempt in Iran**

The covert action operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), like the armed forces of the Pentagon, are subject to the commands of the President. History shows some mistakes in presidential direction of both the armed forces as well as CIA covert operations: President Johnson's direction of the Vietnam war was a disaster. In the mid-70s some abuses and excesses in CIA operations were discovered. But, in the 7,093-page record of congressional investigations of intelligence agencies, it is clear that each questionable action was responsive to White House direction.

Imperfect presidential direction of our armed forces is often criticized in the media, but is not seen as a reason to abolish or severely limit military strength. Yet, CIA "misdeeds," distorted and exacerbated by the media's ravenous appetite for sensational news, has led to spasms of remorse and moralistic overreaction. We unilaterally simply declared an end to the Cold War. Responding to cries for reform from civil rights groups, the President and Congress destroyed most of CIA capacity for covert action. The result is that today we have little choice between military action or accepting terrorists' actions against our diplomats and businessmen.

Without all the facts no one should criticize the President for the rescue attempt in Iran. This was not a CIA covert operation, requiring advance briefing of eight congressional committees. Yet, the unstable situation in Iran, with several competing groups, would be fertile ground for covert operations, if only some assets and operational capacity were available. Covert guidance and support of friendly indigenous factions could help achieve our objectives in Iran and other countries. Whether such groups exist and are available can be determined only by having some infrastructure and clandestine assets in place. The investigations by Senator Church and the influence of Vice President Mondale have assured that such capabilities are limited or non-existent.

Perhaps the Administration would now tolerate some covert action to influence events in Iran and Afghanistan in ways less likely to escalate into nuclear war. But, a viable covert action capability cannot be rebuilt in a few months. It would help to remove legislative restrictions and the Carter Executive Order of January 24, 1978. Also, acceptance by the Congress and the American media that an effective intelligence service cannot operate from Macy's window is essential.

San Antonio, Texas. **WENDELL E. LITTLE**

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ON PAGE A28

THE WASHINGTON POST
5 May 1980

Iranian Arabs Free Third Hostage From Embassy in London

Reuter

LONDON, May 4—Gunmen holding the Iranian Embassy here today released another hostage as the British government wound its way through a diplomatic maze in a slow but deliberate effort to end the five-day takeover.

Gunmen holding the embassy released Mustafa Karkouti, 35, the London correspondent for the Lebanese newspaper As Safir. Karkouti emerged instead from the building and had to be helped along the street by two policemen. Two other hostages were released yesterday.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Jordanian, Kuwaiti and Syrian envoys had been asked for help in resolving the embassy siege, where up to five Arab gunmen from the Iranian province of Khuzestan are still holding about 17 hostages.

Meanwhile, in Tehran, Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh said that, if necessary, tens of thousands of Iranians would march on the London embassy to free the hostages.

Ghotbzadeh said the Iranian people knew the hostages were ready for martyrdom and did not want their government to give in to the gunmen's demands for the release of 91 prisoners held in oil-rich Khuzestan.

"You must be certain that we will never neglect any actions for your freedom," Ghotbzadeh said. "And if it will be necessary, and you wish it, tens of thousands of Iranians are ready to enter the embassy without weapons and shouting 'Allah Akbar' [God is Great] and [punish] these criminal mercenaries of the Iraqi Baath regime."

In another development in Tehran, four members of a well-known Iranian Jewish family went on trial today before an Islamic revolutionary court charged with corruption, monetary offenses and espionage, the official Pars news agency reported.

Izaak, Abraham, David and Baruch Boruchim face the death sentence if found guilty of the offenses, which include embezzlement of public funds in building a chain of hotels and "creating an espionage center for American and Israeli agents and their servants."

Evidence against them included statements by hotel employes that they hosted "continual meetings of the Iranian Jewish Society in the hotels and organized meetings of Zionists."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18VILLAGE VOICE
5 MAY 1980

'Rescue' Covers Fears of a Coup

The Fifth Column: Who Was Waiting in Teheran?

THE MOVING TARGET

By Alexander Cockburn & James Ridgeway

Amidst the first intimations of direct conflict between Iran and the United States the stage could be set for a final, violent resolution of the crisis: sharp military strikes culminating in straight-forward assault on the regime in Iran, to which assault rescue of the hostages would take a very distant, if nonexistent, second place.

In this situation, the response of the Russians and U.S. reaction to their response will be all-important. With the departure of Cyrus Vance, there is now no prudent voice in Carter's crisis meetings. The situation could not be more dangerous. The world picture is very different from 1953, when the U.S. disposed of an Iranian government without undue world commotion.

In the wake of last week's abortive raid, the U.S. has a number of options. The first course, consistently rejected by Carter, but most likely to bring the release of the hostages, would be to make some form of apology for past sins and lower the heat. In other words, treat the hostages like the Pueblo crewmen. This is very unlikely.

The second course would be to let the political situation in Iran unravel further, against a backdrop of escalating tension and confrontation, in which such events as the aircraft encounter of Monday night would become increasingly dangerous.

There may however be a more appealing course for Carter; to move toward a straightforward crushing of the revolution and reconstitution of American influence, as in 1953. The most drastic mode here would be to bomb the oil fields, thereby draining the financial lifeblood of the regime, hastening its collapse, with a rapid thrusting to power of local surrogates from the middle class, and army officer corps.

Slightly less drastic, though with similarly tempting electoral appeal, would be the mining of Iranian harbors, a strategy more complex than might at first appear. Some of the mines would almost certainly end up in Iraqi harbors, and others would probably destroy non-Iranian shipping—Saudi or, indeed, U.S. property under the Liberian flag.

Two weeks ago, in Teheran, when close associates of President Bani-Sadr met to plan strategy, it was agreed by all present that the worst fate that could befall him would be for the U.S. to launch, and bring to a successful conclusion an Entebbe-style raid, rescuing the hostages in the U. S. Embassy. Were that to happen, they speculated, then the right-wing Muslim clerics would seize the occasion to charge Bani-Sadr with responsibility for permitting such an outrage. He would be hounded from office, and the clerics' hold on power would be confirmed.

Within days, the team of American commandos landed and came to grief near Tabas. Eight men lay dead, and plans, maps, money—and the corpses—were abandoned amid the wreckage. Had the mission gone forward as planned, at least six "Sea Stallion" helicopters, carrying some 90 men, would have proceeded across the desert to a second rendezvous in the mountains 100 miles east of Teheran. After hiding overnight, the force would have boarded vehicles already at the mountain camp, mingled with the traffic into Teheran, and made its way to yet another rendezvous in a warehouse. The following night the assault on the compound allegedly would have occurred, and the hostages rescued, with the helicopters picking up the survivors from either the embassy or a sports stadium nearby. A last rendezvous with the C-130 was to have taken place in western Iran for final flight from the country.

But the central mystery remains. Who comprised the fifth column in Teheran—the crucial ingredient without which the entire enterprise appears far beyond the frontiers of sober judgment? It was, after all, the fifth column's responsibility to prepare the mountain hideout, provide transportation, arrange for the movement of the troops, shelter them in Teheran, take them to the embassy gates, and finally help them in the assault and ensuing escape.

It has been suggested in Washington that special U.S. forces and CIA operatives were infiltrated into Teheran earlier this year in anticipation of such a mission. This version is not held by some supporters of Bani-Sadr, who have quite a different view of what transpired, one which involves suspicions of a possible coup attempt by leading clergy and government officials, which must be set in the overall context of Iranian politics since the overthrow of the Shah.

The Buried Past

A most remarkable aspect of the Iranian revolution has been that the secrets of a quarter-century of tyranny have remained hidden. Amid the unceasing hubbub of anti-American rhetoric, leaders of the revolution have preserved remarkable discretion in disclosing the details of dealings among the Shah, foreign corporations, politicians, journalists, and government officials.

It is true that some data has been released or made available at the Central Bank in Teheran. Similar access to the archives of such important ministries as Foreign, Defense, and Interior, has not been provided.

Moreover, under the imperious rubric of swift and sure justice, hundreds of important officials from the Shah's reign were executed before they could reveal the true extent of his political and financial dealings.

A few examples: Shortly after the Shah had fled to Cairo and Iran's embassy in Washington was taken over by the revolutionaries, reporters began to clamor for public disclosure of purportedly damning documents concerning payoffs and bribes. Acting ambassador to the U.S. Rouhani claimed he had sent the files back to Teheran. In Teheran, Rouhani's father, Ebrahim Yazdi—a close associate of Khomeini—insisted the files had been lost.

Last summer, a visitor to the Ministry of National Guidance in Teheran happened to spot on the cluttered desk of a secretary to Minister Minaji several letters discussing payoffs from the Shah's government to American journalists. The secretary was preparing to throw these letters in the wastebasket. The visitor promptly asked if he might take them. After much discussion, Minaji became involved. He promised to copy the letters and deliver them to the visitor. They never arrived.

Such withholding of information that would presumably buttress assaults on the previous regime and expose the Shah's accomplices, agents, and beneficiaries has been a recurring feature of revolutionary Iran.

CONTINUED

Within a month of the seizure of power, the late Ayatollah Taleghani, a key member of the Revolutionary Council, informed another visitor that the Council had reached a consensus: the revolution would soon mount a Third World equivalent of the Nuremberg Tribunals which would bring all culpable parties from the Shah's years to trial. Material witnesses before such a tribunal would include the leaders of the Shah's government, among them Prime Minister Hoveida.

But the rising curtain dropped abruptly.

A fierce propaganda campaign was mounted for swift revolutionary justice, lent fervor by the dissemination of atrocity photographs of torture victims. The Ayatollah Beheshti pressed forward with his revolutionary courts and in short order dispatched 500 material witnesses to the bosom of Allah.

The most telling implementation of this policy concerned Prime Minister Hoveida. He was tried first. Four to five hours before Bani-Sadr was scheduled to interview him, Hoveida was hauled away by the revolutionary court and shot.

The suppression of evidence and rapid extermination of witnesses soon provoked the questions: Who had so manifest an interest in hiding the deeds and data of the Shah's years, and why? In any post-revolutionary situation, there is an abundance of government officials, army commanders, intellectuals, and so on, with much to hide. In this particular instance, suspicions were circulated about many alleged revolutionaries, and four in particular: Beheshti himself, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, now foreign minister; Mostafa Tchamran now defense minister; and Yazdi.

Return of the Past

All, like many under the Shah's regime, had lived abroad; Beheshti in West Germany; the other three in the U.S. Their pasts appear murky, except for one fact: they were all activists within the Muslim Students Association, a body now viewed with considerable interest and mistrust in Teheran, since it received funding from American Friends of the Middle East, identified in the 1960s as a conduit of the CIA; a director of which was Kermit Roosevelt, who organized the 1953 coup against Premier Mossadegh. Two of the leaders, Tchamran and Yazdi, reportedly left the MSA and became leaders in the Iranian Students Association, which became anti-Shah in the early 1960s. Throughout, the lines between the CIA and its different siblings are blurred. Scarcely a student group did not have some kind of connection with the CIA. Not everyone felt impelled to conclude that membership in the MSA meant CIA con-

trol, but the suspicion remained that the past, for those notables and others like them, remained a sensitive topic, not immune to blackmail and kindred pressures. None was anti-American except in the most rhetorical sense.

The Battle in Teheran

Against this background, consider the current situation in Iran. Easily the most radical in the deeply divided leadership is President Bani-Sadr, elected three months ago by a 70 per cent margin. Bani-Sadr, despite popular acclaim, has little real power. He has no organizational roots and, until now, has not been able to control a single ministry, although he does have some sway over the Central Bank and the ministry devoted to radio and TV.

Arrayed against the president is the Islamic Republican Party, controlled by conservative Muslim clerics, led by Beheshti. The party controls 10 of the 15 provinces, and dominates what was left of the Shah's Pahlavi Foundation, which gives it a financial base. It controls a vast urban renewal-type project called The Struggle for Reconstruction, which has a large budget. Folded into this project are many of the Shah's properties, vast amounts of oil money, and other income-yielding ventures. The project dispenses patronage across the country. In addition, the IRP controls the Revolutionary Guards—about 16,000-strong—ill-trained but potent in Iran's disorganized state. The party also controls the revolutionary committees, which are now being merged with local police forces. Its leading members control the key ministries. It is, in short, a government unto itself.

The odds against Bani-Sadr appear to be heavy in the present struggle for power being waged under the erratic overall supervision of Khomeini. Bani-Sadr has in his favor the legitimacy of having won the popular vote and whatever benefits may accrue from the rising popular dislike of the mullahcracy, notably among the middle class, the largest of any Third World country. In the midst of a disintegrating economy, Bani-Sadr has gathered around him intelligent advisers with a rather clearer idea than the mullahs of what should be done.

His posture regarding the hostages has made more and more sense with the passing months: while the taking of the hostages may originally have been a radical act, the reaction generally has been bad for Iran and beneficial to its enemies. Bani-Sadr mentions the rise of Reagan, the increase in U.S. defense spending, and the reinvigoration of imperialistic self-confidence and sense of virtue.

The battle lines are clear and associates of Bani-Sadr now see the situation this way: not only was the fifth column conceivably inspired by one or another of the leading Muslim clerics—Beheshti or Tchamran are names mentioned—but the planned release of the hostages was part of a process designed to overthrow Bani-Sadr.

The failure of the mission has at least temporarily stalled the crisis, with popular enthusiasm for the victory over the great Satan's helicopters attributing overall generalship to Allah and his representative, Khomeini. Bani-Sadr will attempt to gain control of certain ministries. Finance, agriculture and commerce are mentioned. He will also try to reorganize sectors of the armed forces, which are nominally under his control. Thus, his preferred course is to inch his way to real power.

The omens are not seen as auspicious for this strategy. A firmer but alternate course would have the president step defiantly beyond the clergy and make an alliance with the Islamic leftists in the Mujahidin group, which has a political organization. The problem here is that Khomeini regards Islamic leftists as agents of Satan, and Bani-Sadr may not feel he can risk any form of rupture with the 12th century and its fanatical representative today.

Within the next couple of weeks, matters may be clarified. Terrorism is on the increase in Teheran, and the fear of a coup is waxing in the Bani-Sadr camp.

What the unsuccessful raid may presage—at whatever risk in confronting the Russians—is the more determined prosecution not merely of attempts to release the hostages but restoration of American economic and political interests in Iran. Full circle back to the fall of Mossadegh.

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 May 1980

Washington Whispers

Largely overlooked in post-mortems over the aborted attempt to rescue American hostages in Teheran, according to U.S. intelligence officials: Had the effort succeeded, Iran's rulers would almost certainly have reacted by rounding up some of the more than 100 Americans still left in that country and holding them hostage.

* * * *

From Western intelligence sources: The Kremlin is so concerned about growing instability in Cuba that it should not surprise anyone if Russian military forces on the island are increased to prop up Fidel Castro.

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12 May 1980

Raging Debate over the Desert Raid

Critics ask the Pentagon: Was it too little—or too much?

Three C-130 Hercules transport planes roared low across the Florida panhandle last week, two flying tightly as a pair, one trailing without its partner. This is the traditional "missing buddy" formation of the U.S. Air Force, a symbol of mourning for lost fliers. On the ground, in a green park just inside the gates of Hurlburt Field, some of the toughest men in the armed services could not suppress their tears.

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Meanwhile, investigations were begun by Congress and the Pentagon into what happened during the rescue and why it failed. Carter firmly defended his decision to make the attempt. He reaffirmed his confidence in the Pentagon's plan for the raid as "a fine operation that everyone believed had a good chance for success." And, he argued, using one of the year's more improbable euphemisms, "there is a deeper failure than that of incomplete success, and that is the failure to attempt a worthy effort, a failure to try."

Nonetheless, a worldwide debate was raging over the raid. A Pentagon whose planes had not even been detected while flying into Iran, much less shot at, now was barraged by bombs of criticism. Some were hurled wildly by armchair strategists, others by more knowledgeable experts.

The main target was the rescue plan. Some critics charge that it was too lean and spare, with far too few men and aircraft to overwhelm the militants holding the embassy in crowded Tehran, pick up the hostages and escape safely. On the other hand, other critics argue that the plan was too sophisticated and complex, with too many staging points and too many chances for detection before the assault on the embassy.

Under Phase 1 of the raid, three C-130s carrying some 90 air commandos and three others transporting fuel for helicopters took off from an airfield in Egypt. Eight Sikorsky RH-53 helicopters, flying in pairs, left the nuclear carrier *Nimitz* in the Arabian Sea. All were to meet at "Desert One," an unimproved landing strip in the Great Salt Desert southeast of Tehran.

Phase 2, never carried out, called for the C-130s to fly to Oman and the helicopters to ferry the commandos to a mountain hideout some 100 miles from Tehran. The raiding party would stay in hiding there throughout the next day. As darkness fell, the men would climb aboard trucks and buses, which would have been supplied by an undisclosed number of CIA agents and U.S. Special Forces men who had entered Iran earlier, some disguised as European businessmen.

The vehicles would slip one by one into Tehran and rendezvous at a warehouse that had been acquired by an American agent. During the night the commandos would divide into two assault teams. A small party would head for the Foreign Ministry building, where U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Bruce Laingen and two other U.S. diplomats were held captive. The other commandos would drive to the embassy compound, where 50 Americans were imprisoned.

Surprise and speed were essential. The attackers, confident that they knew where the hostages were within the compound, planned to scale the embassy walls and shoot or capture the guards. The assault team was armed with automatic weapons but, contrary to some published reports, did not carry disabling gas, which would have knocked out the captives and required them to be carried to safety.

As the assault began, four of the choppers were to fly to the embassy's soccer field. In the last stage of the assault, the hostages (by now joined by the three from the Foreign Ministry) and the 90 commandos would all leave in the four choppers. They would join the C-130s, which would have flown from Oman, at yet another airstrip, "Desert Two." There the choppers would be abandoned, and everyone would fly to safety in the transport planes.

All during the rescue, Navy fighter aircraft from the carriers *Nimitz* and *Coral Sea* would fly along the Iranian border, ready to dart toward Tehran if the assault party got into trouble. The U.S. planners did not fear Iran's once potent air force. Of the country's 76 advanced F-14 fighters, no more than seven can fly, and none can fire its Phoenix missiles, owing to the lack of maintenance. Iran has 187 operational F-4 fighters, 50 of them near Tehran, but none is equipped

for night combat. Moreover, insists a Pentagon official, "we knew where all their planes were," meaning that they could have been destroyed on the ground if that had been deemed necessary.

American military experts not involved in the mission's planning say that whether the scheme was sound depended on what kind of help the rescuers expected once they reached Tehran. The mission commanders, as well as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman David Jones and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, have refused to comment on speculation that units in the Iranian military or even defectors among the militants who were guarding the embassy were ready to support the operation.

One former U.S. official familiar with Iran finds the mountain hideout scheme more practical than it might sound, noting that there are several well-concealed plateaus in the remote mountains. But few experts can understand the contention of both Carter and Brown that the Tehran phase of the plan would have been easier than getting the assault team into position in the desert in the first place; both of them have refused to explain why they think so. Even some of the military planners concede that the complex mission violated an old Army rule called KISS, meaning "Keep it simple, stupid."

Other questions about the raid and the answers insofar as they were known last week:

Did the plan risk too many lives?

Pentagon officials have adamantly denied reports in Washington of a CIA estimate that 60% of the 53 hostages would probably have been killed in the rescue attempt. But *TIME* has learned that initial casualty estimates once ran as high as 200 fatalities, including both hostages and rescuers. The final plan did, indeed, envision the possibility of losing from 15 to 20 hostages.

Did the military planners want a bigger force?

Outsiders claiming firsthand information from the Special Forces officers involved in the mission insist that earlier plans called for at least 600 men and 30 helicopters in the assault force. Some of these critics contend that the plan was scaled down by President Carter and his National Security Council in the belief that a smaller strike would prove less bloody, less provocative to Iran's Arab neighbors and more politically acceptable at home.

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Indeed, in the months of planning that began within days of the seizure of the embassy last November, a wide range of rescue options was considered. "In the initial stages," General Jones said last week, "we did not see an option that had a reasonable chance of success. We tried and we trained and we exercised, and nothing was denied to us by anybody." Some of the earlier plans did envision a larger force but were discarded as impractical. One reason: the bigger the operation, the more difficult it would be to keep secret. So far, there is no evidence that the more restrictive plan was forced on the military by civilian officials.

What changed to make any plan at all seem feasible?

The planners are secretive about this. Yet it seems clear that they had been more successful than expected in getting covert agents into Iran, gaining support from people already in the country and picking up precise intelligence on where the hostages were and how they were guarded. Over the months, the militants had decreased their numbers and vigilance. Also, the U.S. had launched two secret military satellites in late November, completing the Air Force's positioning of six command and communications satellites around the world, including one over the Indian Ocean. The system could send almost instantaneous messages between the Pentagon and rescue commanders in the field. It might even have helped covert agents get information out of Tehran.

What went wrong with the helicopters?

The mission was canceled when three of the eight helicopters heading toward Desert One broke down while flying through a blinding sandstorm. An electrical power supply on one craft overheated and failed, knocking out the gyrocompass, the horizon indicator and the cockpit lights. The crew flew back to the *Nimitz*, making a dangerous landing, with fuel tanks nearly empty.

On the second helicopter, the crew set down in the desert because a warning light signaled that the chopper's 34-ft.-long rotor blade was in danger of failing. They discovered that it was cracked. The crew and all classified material were picked up by another helicopter.

The crew of the third damaged chopper pushed on to Desert One, despite the failure of a pump that propels the craft's back-up hydraulic system. It is essential, supplementing the primary hydraulic system, which operates the helicopter's control. Because the pump could not be repaired, the helicopter had to be taken out of service, and the rescue mission had to be scrubbed. Planners figured that the rescue required at least six helicopters. There were no back-up helicopters on the *Nimitz*; even if there had been, they could not have been flown to Desert One before daylight.

Did the unusually severe storms cause the malfunctions?

Although the sandstorms were common to all three helicopter failures, the mission leaders do not blame their problems on the weather. Pentagon officials disclosed that the choppers' 150-lb. sand screens had been removed to increase the engines' thrust by 3%, a possibly critical safety margin. But the screens are designed only to protect the engines from long-term wear from dirt, which apparently was not a factor in any of the breakdowns.

Investigators suspect that the overheating in the first craft resulted from a cooling vent having been blocked by a crewman's flak jacket and bag. If so, that obviously was human error. The swirling sand, investigators say, could not have cracked the rotor blade in the second craft. The cause may never be known. The failure of the third chopper's pump also is a mystery and presumably could not have been caused by sand because the helicopters' hydraulic systems are well sealed.

Was maintenance of the helicopters faulty?

From President Carter down to mission officers, this suggestion has been vehemently denied. To the contrary, they say, the helicopters got unusually meticulous care, even though their crews did not know of the impending mission. Fifteen maintenance men were assigned to each of the eight helicopters aboard the *Nimitz*. In addition, two civilian helicopter technical experts, including one from Sikorsky, were sent to the carrier. Almost daily, maintenance pilots flew the choppers to make sure that they were in top condition.

In fact, the crews tending the RH-53s recently won Navy awards for their exceptional maintenance record. The U.S. military may have a general problem in retaining skilled maintenance men, the mission planners concede, but the best were available on board the *Nimitz*.

Just eleven hours before the start of the mission, a sailor accidentally hit a fire control switch, dousing five of the RH-53s with sea water and foam. The aircraft were rinsed with fresh water and inspected. No visible damage was found.

Why were the helicopters not destroyed at Desert One?

So far, the mission leaders have not provided a satisfactory explanation. Fail-

ure to destroy the choppers enabled Iranian officials to obtain mission maps and other secret papers. Whether the documents revealed the identity of some U.S. agents or collaborators in Tehran is not known but seems improbable. The mission leaders suggested that after one helicopter collided with a parked C-130 at the landing strip and both erupted into flames, the resulting shrapnel and flying debris from exploding ammunition threatened to damage four other C-130s and strand the entire party. When asked about this last week, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, who was in charge of the 90-man assault force, said tersely: "That wasn't my job. I can't talk to that. I got all my stuff out of there." Perhaps protectively, the Navy has not revealed the name of the Marine colonel who commanded the helicopter crews once they left the *Nimitz*.

Did the commandos want to continue the mission?

Friends of Beckwith, 51, a true, if little-publicized, hero of Special Forces missions in Viet Nam, insist that he returned crestfallen from the failure in the desert, angry at being ordered to end the effort and on the verge of resigning his commission. But last week he appeared at a select Pentagon press conference at which photos were banned to protect his potential future usefulness in covert operations. He brusquely denied all allegations that he had opposed the decision to abort.

From the start, Beckwith said, everyone had agreed that if the rescue team could not fly out of Desert One with at least six helicopters, the mission could not go forward. After two of the eight helicopters had failed to reach the landing strip, Beckwith had been relieved at the arrival, although late, of the sixth. But then the pilot of the third damaged chopper told Beckwith that it could not fly. The colonel's one-word reply: "Bullshit."

Beckwith went to the overall on-site commander, Air Force Colonel James Kyle, and asked him to take a look at the ailing chopper. "Let's confirm this," Beckwith said. "I want to make sure." When Kyle climbed down from the critical craft to report that it was indeed useless, Beckwith said last week, his own reaction was immediate: "Sir, my recommendation is that we abort." The commander gave Beckwith a chance to change his mind, asking "Would you consider taking five and going ahead? Think about it before you answer me. You're the guy that's got to shoulder this." After only a few seconds of reconsideration, Beckwith said sadly, "There's just no way."

When a reporter persisted, asking again if Beckwith had not argued in favor of continuing the mission, the rugged six-footer bristled and replied in a soft Southern accent: "With

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all due respect, sir, you don't know where you're coming from. I've been there before, and I'm not about to be a party of half-assed loading on a bunch of aircraft and going up and murdering a bunch of the finest soldiers in the world. I ain't gonna do that. It was a no-win situation."

After the order to abort had been confirmed from both the White House and the Pentagon, Beckwith recalled, his first thought was "My God, I'm gonna fail." He ordered his men into the C-130s to take off, then rushed to gather up all classified papers and gear. He was aboard a C-130 when he looked out of a window. He recalled: "A 130 all of a sudden exploded. It was one hell of a fire. On that 130 were 39 of my people." Beckwith said there was no way to get the bodies out of the fire "unless you wanted to burn up everybody who's going in there." Said the much decorated and fearless officer: "I sat there and cried." ■

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Iranians as Captives

Iran got a taste of its own medicine last week. In London, gunmen took over the Iranian Embassy and seized a score of hostages, most of them Iranian diplomats. Identifying themselves as Iranian Arabs, the terrorists threatened to kill their captives unless Iran granted more autonomy to Khuzestan—an oil-rich province on the border with Iraq—and freed 91 Arab activists held prisoner there. British police cordoned off the building just off Hyde Park and conducted negotiations with the gunmen through an open window. Iranian demonstrators flocked to the site to shout pro-Khomeini slogans and words of encouragement to the hostages—first in Persian and then, for the benefit of television cameras, in English. Angry Britons countered with chants of “go home, you bums,” sung to the tune of “Auld Lang Syne,” and vendors sold hot dogs and ice cream.

Iranian authorities largely ignored the danger to their diplomats. At the weekend, as the siege entered its fourth day, they refused to bargain with the Arabs and announced that they were “ready to accept the martyrdom of our children in England.” Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh warned that for each member of the embassy who was harmed, one Arab prisoner would be executed. Teheran radio charged that the incident was “a joint plot hatched by the CIA and British intelligence” and accused Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of being a U.S. “puppet.” The Iranians claimed to see no similarity between the capture of their embassy and last November’s seizure of the U.S. compound in Teheran. “The London affair is a terrorist act,” said Ghotbzadeh. “The occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran is a reaction by the Iranian people.”

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NEWSWEEK
12 May 1980

Another Rescue Mission

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The President himself had surrendered to a passage of gloom in the ashes of his Iran misadventure and Cy Vance's departure. "You seem to be snakebit," House Speaker Tip O'Neill commiserated over a leadership-breakfast. "Apparently you get a good hand and the dealer drops the deck." Carter seemed, in a silent glance, to agree. A spate of postraid polls showed that America cheered the rescue attempt and that Carter might in fact have arrested his downhill slide in public favor even though it failed. But he privately confessed surprise at the numbers—"You'd have thought it would have led to political rebellion"—and he felt obliged to consolidate his advantage before it evanesced like an April morning mist. Aides urged his news conference on him—pressed him to "jut his jaw out and bow his neck a little" and show the world he was in control. He stepped on camera with a visible gulp for air, steeled to explain why it was that *he* hadn't quit instead of Vance. The question never came.

He hoped that night to announce an end to his six-month hermitage in the White House, but he wasn't asked that either; the question had to be planted at a meeting with political friendlies the next day. The First Shut-in had by then slipped out of the Rose Garden twice to meet and thank the commandos he had sent off to Iran. One day, he traveled by unmarked car and helicopter to the CIA's supersecret Camp Perry near Williamsburg, Va., where he spoke with 150 of the raiders—and where, by some accounts, he and field commander Charlie Beckwith wept in one another's arms. Next day, he flew south to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, slipped on a surgical gown and mask, and visited the four men burned on the mission. On both visits, the President said, the men thanked him for sending them, apologized for failing and begged for a chance to try again.

Neither trip was overtly political, but Carter has now yielded to the arguments of his handlers that his Rose Gardening had long since outlived its usefulness to him or the hostages and that he must start running now to beat Ronald Reagan in the fall. Breaking away required him to do a rhetorical dance not unlike former Sen. George Aiken's proposal for ending the Vietnam war: declare it won and walk away.

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CARTER'S JUDGMENT

Delaying High-Risk Raid Lessened Its Chances

By George C. Wilson
and Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writers

Vainly waiting for a diplomatic solution, President Carter missed the most opportune time for launching the hostage rescue mission to Iran, and thereby increased the risk of failure, according to government sources.

About last December, military planners from the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the president that, if he was going to launch a secret raid, he should do so within about about 90 days — before the end of March.

By April or before, they warned, desert sandstorms would howl across the Iranian backcountry, greatly complicating the long-distance logistics of the raid and lengthening odds against success.

When the mission was aborted 10 days ago, a raging late-April sandstorm in the southern desert of Iran was a principal component of the failure. It forced one helicopter to retreat to the Nimitz aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Oman, grounded another one temporarily in the desert and may have contributed to the technical breakdowns. The mission was scrubbed for want of enough helicopters.

This question of high-risk timing is one of many elements, disclosed by those with inside knowledge, which suggest an understanding of the mission plan that is quite different from that suggested by President Carter and his top military advisers, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The president and his officials have portrayed the mission as "snake bit" by bad luck and random technological failures, but they insist that the original plan had "good" to "excellent" prospects for success.

To some planners, however, it always looked like a high-risk operation. Indeed, in corroborating details now filtering out, the picture is clear: preparations were made anticipating the possibility of extensive casualties, including perhaps some of the hostages who were to be rescued.

This, in turn, underscores a fundamental change in President Carter's thinking about the long-running crisis. For six months, Carter said again and again that his main purpose was to save the 53 American captives in Tehran. But in launching the desert mission, he concluded that another objective had taken precedence — ending the crisis, once and for all.

Carter, said one administration official, wanted "to lance the boil," even if the outcome fell short of his original goal of rescuing all the hostages in good condition.

"A cancer that has to be removed," according to one adviser.

In fact, at one point the going estimate inside Pentagon and administration councils for a successful mission was as low as one in four, or 25 percent, sources said.

Gen. Jones came close to acknowledging this last week when he said at a Pentagon press conference that "in the initial stages we did not see an option that had a reasonable chance of success."

"After improvements, some in use of technology, exercises, concepts—we came to the conclusion that it was militarily feasible, and all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—we collectively addressed this—concluded that we had a good chance of success. There were some risks, yes."

Jones and others have steadfastly declined to specify the degree of risk, but one part of the operation that has not been disclosed before suggests heavy casualties were considered a definite possibility.

Besides the C130 transports waiting for rescue helicopters in a secret escape base west of Tehran, sources revealed, the plan called for having giant C141 transports on call in case there were too many dead and wounded to fit inside the two C130s. The casualties would have been flown to a hospital in Egypt, presumably in Cairo.

Although this fits under prudent worst-case planning, the inclusion of the C141s throws new light on Secretary Brown's April 25 assertion that, once the Blue Light commando unit reached the embassy itself, this "was the part of the mission of which they were most confident." Brown said he and the Joint Chiefs had focused on the embassy takeover part of the plan before recommending the mission to Carter.

The apparent reason Carter, Brown and Jones put so much confidence in a plan considered risky by some other insiders was their conviction that the assault force could be called back quickly at almost any "fail-safe" point along the way and that the embassy could be taken by surprise, according to sources.

Brown suggested as much last week when he said "the plan provided for the possibility of terminating the operation because of any difficulties, such as mechanical failure or detection by the Iranians of the mission."

Yesterday sources disclose that an elaborate recall network had been established in Iran, with superb communications linking it all together.

For example, sources said, the 50 to 100 "friendlies" infiltrated into Iran in advance of the rescue attempt were ordered to spread themselves out all along the advance route from the Blue Light teams' mountain hideaway east of Tehran to the embassy compound itself. The friendlies included U.S. military specialists and intelligence operatives.

As the commandos approached the city in innocent-looking trucks and buses mixed in with the night traffic, the friendlies were supposed to keep track of them and Iranian security forces every step of the way.

At the first sign that the cover of the mission had been blown, the Blue Light commanders would learn about it from friendlies plugged into the elaborate warning system. Then the commanders would have the option of calling everything off.

If the 90 Blue Light commandos reached Tehran undetected, they would have been assembled in a warehouse in the city staked out as a last-minute check point before racing into the embassy.

The troopers, commanded by Col. Charlie Beckwith, were going to thrust into the embassy like a stiletto, not a broad sword. The plan depended on speed, stealth and deadly marksmanship, not on some super-duper secret weapon like knockout gas.

The Blue Light commandos were going to kill or subdue the guards and herd the hostages to a predesignated rescue point, where the helicopters from the mountaintop hideaway

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would swoop down and fly them away to the C130s, which were waiting west of the city.

Blue Light's hand-picked sharpshooters were armed with .45 pistols with silencers and M16 rifles. These sharpshooters were so accurate, one source said, that during training Beck with and a visiting commander of a West German anti-terrorist outfit once confidently sat between target silhouettes while the commandos blasted away with their weapons.

If Beckwith needed outside help during the embassy takeover, he could have called in C130 transports armed with machine guns and 105-millimeter cannon.

The planes' crews were trained to orbit in the night sky over the embassy, "hosing down the streets," as one source put it, to stop any Iranian forces that might have tried to stop the rescue.

Another C130 crew was ready to orbit over the Tehran airport, blasting the runways to stop any Iranian fighter planes which tried to take off from there.

Far to the south, in the Arabian sea and Gulf of Oman, the aircraft carriers Nimitz and Coral Sea had tricky assignments, too. Some of their war planes were prepared to make a feint

at bombing Iranian oil fields at the head of the Persian Gulf, while others would protect the C130s and C141s flying out of Iran to Egypt with their load of hostages, commandos and perhaps a few of the friendlies.

Under that option, which might not have been exercised at all if the embassy takeover went smoothly, Navy A7 fighter-bombers would have feinted a bombing raid on the oil fields while F4 and F14 fighters would have provided the protective "cap" for the departing transports. Presumably any Iranian planes which got aloft would have raced south to defend the oilfields.

Officials stressed that the warplane option was defensive in nature and not part of any offensive strike against Iran. Indeed, sources say the plan did not include any punitive raids against Iran even in the event of a serious failure of the rescue operation. The idea was to stick to a rescue mission and not to undertake actions that could have inflamed the whole region and possibly driven Iran into Soviet hands.

Officials said it would have been too difficult to try to launch any sizable force of fighter-bombers over Tehran from the carriers. This would have required mid-air refueling at night since, when loaded, these warplanes have a combat radius of only about 300 miles.

The Joint Chiefs opted for going fast and light, counting on speed and surprise for success. This decision, sources said, resulted in paring down elements of one of the many preliminary drafts of the rescue plan finally implemented by Carter.

Planners anticipated that several Navy RH53 helicopters would fail in the two long hops from the Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman to the mountaintop hideaway east of Tehran, totalling 700 miles. Some planners early on recommended up to 12 to 14 helicopters instead of the eight decided upon.

Although they are not saying so publicly, many military officers now fault the final plan as "too thin," resting on too many unrealistic assumptions. Some contend the obstacles most likely would have gotten worse, not better, as the Blue Light team proceeded beyond Desert One, the refueling site 500 miles inside Iran, toward the embassy. They complain of too few "worst case" protective features in the planning.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) signaled last week that he is going to demand explanations on this point during the Senate Armed Services Committee audit of the rescue attempt.

The committee has scheduled a closed meeting Wednesday to start hearing from participants in the rescue attempt.

Although not yet briefed formally on the plan, Jackson said from what he has learned it did not have "enough redundancy, enough backup. In a mission of this magnitude, in which the whole world is looking at this, and after a series of defeats in Vietnam, it could hamstring the U.S. position in the world. If you are going to do it, there damn well ought to be some backup for contingencies."

Carter obviously felt otherwise as he took what looks like the biggest risk of his presidency—to "lance the boil" of the hostage crisis.

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4 May 1980*Joseph Kraft*

End of the Rose Garden Strategy

Jimmy Carter is moving smartly to bury the busted Iranian rescue mission. Hence the quick appointment of Sen. Muskie as secretary of state, and the decision to give up the Rose Garden in favor of the campaign trail.

But can a president walk away from such a fiasco as if nothing had happened? Is it possible to put a lid on one of the most widely publicized failures in history?

"No way," would seem to be the answer at first blush. But the sad turn of events in Iran, rubbed against all sections of public and official opinion in a moment of intense competition among rivals for the presidency.

Liberal sentiment took offense at the resort to force. The resignation of Cyrus Vance as secretary of state furnished a martyr and a cause célèbre. Though the former secretary has said nothing in public, he has privately been telling friends that the mission was a "harebrained" scheme that couldn't possibly have succeeded. That view, coupled with alarm about driving Iran into the arms of Russia, is generally entertained by Vance's friends and supporters throughout government, and in the press and television.

Conservatives and others, disposed to support the mission at first, have been made increasingly uneasy by details leaked to silence liberal critics. The most prestigious committee in the Congress, the Senate Armed Services Committee, has engaged itself to get to the bottom of a veritable Everest of distressing rumors and reports.

Leading committee members suspect that the basic plan was far too complicated to succeed. They fear the preparations, particularly the training of the helicopter pilots, were inadequate. They are inclined to believe that leaks may have compromised some intelligence assets in Iran, and ongoing negotiations for base rights in Oman. They wonder whether the White House did not impose too many controls from the top. They smell a political role in the shaping of the operation—perhaps by the president's chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan.

But despite their extent and depth, the doubts and suspicions seem sure to be muffled. For one thing, there is the impact of the Muskie appointment. By itself, it turned attention from the outgoing, and toward the incoming, secretary of state. Vance is already a receding figure for whom no one will risk doing serious battle. The play in Washington is for the favor and attention of Muskie.

On policy matters, however, Muskie takes almost exactly the same position as Vance. All the people who liked Vance, particularly in the State Department and in the media, also like Muskie. They are not going to embarrass the new boy, and spoil their standing with him, by taking up the cudgels for what is over and done.

The disposition of the liberal critics of the Iran policy to let bygones be bygones inevitably crimps the style of President Carter's chief Democratic opponents. Sen. Kennedy is made to sound self-serving and shrill when he goes after the president on Iran.

As to conservative and moderate critics, they are tied up by their own problems. John Stennis, the chairman of the armed services committee, has always—as his behavior in the Watergate investigation showed—equated responsibility with serving the interest of the president. The committee as a whole has a mystique of secrecy. Several of its leading members, notably Sen. Henry Jackson, believe as a matter of policy that it is wrong to place heavy emphasis on the hostages issue.

Moreover it is not at all clear that the armed services committee is going to find the usual army of eager whistle blowers. The officials who planned the operation at the top—Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; Gen. David Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adm. Stansfield Turner of the Central Intelligence Agency—are

not about to acknowledge the weakness of their work, or their inexperience in such operations. As to participants in the mission, including its leader, Col. Charles Beckwith, they too may have a reason for caution. The leaving behind of bodies, and of secret documents, maps, weapons and helicopters, suggests someone panicked in the middle of the operation.

Accordingly, the leading Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, is in poor position to exploit the issue in an assertive way. Rather than run the risk of seeming to criticize brave men, his best bet is to quarrel about minor details—like timing.

Politically, therefore, the president is acting shrewdly to end the Rose Garden strategy with its emphasis on the Iranian hostages. No doubt former Carter fans are right to charge him with hypocrisy in calling the rescue mission an "incomplete success." They are also correct in charging lack of candor when he claims the battle against inflation has "turned the corner." But politically Carter's best shot is to focus attention on the contest with Ronald Reagan. That is one fight he might well win, for the issue that now shapes up before the country is which candidate for president is the least incompetent.

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NEW YORK TIMES
3 MAY 1980

U.S. Had Plan for Strafing Teheran in Rescue Mission

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 2 — The United States plan for rescuing the hostages in Teheran included an option for calling in C-130 gunships that would have used flares to light up the American Embassy area and then strafe any Iranian troops moving toward the area, Government officials said today.

At the same time the officials said the Administration had been prepared to use the Navy's most advanced combat plane, the F-14 Tomcat to attack Iranian fighters attempting to interfere with the mission.

The general plans for using air power during the embassy raid were disclosed earlier this week. The officials provided new details today on military options that were open to President Carter. They stressed that the heavily armed gunship version of the C-130 and the fighters would have been ordered into action only in the event the 90-member assault team ran into trouble.

The gunships are equipped with advanced radar and infrared night detection equipment as well as an array of weaponry, including 20-millimeter Gatling guns, 40-millimeter Bofors cannons and a 105-millimeter howitzer.

Large Air Support Operation

The officials added that as part of the tactics of assuring the presence of aircraft near Teheran during the assault, the planners provided for large-scale air operations over and near Iran, involving two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea, airborne warning-and-control-system aircraft and Air Force KC-135 tanker planes dispatched from Oman and other bases in the Persian Gulf region.

According to aides involved in planning the operation, a small number of C-130 gunships would have flown to Teheran on the night of the embassy raid. The planes,

they said, would have gone in low to avoid radar, much as the six C-130's reached the desert refueling site southeast of Teheran before the mission was canceled.

Fighters in Air Near Teheran

Simultaneously, F-14's and A-7 Corsair attack aircraft from the carriers Nimitz and Coral Sea would have been sent aloft, the officials said, and refueled in flight by tanker planes. The fighters were to have headed toward Teheran and would have arrived in the vicinity about the time the attack on the embassy was starting.

Like the C-130's the fighters would have relied on low-altitude flight, evasive maneuvers and electronic countermeasures to escape detection. According to one official, the Navy had been launching fighters at night and sending them toward the Iranian coast for several weeks before the mission. These feints, as the aide described them, were intended to accustom Iranian and Soviet monitors to American air activity.

Iran's Military Radio Monitored

A crucial aspect of the option for using air power, according to the account, was the ability of American intelligence to eavesdrop on Iranian military communications. The officials added that American commandos on the ground were assigned the task of repelling any civilians groups that approached the embassy grounds after being alerted to the rescue operation.

The officials said that American forces would have been able to intercept any messages ordering Iranian troops to the embassy compound and that within seconds the C-130's could have been sent to the area. Using high-intensity flares that would have created almost daylight conditions, the officials said, the gunships would have been able to destroy any Iranian forces moving toward the compound, including tanks.

They said that if the American commanders learned that Iranian fighter planes had been alerted, the Navy's F-14's could have flown to the scene swiftly. An aide said that it was the expectation of some senior officers that the F-14's would have been able to destroy any alerted Iranian fighters while they were preparing for takeoff.

Commenting on the overall size of the air mission, which would have required several back-up fighters and tankers, an official acknowledged that the risks of accidents, including collisions and crashes, was high. "But when you undertake these kinds of operations, you've got to be prepared to run risks," he said.

In discussing the decision to call off the mission at the desert refueling base, Pentagon officials continued to assert that there had been no disagreement among the commanders on the scene over the decision once it was learned that only five of six remaining helicopters was operable. But they divulged that a debate erupted between Col. Charlie A. Beckwith of the Army, the commando leader, and other officers at the desert site shortly after the six helicopters landed.

The officers said that two of the six helicopter pilots, who had flown through severe sandstorms, were exhausted and ill and there were questions whether they could continue. Colonel Beckwith, the officials said, strongly urged that the operation be continued and his advice was followed by Col. James Kyle of the Air Force, commander at the desert site.

Some officials suggested that after one of the helicopters sliced into a C-130, Colonel Beckwith quarreled with Colonel Kyle's decision to evacuate the refueling site swiftly without pausing to destroy the five intact helicopters being abandoned. A Pentagon spokesman strongly denied this report, saying that the helicopters had not been destroyed because of the perils from the burning and exploding ammunition-laden C-130.

ZRR027

R 13236)1CZCBLZSA

REUTER

ZBFC-IRAN-SUBIC 11111

TEHERAN, MAY 5 - REUTER - ONE OF THE U.S. HOSTAGES IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TEHERAN HAS SAID ON IRANIAN TELEVISION THAT THE UNITED STATES RAN A SPY PLANE OPERATION FROM TEHERAN COVERING INDIA AND PAKISTAN AS WELL AS IRAN.

THE HOSTAGE, STAFF SERGEANT JOSEPH SUBIC JR., WHO DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ASSISTANT IN THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE AT THE EMBASSY, NAMED OFFICERS HE SAID WERE INVOLVED.

HIS STATEMENT WAS BROADCAST THREE WEEKS AGO, BUT AN UNDOUBBED TAPE WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO REUTERS BY HIS CAPTORS ONLY THIS WEEK.

SERGEANT SUBIC SAID IN THE BROADCAST THAT A C-12 PLANE FITTED WITH A CONCEALED CAMERA WAS KEPT BY THE UNITED STATES AT TEHERAN'S MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT UNTIL APRIL LAST YEAR.

"IT HAD TAKEN PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE COUNTRY OF IRAN, INDIA AND PAKISTAN, AND THESE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE SHIPPED OUT OF THE COUNTRY," HE SAID. "THE SPY CAMERA I MYSELF SHIPPED OUT, TWO MONTHS JUST BEFORE THE STUDENTS CAME" AND OVERRAN THE EMBASSY ON NOVEMBER 4."

MORE 0325 MH

ZRR028

R 13247)2CZCBLRYR

ZTPH-IRAN-SUBIC 2 TEHERAN

SERGEANT SUBIC SAID KNOWLEDGE OF THE ESPIONAGE OPERATION WAS CONFINED TO THE AMBASSADOR, THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) OFFICIALS.

HE ALSO OUTLINED THE WORKINGS OF AN INTELLIGENCE COMPUTER AREA BENEATH THE U.S. EMBASSY'S SUPPLY WAREHOUSE.

"DURING THE REVOLUTION, THIS ROOM AND OTHER PARTS OF THE BUILDING WERE MONITORING COMMUNICATIONS IN IRAN, MONITORING ALL TRAFFIC, TV AND ANYTHING THAT WAS ON THE AIRWAVES IN IRAN," HE SAID.

"A LOT OF INFORMATION WAS SENT HERE. THIS WAS A MAJOR OPERATION BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT...."

SERGEANT SUBIC EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH THE WAY PRESIDENT CARTER HAD HANDLED THE HOSTAGES CRISIS AND SAID HE HAD COME TO LEARN ABOUT CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE FORMER SHAH.

HE ALLEGED THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN CONTROLLED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND ADDED: "ALSO I'VE HEARD AND SEEN PICTURES WHERE CERTAIN (U.S.) GOVERNMENT LEADERS, BOTH PAST AND PRESENT,

1 of 2

-IRAN-

REUTER

HAVE HAD MANY SEX PARTIES...AT A MANSION OR PALACE UP IN NORTHERN TEHERAN.''

HE ADDED: ''TO ME, FOR GOVERNMENT LEADERS TO DO SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS TOTALLY UNCALLED FOR.''

MORE 0328 MH

***R029

R 13263)3CZC8YLIYC

17PM-IRAN-SUBIC 3 TEHERAN

SERGEANT SUBIC SHOWED HIS STUDENT CAPTORS KODAK PLUS-X AEROGRAFIC FILM 2402 70MM TYPE 2 WHICH HE SAID WAS USED IN THE SECRET CAMERA UNDER THE CO-PILOT'S SEAT OF THE C-12.

''THE PILOTS WERE COLONEL THOMAS E. SCHAEFFER; CAPTAIN HOLLINGSWORTH; WHO'S NOW IN ENGLAND WORKING WITH THE U.S. NAVY; CAPTAIN DAVIS ROEDER; WHO JUST ARRIVED HERE AND HAS NOT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY YET TO PARTICIPATE IN A FLIGHT BUT HE HAS TRAINED IN A C-12; AND MAJOR HARRY F. JOHNSON WHO HAD MADE NUMEROUS FLIGHTS WITH COLONEL SCHAEFFER; BOTH IN IRAN; INDIA; PAKISTAN THAT THEY FLEW THESE C-12 AIRCRAFT.''

SERGEANT SUBIC SAID. HE SAID THE PLANE WAS WITHDRAWN FROM TEHERAN AFTER U.S. DIPLOMATS WERE EXPELLED FROM SOUTH AFRICA FOR USING A SIMILAR AIRCRAFT THERE.

SERGEANT SUBIC SAID THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PUSHING FOR THE RETURN OF THE PLANE IN ORDER TO MAKE FLIGHTS TO CAMP BEHSHAHK NEAR THE SOVIET BORDER; WHICH HE SAID WAS A CIA OPERATION; AND TO UNIDENTIFIED AREAS IN SOUTHERN IRAN.

MORE 0331 MH

17PM-IRAN-SUBIC 4 TEHERAN

ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMPUTER AREA; HE SAID IT WAS ''A VAULT WITHIN A VAULT''.

''THIS IS ONE OF THE BIGGEST VAULTS IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS IS ALMOST AS BIG AS THE ONE AT THE PENTAGON.''

SERGEANT SUBIC ADDED. THE VAULT WAS DUE TO HAVE ITS OWN POWER SUPPLY AND WAS HEAVILY SOUND-PROOFED; HE SAID.

''THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THIS OPERATION AFTER THE SHAH WAS COLONEL THOMAS E. SCHAEFFER; WHO WAS THE DEFENSE ATTACHE OVER HERE.

''BERT MOORE; GARY LEE AND COLONEL HOLLING (HOLLAND?) WERE ALL INVOLVED IN THIS IN SOME WAY AS WAS THE CIA PEOPLE -- TOM RHEANY; WILLIAM DAUGHERTY AND LATER GEORGE O'KEEFE AND MALCOLM KALB TO A LEAST EXTENT AND I BELIEVE COLONEL SCOTT; WHO WAS CHIEF OF ARMISH)HAGG (DEFENSE CONTRACTS)...'' SERGEANT SUBIC SAID.

REUTER 0333 MH

2 of 2

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

THE WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL
3 May 1980

Ex-CIA employee starts fulfilling pledge to reveal agency secrets

By JOE TRENTO
Staff correspondent

ALEXANDRIA, VA. — An ex-CIA employee yesterday tried to make public the names of men who he says are CIA agents in Iran.

The list was released by Donald E. Deneselya, a disaffected former CIA employee whose action was prompted by the imprisonment yesterday of his Iranian friend, Shahrokh Bakhtiar, 37.

Bakhtiar was sentenced to 15 years in jail for importing seven pounds of heroin and selling it to a federal agent.

Deneselya, who was in the courtroom, said release of the names, which could not be verified by the Saturday News Journal and therefore are not being published, was just the beginning of his release of a massive amount of CIA secrets.

When Bakhtiar was arrested, Deneselya contacted the government, demanding his release. If Bakhtiar were not released, Deneselya threatened, hundreds of CIA secrets, including a list of 7,500 people who work for the agency, would be released.

"I'm going to start to release the names now," said Deneselya outside the courtroom where Bakhtiar was sentenced yesterday.

"I'm going to do it very slowly," he added and offered a typewritten list of names to the News Journal reporter covering the sentencing. The reporter read the piece of paper, but did not accept it.

The paper said: "These are the CIA agents in Iran." One of the men

on the list was identified only by his last name.

Spokesmen for the CIA and the State Department refused to comment on the list, the names it contained or the effect of its release on the men who have been held by Iranian militants since Nov. 4.

"We are not commenting on anything having to do with Iran," said CIA spokesman Dale Peterson. "We have absolutely nothing to say about Iran."

State Department spokesman David Nail said, "Since the beginning of the crisis, we haven't released any information concerning the identity of the hostages or what their jobs were."

Asked whether the release of the names would jeopardize the lives of the hostages, Nail said, "There have been a number of threats to the people there. I don't think I can dignify this particular accusation — from an American or anyone else with any kind of response."

Deneselya says he had been collecting those names — and other information — while working for the CIA from 1960 until he was fired in 1964, and since then.

Once Bakhtiar was convicted on April 3, Deneselya modified his threats, saying he would release the information through Iranian and other foreign news services if Bakhtiar were jailed or deported to Iran. Bakhtiar is a member of a prominent Iranian family: his father founded Sayak, the secret police agency, and was later murdered; his cousin was the shah's last prime minister.

Also sentenced yesterday was Mohammad Roshan, 34, an Iranian and Washington, D.C., restaurateur. He received two years in prison and five years' probation on a single count of aiding and abetting in the distribution of heroin. A third defendant, Reza Mianegaz, pleaded guilty and cooperated in the prosecution of his friends. He was sentenced earlier to two years in prison.

Federal authorities said they seized almost seven pounds of uncommonly pure heroin, worth an estimated \$32 million, the largest seizure ever of such high-quality drugs, when they arrested Roshan and Bakhtiar on Feb. 6 in the Washington, D.C., area. Prosecutors said Bakhtiar, of Hyattsville, Md., brought the drug into the United States on Feb. 1 from a factory in Tehran.

During the trial last month Bakhtiar's attorney, Louis Koutoulakos, presented no witnesses on his clients' behalf. In closing arguments, Koutoulakos said that both defendants were lured into the scheme by federal agents and the "promise of \$5 million at the end of the rainbow."

"Had the government not furnished \$36,000 to Bakhtiar," Koutoulakos told Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. yesterday, "he would have not gone to Iran [to get the heroin]."

He also said that, although this was Bakhtiar's first offense, "this is a beautiful man, we don't expect him to get a slap on the wrist. I do feel he deserves punishment."

Bakhtiar was convicted of two counts of conspiracy, three counts of heroin distribution, three counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of a controlled substance, three counts of using the telephone in the commission of a crime, two counts of crossing state lines in the commission of a felony and illegal possession of a firearm. He was held in custody since his arrest.

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FAM-CIA List:220

EX-CIA EMPLOYEE TRIES TO IDENTIFY AGENTS AMONG HOSTAGES

WILMINGTON, Del. (AP) - A MAN WHO SAYS HE IS A FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE TRIED FRIDAY TO MAKE PUBLIC THE NAMES OF MEN HE SAID ARE CIA AGENTS BEING HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAN; THE WILMINGTON NEWS-JOURNAL REPORTED.

THE NEWSPAPER REPORTED IN ITS SATURDAY EDITION THAT IT RECEIVED THE LIST FROM DONALD E. DENESELYA.

THE NEWS-JOURNAL SAID IT COULD NOT VERIFY THE NAMES AND THEREFORE DID NOT PUBLISH THEM.

IT SAID DENESELYA'S ACTION WAS PROMPTED BY THE JAILING FRIDAY IN ALEXANDRIA, VA., OF HIS IRANIAN FRIEND, SHAHROKH BAKHTIAR, WHO WAS SENTENCED TO 15 YEARS IN PRISON FOR IMPORTING SEVEN POUNDS OF HEROIN AND SELLING IT TO A FEDERAL AGENT.

DENESELYA SAID WHEN BAKHTIAR WAS ARRESTED THAT: IF HE WAS NOT FREED, HE WOULD RELEASE HUNDREDS OF CIA SECRETS INCLUDING THE NAMES OF 7,500 PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

"I'M GOING TO START TO RELEASE THE NAMES NOW," SAID DENESELYA OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM FRIDAY. "I'M GOING TO DO IT VERY SLOWLY."

THE NEWSPAPER SAID HE THEN GAVE A TYPED LIST OF NAMES TO ITS REPORTER.

THE SHEET OF PAPER, ACCORDING TO THE NEWS-JOURNAL, SAID: "THESE ARE THE CIA AGENTS IN IRAN." IT DID NOT SAY HOW MANY NAMES WERE ON THE LIST OR WHETHER IT ALSO INCLUDED NAMES OF SUPPOSED AGENTS PEOPLE NOT BEING HELD HOSTAGE.

PROSECUTORS ALLEGED THAT BAKHTIAR, OF HYATTSVILLE, MD., BROUGHT THE DRUGS INTO THE UNITED STATES FEB. 1 FROM A FACTORY IN TEHRAN.

AP-NY-05-02 2307EST

DAILY PRESS
NEWPORT NEWS, VA.
2 MAY 1980

Was Carter Down On 'Farm' Near Williamsburg?

WASHINGTON (AP) — Did President Carter secretly meet commandos at "The Farm," the CIA's supersecret Camp Peary installation near Williamsburg? The White House is concealing where Carter met on Sunday with some of the commandos who attempted the rescue in Iran and it's even concealing why that's such a big secret. "I'm simply not going to tell you," said press secretary Jody Powell at his briefing Thursday. Asked why not, he replied: "Because I've been instructed not to." There is speculation that Carter met with the men at Andrews Air Force Base, 15 miles from the White House. But a public information officer there said Thursday that while he, too, had heard the report, "I know nothing of the president being here last weekend." Another report was that the meeting took place at Camp Peary, about 125 miles from Washington. Carter attended church services in Washington Sunday but was not seen by reporters after returning to the White House at midday.

DETROIT NEWS
1 May 1980

Students? Hah!

A large number of captors who hold the 50 American hostages in Tehran are not what they say they are.

The language of Iran is Farsi (Persian). Gun-toting guards in khaki fatigues at the American Embassy speak Arabic. Although they call themselves students, it's unlikely they have ever seen a campus.

Who are all those sinister-looking creeps?

In a recent MacNeil/Lehrer Report television program, Arthur Meyerhoff, a petroleum consultant with solid connections in the Middle East, said "a large number of these so-called students . . . are actually Syrian militants."

Three diverse intelligence sources in Washington confirm that statement and take it a step further.

The Syrian militants, these sources tell us, are actually Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) operatives, mainly from Damascus, who carry Soviet-made weapons and are trained and otherwise aided by the USSR.

The PLO people, capitalizing on Iran's upheaval, quickly joined the bizarre coalition of Muslim fanatics and leftist radicals who are now pitted against the political moderates.

Thus, there's a direct Soviet connection with, and a direct Soviet responsibility for, the captivity of American diplomatic personnel.

So please let's not have any more of this "militant" or "student" business. The jailers who man the iron gates of the U.S. Embassy are, for the most part, PLO terrorists who are being aided and abetted by Russia.

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ON PAGE 1

THE VIRGINIA GAZETTE
30 APRIL 1980

A digest of Williamsburg-James City-
York news during April 23-30, 1980

In Sum

A replica of the U.S. Embassy in Iran was developed at Camp Peary for use by the 90-man commando unit to train for its aborted assault to free the American hostages. The CIA reportedly did not have any agents participating in the training. Story on page 1.

Commandos trained at Peary

A replica of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was fashioned at nearby Camp Peary and used for almost 30 practice missions by the commandos who participated in the aborted rescue of American hostages last week. So reports the New York Daily News in its Tuesday editions.

Harrison Rainie, who covers the military and Capitol Hill for the newspaper, gave a detailed account of how the U.S. troops planned to slip up to the entrance of the embassy and gain access to the hostages.

The plan was for the 90-man American commando squad to join with sympathetic Iranians to move around the perimeter of the embassy, cutting phone and electric power lines while simultaneously using gas or other force to neutralize the few militants at guard posts.

A hole was to be blown in the walls of the embassy to allow trucks to roar in to the rescue. Rainie wrote that the remaining

embassy captors were to be "cut down" with gas garrotes and guns with silencers. Then a squadron of giant Navy helicopters was to swoop in and whisk all the Americans back to the desert airfield where revved-up C-130 transports were waiting to take off to freedom.

Rainie wrote: "Months of preparations would have come into play once the team was at the embassy wall. As almost 30 practice missions at an embassy replica the CIA training base at Camp Peary, Va., taught them, the team would have moved to cut telephone and electric lines. Each commando had an assignment — wipe out a technical gadget or take out a guard."

Rainie could not be reached for further comment about the Camp Peary connection, but a Daily News editor in the Washington bureau, Frank Jackman, said the training at the sprawling CIA base was limited to ground exercises and that the flight portion of the training was conducted at Nellis Air Force Base out West.

Jackman said it was his understanding from Rainie that the CIA did not participate in the Camp Peary training except to provide the replica. "He did not believe the CIA was actively involved there. If they were, he would have put in the story."

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
30 April 1980

Rescue teams recruited 'moles' at embassy

By CLARE HOLLINGWORTH, Defence Correspondent

MORE than 100 Americans are hiding in Iran after the failure of the attempt to free the hostages held at the United States Embassy in Teheran. They include Farsi-speaking post-graduate students, CIA agents and members of the "Green Berets," the American Special Forces, whose routine training often includes spells in Britain with the special Air Services at Hereford—the teams included students carrying genuine Iranian passports.

Besides "Green Berets," there are now American teams in Teheran and other urban areas of Iran. The general feeling is that as they never speak English and carry Turkish, Egyptian or Pakistani passports they will not be discovered.

Airstrip chosen

The first team to enter Iran inspected several disused airstrips but chose one in the desert near Tabas as their main communications and operational headquarters. Other teams arrived to disappear among Teheran's large middle class.

Iranian infiltrators made contact with the militants guarding the hostages through the university and obtained detailed information about their relations with the police, communications with them and the guards' organisations.

The Iranian members of the teams also persuaded several of the guards to become "moles" inside the embassy ready to assist in the escape of the hostages.

The teams reported that the vast majority of the Iranian middle class is tired of what they call "mob rule" but fearful that they will be taken over by the still-illegal pro-Russian Tudeh Communist party.

One of the main objectives of the teams was to cause confusion at the time of the rescue not only in the capital but throughout the country.

Streets would have been blocked with the cars of members of the middle classes who had agreed to co-operate. Bombs would have been detonated and fires started.

Iranian members of the teams had arranged that the nine of the hostages accused of spying would be the first to be evacuated to Tabas in helicopters belonging to the Iranian Army and piloted by Iranian

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LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
28 APRIL 1980


CIA men go into hiding

By FRANK TAYLOR in Washington

TWO teams of special agents who had been infiltrated into Iran over the past three months were to have taken part in the abortive mission to rescue American hostages from Teheran, it was disclosed yesterday.

The teams—one made up of agents from the Central Intelligence Agency and the other of commandos from the American Special Forces—are still hiding in Iran.

American officials confirmed that teams had entered Iran using forged passports, but



would not discuss how it was now proposed to get them out.

They are believed to have linked up with Iranians sympathetic to the American cause and to be under their protection.

President Carter ordered the teams to begin infiltrating Iran in January in preparation for the rescue attempt. They were told to make a thorough reconnaissance of the American Embassy compound in Teheran where 50 hostages were being held and to establish a secure base near Damavand, in a mountainous area east of Teheran.

They were also to buy vehicles for use in the final assault on the embassy.

Last Thursday the agents and commandos were waiting at Damavand for the rescue troops who were to arrive in helicopters. But the mishaps which plagued the troops in the desert 200 miles south of Teheran led to the whole operation being abandoned and the

agents being left to fend for themselves.

The plan called for the 90-strong rescue force to link up with the agents and commandos at Damavand and to rest there until Friday. The agents and commandos were then to lead the troops into Teheran in the vehicles bought for the job.

The first stop was to be at a warehouse on the outskirts of the city where a final briefing would take place. Then the troops, commandos and agents were to move into the centre of the city for the attack on the compound.

From blueprints of the embassy every room and corridor was known. Even the routes of telephone lines had been mapped and selected commandos told off to cut them during the initial assault. Officials discounted reports that the rescuers were to use a non-lethal chemical to disable the militants holding the hostages.

Once the captors were overpowered, the rescuers were to call in the helicopters by radio. If the helicopters had trouble landing in the compound, the rescuers and the hostages were to drive to the Ampadieh football stadium a few hundred yards away to board the helicopters.

The helicopters were to fly to a rendezvous with C-130 transport aircraft at an abandoned airstrip west of Teheran where the helicopters were to be abandoned.

But unknown to the agents and commandos waiting at Damavand, the mission was abandoned after the rescue troops lost three helicopters. Then came the collision between a helicopter and one of the C-130 planes, with the loss of eight lives.

The Armed Forces and Military Affairs Committees of Congress are expected to hold inquiries into the failed mission in the coming weeks and some of the main questions will centre on the breakdown of the helicopters.

The rescue troops were part of the so-called Blue Light anti-terrorist unit which is based at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. The troops are also known as "Charlie's Angels" because they are under the command of Col Charles Beckwith, who was a Green Beret (Special Forces) commander in the Vietnam War.

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NEW YORK TIMES
5 MAY 1980

Editors, in Note to Carter, Assail Policy on C.I.A. Use of Reporters

By DEIRDRE CARMODY

The American Society of Newspaper Editors has written a letter to President Carter, expressing concern over his position on the use of American journalists by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The letter, dated April 18 and made public by the society for publication today, referred specifically to remarks made by Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, when he addressed the organization's convention in Washington April 10. Admiral Turner told the editors that he would not hesitate to recruit journalists as agents in given situations if he felt that it was in the national interest to do so. The President said later that he supported the director's position.

Admiral Turner's comments rekindled a controversy that had been thought laid to rest in 1976 when George Bush, then Director of Central Intelligence, announced that the agency would no longer enter into paid relationships with part-time or full-time news correspondents accredited by any American news organizations.

The following year the intelligence agency, under Admiral Turner, restated the prohibition on the use of journalists, but added that exceptions could be made with the specific approval of the director. This proviso went unnoticed by many observers in the press, who thought that the ban on using journalists as agents was still in effect.

Credibility of Journalists

The letter to the President was signed by Thomas Winship, editor of The Boston Globe and president of the national editors' group, and Charles W. Bailey, president of the group's Freedom of Information Committee and editor of The Minneapolis Tribune. It said:

"At issue in this matter, we believe, is not merely the ability of American journalists to operate effectively, but the credibility of the American press at home

and abroad — and in some cases the physical safety of correspondents.

"We believe the Administration simply does not understand why we are so concerned about this: If our concern were fully understood, we believe, the policy would surely be different. We would appreciate an opportunity to discuss this matter with you personally."

For many editors, one of the most troublesome aspects of Admiral Turner's remarks to the society was his evident misunderstanding of how the press felt on the issue. At one point, he called the editors "naïve" and suggested that journalists should consider it an honor to be asked to serve their country. He said he thought most journalists would be "patriotic enough to do this."

Protests in Editorials

A number of editorials on the subject have appeared in newspapers around the country. The Wichita, Kansas, Eagle, in an editorial titled "Memo to Stansfield Turner," said: "One thing that sets the American press apart from many of its counterparts elsewhere is that it is free, not only from government control, as prescribed by the Constitution, but also from government influence. The latter is even more sinister than the former, and it is because the press in so many nations does work closely with the government in power that American news people are so often suspect when they go abroad.

"You correctly said that it would be 'naïve' to think foreign governments regard United States journalists as being above reproach. But that hardly means you should confirm those governments' worst fears by revealing that the C.I.A. does indeed ask journalists to spy for it on occasion."

A spokesman for the White House acknowledged receipt by the President of the society's letter, but said it had not yet responded to it.

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CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER USE OF JOURNALISTS AS CIA AGENTS

MINNEAPOLIS (AP) - THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS HAS TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER IT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON THE USE OF U.S. NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS AS AGENTS FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

"WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THE POSITION THAT YOU AND YOUR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAVE TAKEN ON THE USE OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY," SAID THOMAS WINSHIP, EDITOR OF THE BOSTON GLOBE AND ASNE PRESIDENT; AND CHARLES W. BAILEY, EDITOR OF THE MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE AND PRESIDENT OF THE ASNE'S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMITTEE; IN AN APRIL 18 LETTER TO CARTER.

WINSHIP AND BAILEY SAID THEY WERE REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO REMARKS MADE BY ADM. STANFIELD TURNER BEFORE THE ASNE CONVENTION AND TO CARTER'S COMMENTS IN A MEETING WITH A GROUP OF EDITORS; AS RECORDED IN A WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT RELEASED APRIL 12.

THE WHITE HOUSE HAS NOT RESPONDED TO THE LETTER.

TURNER TOLD ASNE MEMBERS ON APRIL 10 THAT ON THREE OCCASIONS HE APPROVED THE USE OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN CIA OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, TURNER SAID; IN EACH CASE THE PLANS DID NOT MATERIALIZE AND THE JOURNALISTS WERE NOT USED.

CARTER SAID THE FOLLOWING DAY IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH EDITORS THAT ONLY IN EXTREME CASES WOULD AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS BE USED IN CIA OPERATIONS.

WINSHIP AND BAILEY SAID ASNE EDITORS, WHO REPRESENT MOST OF THE NATION'S 1,750 DAILY NEWSPAPERS, AGREE WITH THE VIEW TAKEN BY R.M. ROSENTHAL, EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES.

ROSENTHAL WROTE:

"WE SEND CORRESPONDENTS ABROAD AS CORRESPONDENTS; NOT AS AGENTS. THEY ASK THEIR HOST COUNTRIES TO TRUST THEM; TO GIVE THEM SPECIAL ACCESS; TO ALLOW THEM TO TRAVEL ABOUT; AND TO ENJOY THE PRIVILEGES OF A CORRESPONDENT WHOSE ONLY JOB IS TO GATHER THE NEWS.

"IF IT'S THE POLICY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE THAT IT CAN ON OCCASION USE A FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT (AS A CIA AGENT); EVERY AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT ABROAD IMMEDIATELY BECOMES SUSPECT.

"WHY SHOULD ANY GOVERNMENT TRUST ANY AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES? ADMIRAL TURNER SAYS HE PLANNED ON THREE OCCASIONS TO USE CORRESPONDENTS. 'WHY BELIEVE HIM?' WOULD BE THE NATURAL REACTION OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT: 'WHY NOT 200?'

1 of 2

ASSOCIATED PRESS

- CIA -

"IT IS SO OBVIOUS THAT IT IS ALMOST PAINFUL THAT THIS CIA POLICY PUTS INTO JEOPARDY THE PHYSICAL SAFETY AND ETHICAL POSITION OF EVERY AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT ABROAD."

THE TWO ASNE OFFICIALS ADDED: "WE FIND IT IRONIC THAT ON THE ONE HAND OFFICIALS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION ARGUE THAT THE CIA MUST BE EXEMPT FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT; ON THE GROUND THAT THE MERE EXISTENCE OF THE MACHINERY MAKES FOREIGN SOURCES RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION - WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND THE SAME OFFICIALS CANNOT SEE THAT THE MERE EXISTENCE OF AUTHORITY TO USE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS AS AGENTS HAS EXACTLY THE SAME EFFECT.

AT ISSUE, SAID WINSHIP AND BAILEY, IS NOT MERELY THE ABILITY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY; BUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN PRESS AT HOME AND ABROAD; AND, IN SOME CASES, THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS.

"WE BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION SIMPLY DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE SO CONCERNED ABOUT THIS; IF OUR CONCERN WERE FULLY UNDERSTOOD, WE BELIEVE, THE POLICY WOULD SURELY BE DIFFERENT," CONCLUDED THE EDITORS.

AP-NY-05-04 2058EST

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LEAKS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
8 May 1980

Bayh Asks FBI Chief To Check News Leaks

By Allan Frank

Washington Star Staff Writer

The Senate Intelligence Committee is "angry" about news leaks of details of the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission and committee chairman Birch Bayh, D-Ind., has asked the FBI to begin a "leaks investigation" of government officials.

Bayh said he asked FBI director William H. Webster yesterday, by telephone and by letter, to initiate the investigation of the leaks which the committee believes may have jeopardized future rescue missions.

The committee chairman said he informed other committee members Tuesday about his desire to request an FBI "leaks investigation," and although the committee did not take a formal vote, it agreed with the request.

"Everybody (on the committee) was irate about this, indignant that this is going on, and something has got to be done to stop it," Bayh said. The committee response when he informed them that he was going to ask for the investigation was, "Go to it."

The FBI is needed, Bayh said, because the CIA is not "an investigative body" and earlier committee efforts to trace the leaks about the Iranian mission, U.S. and Russian involvement in Afghanistan and about details of the SALT talks had failed.

Bayh asked Webster "to mobilize whatever forces are necessary" to conduct a leak investigation because recent news stories about the ill-fated rescue mission are a "devastating practice" that could jeopardize "people who are still there (in Iran)."

Bayh declined to release his letter to Webster on grounds that it might be a violation of national security. Bayh said Webster said "He'd look into it right away... he certainly thought the leak situation was tragic."

"I don't know where they (the leaks) are coming from, but I want them stopped," said Bayh. "We need to find out who they are, and we ought to prosecute them."

The senator acknowledged that prosecution might be undesirable because it would require confirmation of details about the attempted raid. But he added, "If we find out who's doing this and kick their rear end out of government, that's a start."

President Carter informed almost no one on Capitol Hill about the raid in advance, Bayh noted, and in subsequent briefings for Congress, there were not many details given about the plans that would have been carried out had the first phase of the operation not failed in Iran's Great Salt Desert.

Saying he had been briefed "rather fully" about the Iranian mission, even though other members of the intelligence committee had not, Bayh said he was confident of his knowledge about what constituted leaks that seriously breeched national security.

REUTER

IRAN-IRAN-LEAKS

WASHINGTON, May 7, REUTER - SENATOR BIRCH BAYH TODAY URGED FBI DIRECTOR WILLIAM WEBSTER TO INVESTIGATE LEAKS OF SECRET INFORMATION ABOUT THE ABORTIVE COMMANDO RAID IN IRAN AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

THE INDIANA DEMOCRAT, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, ASKED MR WEBSTER IN A LETTER TO "MOBILIZE WHATEVER FORCES ARE NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE AND PUT AN END TO THIS UNCONSCIONABLE AND DESTRUCTIVE PRACTICE."

MR BAYH SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT IF SECRET INFORMATION PUBLISHED ABOUT THE RAID WAS ACCURATE, ITS RELEASE WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE LIVES OF AMERICANS AND ENDANGER FURTHER EFFORTS THE UNITED STATES MIGHT WISH TO TAKE TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES IN IRAN.

"OUR COUNTRY CANNOT PLAN A FOREIGN POLICY; WE CANNOT DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES; IF THE ENTIRE WORLD HAS ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF THE MOST SENSITIVE NATURE," HE SAID.

THE SENATOR SAID HIS COMMITTEE HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ABOUT CONSTANT BREACHES OF SECURITY.

"HE SHARES THIS CONCERN BUT APPEARS POWERLESS TO FIND WHO THE CULPRITS ARE AND PUT A STOP TO THIS DEVASTATING PRACTICE," SENATOR BAYH SAID.

HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHICH RECENT NEWS ACCOUNTS HAD ALARMED HIM.

HIS AIDES SAID THE SENATOR WAS CONCERNED ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT THE HOSTAGE RESCUE PLAN HAD THE COOPERATION OF "FRIENDS" WHO HAD INFILTRATED IRAN IN VARIOUS GUISES, INCLUDING SOME MASQUERADING AS EUROPEAN BUSINESSMEN.

THEY INCLUDED CIA AGENTS, SOLDIERS TRAINED IN ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND IRANIAN NATIONALS, ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS.

REPRESENTATIVE LES ASPIN, A WISCONSIN DEMOCRAT WHO SITS ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, SAID CONGRESSIONAL PROBES OF THE FAILED RESCUE ATTEMPT SHOULD INCLUDE AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION LEAKS.

REUTER 1613 BH

OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

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INSIDE REFOKI

RELEASE WEDNESDAY, MAY 7, 1980

BY ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

LEAKING OUT OF CONTROL

WASHINGTON --- THE TORRENT OF LEAKS BY CARTER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS THAT INSTANTLY FOLLOWED THE ABORTED RESCUE MISSION IS AN INTELLIGENCE FIASCO THAT MAY COST THE U.S. MORE DEARLY THAN THE FIASCO IN THE DESERT ITSELF.

BESIDES JEOPARDIZING THE LIVES OF U.S. AGENTS IN TEHRAN, THE MASSIVE SPILLAGE OF OFFICIAL SECRETS BETRAYS TO THE WORLD A GOVERNMENT OUT OF CONTROL. "THIS CRIMINAL ACT COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IF JIMMY CARTER WERE IN CHARGE OF HIS OWN ADMINISTRATION," ONE WELL-PLACED SPECIALIST FAMILIAR WITH COVERT OPERATIONS TOLD US. "THERE IS NO ONE AROUND ABLE TO COMPEL SILENCE."

SUCH COMMENTS IN INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CIRCLES ARE THE TALK OF THE TOWN. WHILE SOVIET PROPAGANDA SEIZES ON THE LEAKS TO TRUMPET U.S. SUBVERSION AGAINST IRAN, SENIOR OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ARE DUMBFOUNDED AND DISMAYED AT HOW SECRETS DENIED TO CONGRESS ARE LEAKED TO THE NEWS MEDIA. THE FRAGILE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM HAS SUFFERED A RELAPSE, AND TARNISHED U.S. CREDIBILITY HAS BEEN FURTHER UNDERMINED.

WHO IS LEAKING? POSSIBLY MILITARY OFFICERS WHO NEVER THOUGHT THE PLAN WOULD WORK; TRYING TO CLEAR THEIR SKIRTS. POSSIBLY DEFENDERS OF THE MISSION WHO BELIEVE THAT THE MORE KNOWN ABOUT IT, THE BETTER IT WILL LOOK TO CRITICS. SENIOR OFFICIALS CLAIM TWO THINGS: FIRST, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS ORDERED SILENCE; SECOND, NEITHER HE NOR THEY KNOW THE ORIGIN OF THE LEAKS.

OBVIOUSLY, THIS HAS ENDANGERED UNDERCOVER AMERICANS EXPOSED BY LEAK AS HAVING BEEN ASSIGNED KEY ROLES IN TEHRAN FOR LATER STAGES OF THE

Cont

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EVANS & NOVAK

THREE-PHASED RESCUE ATTEMPT. BUT DEEPER IMPLICATIONS STEM FROM MOSCOW'S EAGER USE OF THE LEAKS.

SOVIET COMMENTATORS IN MOSCOW, PICKING UP LEAKED SECRETS FROM THE U.S. PRESS AND TELEVISION, HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY SPILLING INSIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE U.S. RESCUE OPERATION ACROSS THE PAGES OF PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA. "INTERNAL COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY FORCES" WERE TARGETED FOR ON-THE-SPOT HELP TO THE U.S. RESCUE TEAM; IZVESTIA INFORMED ITS READERS APRIL 29.

ON MAY 1, PRAVDA'S TOP POLITICAL WRITER, YURIY ZHUKOV, BACKED UP HIS CHARGE THAT THE U.S. WAS OUT TO DESTROY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. HE CITED EVIDENCE LEAKED IN THE U.S. THAT THERE WAS A "FIFTH COLUMN" OF UNDERCOVER AMERICANS ALLEGEDLY ON THE GROUND IN TEHRAN.

SUCH ALLEGED REVELATIONS WOULD BE EXPECTED EVEN IF SOVIET OPINION ORGANS WERE MANUFACTURING THEM. WHAT MAKES THESE SOVIET REPORTS SO DAMAGING TO THE U.S. IS THAT EVERY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE FREE WORLD KNOWS THEY WERE IN FACT PICKED UP FROM REASONABLY ACCURATE REPORTS LEAKED FROM WITHIN A CARTER ADMINISTRATION HELPLESS TO PREVENT IT.

WARNINGS HAVE BEEN INFORMALLY DELIVERED TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES THAT ALLIED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE GOING TO STOP COOPERATING WITH THE U.S. FOR A TIME. THE REASON: THE U.S. HAS PROVED ONCE AGAIN: IN EVEN MORE HUMILIATING FASHION THAN BEFORE; THAT IT CANNOT PROTECT ITS INTELLIGENCE METHODS.

THIS SAME CHARGE WAS MADE DURING THE POST-WATERGATE CRISIS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), WHEN SECRETS WERE SPRAYED AROUND THE WORLD AMIDST NON-STOP CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF SUPPOSED EXCESSES. THE NEW LEAKERS ARE U.S. OFFICIALS INSIDE JIMMY CARTER'S OWN BUREAUCRACY WHO FEEL SO LITTLE RESTRAINT FROM ABOVE THAT: WHATEVER THEIR PURPOSES, THEY HAVE TAKEN UPON THEMSELVES THE INTIMATE DETAILING OF THE NATION'S DISASTROUS FAILURE.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS HAVE DRAFTED A LETTER TO ATTORNEY GENERAL BENJAMIN CIVILETTI ASKING FOR AN IMMEDIATE FBI INVESTIGATION. THE LETTER HAS BEEN HELD UP. SUCH FBI PROBES SELDOM DISCOVER ANYTHING. WORSE: IF ANYBODY CHARGED WITH VIOLATING SECURITY LAWS GOES TO COURT, IT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE TO PROTECT ANY SECRETS AT ALL.

BUT THE PRESIDENT MAY YET ORDER IN THE FBI. SO FAR, HE HAS BEEN INCLINED AGAINST AN INVESTIGATION STARTED IN THE SUSPICIOUS AND

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EVAN & NOVAK

LEAKING OUT OF CONTROL

SUPERCHARGED POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE FOLLOWING THE RESCUE FAILURE. HE COULD CHANGE HIS MIND IF THE STEADILY- BUILDING RESENTMENT ON CAPITOL HILL SHOULD EXPLODE.

THAT MIGHT HAPPEN SOON. SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS ARE BEING CALLED FOR UNANNOUNCED APPEARANCES BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. THEIR ORDERS ARE CLEAR: GIVE NO DETAILS OF THE ABORTED RESCUE EFFORT.

THIS WILL ENRAGE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, WHO SEE THE LEAKING BUREAUCRACY OUT OF CONTROL, A SYMPTOM OF AN ADMINISTRATION LOSING ITS CAPACITY TO GOVERN. THAT RAISES AGAIN THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A COUNTRY THAT CANNOT KEEP A SECRET, EVEN AT THE RISK OF ITS OWN MEN'S LIVES, CAN LONG CONTROL ITS DESTINY.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
2 May 1980

House Unit Prepares Curb on CIA Prepublication Review

LEGISLATION is being written to remove from the intelligence agencies the final decision on whether books proposed by their employees or former employees contain sensitive material that should be excised.

Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, has instructed his staff to come up with legislation to establish an independent appeals board and limit the power of all government bodies to require secrecy or prepublication review agreements of their employees.

Aspin, in a mid-April House speech, said the proscription on all government entities was necessary because the Supreme Court's February decision in the Frank Snepp case was so broad that any agencies that deal with confidential information could hide behind it. Aspin cited the Agriculture, Commerce and Interior Departments and the Environmental Protection Agency as examples. The law, he said, should set limits on the power of the intelligence agencies to excise material from manuscripts and at the same time should set strong penalties on violators of the agreements. But Aspin would limit liability to those who signed the secrecy oath.

"Threatening publishers will certainly add to the costs of administering the law," he said. "The publisher's lawyers will argue the legal implications and provide a boon for the publishers of legal briefs. The author understands the nuances of classification; the publishers do not."

Aspin's proposed legislation is partly an outgrowth of concern over the Central Intelligence Agency's handling of prepublication review powers. Citing March 6 testimony by the CIA (he made public "sanitized" transcripts of the closed briefing), Aspin said it is clear the CIA "applies the review process strenuously to books, sporadically to magazine articles, rarely, if at all, to columnists, and never to speeches or lectures."

Aspin questioned the CIA's logic in

limiting its reviews primarily to books. "The revelation of classified information in an article may be even more damaging than its revelation in a book, because of the time factor," Aspin said. He suggested that the CIA may be concentrating on books, like those of Snepp and John R. Stockwell, rather than articles, like those of Cord Meyer and Tom Braden, both of whom are columnists and former CIA officials, "because critics have concentrated on books as their outlets."

Aspin said he was also concerned that during their reviews, intelligence agencies might excise material not because it was classified, but because it would be embarrassing.

Any law considered, he said, "must be explicit and unprejudiced in defining exactly what materials the intelligence agencies may require their employees and former employees to submit for review."

Former Attorney General Griffin Bell proposed similar legislation in an article for *The Washington Post*.

The CIA already has indicated it may resist such proposals. When Aspin brought up the suggestion at the closed March briefing, CIA lawyer Ernest Mayerfield objected: "I don't see how an independent and, if you will, impartial body can make a determination as to whether a piece of CIA information requires protection under the Executive Order."

The CIA may be planning to go after still another author publishing a book in

violation of CIA strictures. The plan is hinted at in the March 6 "sanitized" transcripts in which officials said it was too soon after the Supreme Court's Snepp decision to decide what further action the CIA would take. The Stockwell case, pressed immediately after the Snepp decision, had been pending before the Justice Department prior to

the court decision, said one CIA official. Then followed this exchange:

Rep. Aspin—"So they just recently decided to take it [the Stockwell case] up?"

Mayerfield—"Because of the Snepp decision."

Aspin—"Do you have any others pending over there?"

Mayerfield—(Material deleted.)

The fact that testimony was deleted at that point may indicate pending action the CIA wants to keep secret.

Generally, however, it would appear the CIA's troubles with recalcitrant former agents have eased. Mayerfield said, "We find, not to our great surprise, that we have not had to take the initiative, because in the last few weeks the phone has been ringing off the hook and our mailboxes are stuffed with questions."

Elsewhere in the testimony, it was revealed that one of the longest books the CIA review board has had to read for clearance is a tome of more than 500 pages submitted by Meyer for review.

At other places in the testimony, however, CIA officials acknowledged that Meyer does not submit his syndicated columns for review. "That is not to say that they have not been asked," said one official of Meyer and Tom Braden.

Aspin asked officials if they were "going to go after them in a court of law and ask for a return of their money" as the agency got in the Snepp case and is seeking in the Stockwell case.

"That is not my decision," the review board's chairman, Herbert Hetu, answered, deferring to the Justice Department.

Hetu said that in the three years of the board's activities, 198 manuscripts (not all books) have been reviewed. Two by current employees and one by

CONTINUED

a former employee have been disapproved. Four were withdrawn, he said. Of the 198, only about 5% were fiction, one official guessed.

At a later hearing, on April 16, the CIA reported that, as of April 9, 47 manuscripts had been submitted this year for review. Of those for which action has been completed, 20 were approved with no changes, six were approved with changes, one was disapproved and one was withdrawn.

In the "sanitized" testimony, the CIA officials admitted they never review the novels written by E. Howard Hunt because he has never submitted them. Harry Rositzke and Lyman Kirkpatrick submitted their manuscripts and Miles Copeland submitted one of his, although in the foreword to his "Without Cloak and Dagger," he decried the review procedure.

Only one manuscript has gone all the way up to the CIA's appeals board, and "fairly recently," said Charles Wilson, the review board's executive secretary. He said the review has been completed, but "we are still negotiating with that author to try to find some way for him to get open source documents, open source literature which he believes might exist to substantiate those portions of his paper so that he can use those materials but source it with footnotes that would steer any reader away from a CIA or any classified document."

The April 16 hearing was called by Aspin to see what effect the Snepp decision had on other intelligence agencies. Representatives of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI said they would move to adopt a pre-publication review system similar to the CIA's.

HOWARD FIELDS

Secrecy Oath

This is part of the secrecy agreement CIA agents must sign as a condition of employment:

"As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or materials including works of fiction which contain any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information classified pursuant to the Executive Order, which I contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter, prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that I will not take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence Agency."

NORRISTOWN TIMES HERALD (PA)

15 April 1980

INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

THE DILEMMA posed by the problem of former intelligence officers writing about United States intelligence operations remains unresolved. This dilemma is neither simple nor inconsequential. It involves numerous delicate considerations having to do with national security and the relative safety of intelligence agents in the field.

Something else is involved which further complicates the matter. At present, such material written for publication is subject to review only by the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence groups. That brings up questions of the fox-guarding-the-chicken-coop variety.

Rep. Les Aspin of Wisconsin put it more temperately in comments made after CIA officials had appeared before the House Intelligence Committee, of which he is a member. Their description of the agency's procedures for reviewing manuscripts written by former and current CIA officers led Aspin to observe in his statement that "the only clearance is done by the agency the employee worked for, which all too often feels it 'owns' the information."

This presumed agency attitude was not plucked out of the blue. Aspin notes that at one point in the Intelligence Committee hearing a CIA official told the congressmen: "The people who own the information are in the best position to make a determination whether or not anything is classified."

It may be true that an agency which collects information is uniquely qualified to judge its sensitivity. But no government agency, the CIA included, "owns" the information it obtains; the people own it. Moreover, the public has an important stake in knowing that congressional guidelines for intelligence operations are being honored in particular, that agencies are not breaking the law, as has happened repeatedly in the past.

That public right is meaningless without access under reasonable controls for safeguarding national security to all information. Congressman Aspin is right when he says that secrecy oaths sworn by intelligence agents "don't necessarily protect national secrets from compromise but may enable the intelligence community to ward off criticism and embarrassment quite the reverse of what should be our intent."

For these reasons, Aspin's proposal for creation of an outside review board appears to have merit. Such a board, operating discreetly, would lessen fears that material might be withheld from publication more to avert censure than because of any threat to security.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 25COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW
May/June 1980

COMMENT

Shielding the CIA

While members of Congress were still perfecting the language that would free the CIA from all "unwarranted restraints," the Supreme Court in late February handed down a decision that will make the agency virtually immune from outside criticism. The case was, of course, *The United States v. Frank W. Snepp III*. Upholding a Federal District Court judgment against the former CIA employee and the author of *Decent Interval*, an account of the CIA's activities in the last days of the Vietnam War, the Court, while conceding that the book contains no classified information, decided that Snepp had violated his contract with the agency by not clearing his manuscript with it. This was not surprising. But the Court then went much farther. Holding that Snepp had not merely breached his secrecy contract with the CIA, but had also breached a position of trust, the Court ordered the agent-turned-author to pay to the government all present and future profits from *Decent Interval*. And it went farther in another essential area, ruling that even in the absence of a secrecy contract, present or former government employees with "access to confidential sources and materials" may be placed under prior restraint.

Shortly after this decision, the Carter administration sued another critic of the agency: John Stockwell, former chief of the CIA's task force in Angola and the author of *In Search of Enemies*, which tells the ugly tale of American intervention in Angola, including a CIA attempt to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.

A March 11 *New York Times* article, WHY DECISION IN SNEPP CASE DISTURBS PUBLISHERS, quoted reactions from several sources. Henry R. Kaufman, general counsel for the Association of American Publishers, found "the entire opinion . . . an unadulterated disaster." Alan Dershowitz, the noted Harvard Law School professor who assisted in Snepp's defense, commented: "It's the greatest example of overreaching and lack of judicial restraint in our memory." And Professor Thomas Emerson of Yale said: "I am appalled. . . . [F]or a Government to impose that kind of blanket inhibition on its employees is a kind of action that is simply not governed by normal contract rules."

The implications of *Snepp* for the press were succinctly formulated by Nat Hentoff in a *Village Voice* article on the decision: "Now, with this implicit encouragement from the Supreme Court, the Government is much more likely to move against any . . . publisher, or broadcaster, who retains the

quaint notion that muckraking cannot depend on the prior approval of the targets of that muckraking."

Speaking in support of a bill devised to "unleash" the CIA, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan emphasized that the country must face "the reality of the totalitarian state in today's world, and the conditions of conflict which the existence of the totalitarian state imposes on the rest of us." Presumably he was referring to the Soviet Union. The Supreme Court's repressive *Snepp* decision, however, together with the congressional rush to elevate the CIA to an entity subject only to the checks imposed by the equivalent of a presidency, threatens to bring "the reality of the totalitarian state" uncomfortably close to home.

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ON PAGE A-23

NEW YORK TIMES
3 MAY 1980

For a Presidential Advisory Board

By David M. Abshire

WASHINGTON — The best aid for the ruler, as Seneca said, "is to have an honest counselor."

Previous Presidents have had a continuing group of such outside counselors in the bipartisan, extremely influential but little-known President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. After taking office, President Carter abolished this board. The aborted rescue mission in Iran raises serious questions about the advisability of that decision.

A continuing small board was first created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower during his second term to audit the intelligence process and direct Presidential advice. In his exuberance for personal leadership and dislike for the more staid Eisenhower process, President John F. Kennedy abolished the board soon after taking office but was wise enough to reinstitute a refurbished board in 1961 in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.

Under the Johnson Administration, the board remained intact, though increasingly less used, as the President became isolated in his strategy of attrition in Vietnam. During the Nixon Administration, senior policy officials never liked being second-guessed or critiqued by an outside group with direct access to the President, and meetings with the President were not as frequent as the board wanted. Despite this impediment, the board served Presidents Nixon and Gerald R. Ford very well — especially when most needed.

Those unaware of the board's workings failed to understand this unique role. Obviously no Government can rule by committee, and outside advisers always suffer to some extent from a lack of current knowledge and relevance. Nonetheless, this experienced board maintained a continuing critique of the intelligence and national security process. Supported by only a three-man staff, it met once every two months in the Executive Office Building, next to the White House, and would call in high officials throughout the Government for evaluation of programs and policies. Subgroups traveled throughout the world when there was a policy failure.

Some of the past boards' accomplishments speak for themselves. Under the aegis of a member, Dr. Edwin Land, it prodded the Government into the use of overhead surveillance, which led to satellite photography and telemetry. Even before the

energy crisis, it questioned the lack of emphasis on economic, commercial and financial intelligence. It did post-mortems on a variety of intelligence failures. It warned against the rising use of terrorism, as well as the effects of growing Soviet naval capabilities.

The range and richness of advice available to Presidents was illustrated by its four chairmen: James R. Killian Jr., scientist; Clark Clifford, lawyer; General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral George Anderson and Leo Cherne, research executive. The board's makeup constituted a who's who in the security and diplomatic fields.

With the Iranian fiasco, as well as major questions other events have generated about the Carter Administration's entire decision-making process, the board urgently needs to be reinstituted with an esteemed nonpartisan membership of experienced strategists, diplomats, economists, scientists and former Cabinet members. The blue-ribbon advisory board — call it, say, the President's National

Security Advisory Board — broadened to include intelligence, defense and foreign-policy jurisdiction, should immediately be constituted and given direct and unfettered access to the President.

The new board should look at the total relationships between all agencies and departments that bear on the foreign-affairs field, and examine the dangers of the windows of vulnerability of the 1980's. It must also address what is and is not being done to plan for contingencies, including a Persian Gulf oil cutoff; to match objectives and capabilities, and to better use our scientific and technological strengths.

More specifically and immediately, the board should examine the aborted rescue attempt to determine whether the failing operation shows a weakness of equipment, planning, personnel or judgments. If the United States fails in this operation, is it a portent of failure in a larger military operation? Have our post-Vietnam armed forces, with lack of operations and maintenance capabilities, spare parts, spirit and leadership become incapable of effective action? Do they have the proper strategic and tactical concepts, the logistical capabilities, and the intelligence support for action in the Persian Gulf or even in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization area itself? Even if it is found that there is no relationship between this failure and general military readiness, there is enormous uneasiness in and out of the Pentagon, and among the best informed on Capitol Hill, about America's operational competence and combat capabilities.

A properly constituted blue-ribbon board can put fears to rest if unwarranted. Or if, on the other hand, sensitive concerns exist, the President can be informed without diplomatic damage and further erosion of international confidence. Equally important, as "honest counselors," the board members can address the decision-making process itself and counsel the President as no subordinates within that process can do.

David M. Abshire was Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from April 1970 to January 1973, and is a former member of the Congressional Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. He is chairman of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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ON PAGE A28

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 May 1980

High Saudi Official Ridicules Reports of Political Instability

Associated Press

Some American reporters have distorted and exaggerated the danger of instability and revolution in Saudi Arabia, a ranking Saudi official said yesterday.

Dr. Ghazi Alghosaibi, speaking to the National Association of Arab-Americans, ridiculed stories suggesting that Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to the same sort of Islamic revolutionary turmoil that swept Iran.

"The domino theory, which was proven correct nowhere, will not be vindicated in the [Persian] Gulf. We are not a set of dominoes, and Saudi Arabia is not Iran," said Alghosaibi, Saudi Arabia's minister of industry and electricity.

He said the fate of the Saudi regime depends on the feelings of the Saudi people.

"It does not depend," he said, "on the predictions of journalists acquiring omniscience through five-minute

chats and one-day visits or the pronouncements of third-rate bureaucrats reading fourth-rate intelligence reports from fifth-rate spies."

Alghosaibi did not specify the reports he objected to. Some of the reports he apparently referred to were written in the aftermath of the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in December, an event he said was misinterpreted by Western reporters.

He said that contrary to reports that the terrorists were part of an organized political group, they were motivated simply by religious fanaticism.

"Fanaticism could drive apparently rational human beings to tragic extremes. The Jonestown massacre which killed 900 people in Guyana in 1978, is an eloquent, if bloody, case in point. Yet fanaticism pure and simple was not accepted as an explanation."

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ON PAGE A-11

WASHINGTON STAR
4 MAY 1980

Saudi Official Attacks Talks on Palestinians

Predictions on Fall Of Dynasty Derided

By Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writer

A Saudi Arabian cabinet minister last night made a blistering assault on the ongoing talks by the United States, Egypt and Israel to bring autonomy to Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In the same tone, the Saudi minister of industry and electricity, Dr. Ghazi A. Alghosaibi, also accused the U.S. media as well as the CIA of fostering a campaign predicting the imminent downfall of the ruling royal family. He derided such predictions as ones concocted in ignorance by journalists and low-level bureaucrats.

On the autonomy talks, Alghosaibi indicated that, even if the United States is successful in fostering an agreement between Egypt and Israel by the May 26 deadline, it would not be enough.

"No 'ism' justifies the enslavement of free people, be it nationalism, communism or Camp Davidism," he said.

"Occupation is occupation, even when it is called autonomy," he said in a speech prepared for delivery to a meeting here of the National Association of Arab Americans.

The cabinet minister, who is not a member of the ruling royal family, mocked the emphasis on autonomy.

"Autonomy means that while the colonial power exercises sovereignty, the natives are allowed to tend their own parks, build their own sewers and collect their own traffic tickets."

"How touchingly generous," he said.

The minister's speech is viewed here as the most strident ever delivered by a Saudi official in the United States.

While the oil kingdom, the major oil supplier to the United States, has voiced its opposition to the Camp David peace process on many occasions, speeches in this country normally dwell on the good relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom wants a comprehensive Middle East settlement, agreed to by the Palestinians, believing that only the settlement of this issue will bring peace to the pivotal Persian Gulf area.

On predictions of the Saudi Arabian royal family's downfall, Alghosaibi said the fate of the Saudi regime depends in the final analysis on Saudis themselves.

"It does not depend on the predictions of journalists acquiring omnisciences through five-minute chats and one-day visits or the pronouncements of third-rate bureaucrats reading fourth-rate intelligence reports prepared by fifth-rate spies," the minister said.

He was referring here to reports following the two-week siege of Mecca last autumn as dissidents against the royal family as well as a recent CIA report predicting the downfall of the royal family in a year or two.

"While the ignorance of politicians and journalists is never to be underestimated as the source of many evils in the world, I suspect that ignorance alone does not explain the subtle and not so subtle attacks on Saudi Arabia," he said.

He was apparently referring to the Saudi belief that Zionists are behind the stories implying that the Saudi government is in danger of falling.

The minister said that he believed that part of the reason for the dire predictions on the fate of the Saudi regime stems from the Iranian revolution.

Those who yesterday made shortsighted judgments about Iran are today attempting to compensate for the foolishness by making even more shortsighted judgments about Saudi Arabia," he said.

The minister did acknowledge that corruption — much written about by American journalists — does exist in the oil kingdom.

Alghosaibi said the sudden wealth thrust on the kingdom by its oil riches "dazzled, overpowered and corrupted."

"Those superstars of scandalous decadence who inhabit gossip columns, giving Arabs and the rest of decent humanity a very bad name, are a painful testimony to the pitfalls of instant fortunes," he said.

But, he added, "such characters do not represent our great national effort; they embody its sad shortcomings."

The speech apparently served as a forum for the Saudis to air some of their grievances with the United States, building up since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and intensifying in the wake of the collapse of the pro-Western Iranian monarchy.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 23

THE WASHINGTON POST
PARADE MAGAZINE
4 May 1980

Spy Recruitment

In much the same way that our Central Intelligence Agency advertises in college newspapers for prospective agents, the KGB—the Soviet Union's intelligence and security apparatus—advertises in Red Star, the Soviet army newspaper.

According to a recent Red Star ad, the KGB is seeking recruits proficient in foreign languages, math, physics and Russian literature. Those who make the grade will have the choice of working in one of three departments: general, political or foreign.

Applicants for the political department are warned: "Preference will be accorded active members of the Communist Party who can provide recommendations from their local Communist District Committees."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6WASHINGTON WEEKLY
13 May 1980

Have Jack Anderson's Reports Harmed National Security?

WASHINGTON—In his recent clash with convicted Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy on ABC's "Good Morning, America," columnist Jack Anderson vehemently denied that he had ever published anything that resulted in the execution or imminent execution, probably after torture, of a U.S. intelligence agent abroad. In his new book, "Will," Liddy says that he had suggested that Anderson be killed because there was reason to believe the columnist had done this. Anderson told Liddy:

"You can't name any CIA agent whose death or execution I caused . . . because it never happened. I don't reveal the names of CIA agents. I consider that to be reckless."

Well, indeed Liddy couldn't name any such names. But the idea that a U.S. intelligence operative might be murdered, because his name was published is not really all that far-out. On Dec. 23, 1975, Richard S. Welch, the CIA station chief in Greece, was shot and killed by three masked gunmen outside his home in a suburb of Athens. Welch, who was officially listed as a member of the U.S. diplomatic corps attached to the U.S. Embassy, was murdered after he had been named as a CIA agent in a letter published in the English-language daily Athens News on Nov. 25, 1975.

In any event, Anderson cannot deny Liddy's statement that the columnist has published material "seriously damaging the ability of the United States government to conduct foreign policy and diplomacy."

—On Dec. 14, 1974, after four days of hearings on unauthorized disclosures and transmittal of classified documents, the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report about what it called leaks to the press of "highly sensitive information" which were "a serious compromise to national security decision-making." In a section titled "Material Facts," this Senate report declared:

"Information from at least 70 highly sensitive, classified documents was disclosed by Mr. Jack Anderson in his newspaper column between December 13, 1971, and February 1, 1972."

"The documents covered a range of subjects—the Indo-Pakistan situation, the military status in Cambodia, Arab guerrilla activity, B-52 strikes in

Laos, etc.—and were from a variety of sources—National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, U.S. Mission at the U.N., etc."

The leaks to the press were massive and of a serious consequence. Particularly important were leaked minutes of the Washington Special Action Group meetings of the National Security Council which provided a verbatim depiction of the national security decision process in an ongoing crisis situation—the Indo-Pakistan war. Other documents tended to reveal sensitive sources of intelligence information. Still other material disclosed secret information regarding U.S. military movements."

Commenting on the information Anderson published regarding the Indo-Pakistan situation, former Anderson legman Brit Hume wrote in the August 1974 issue of The Washingtonian magazine:

"At first his sources gave him only a few papers. But Jack insisted that he had to have a full set, or his stories could be challenged as being only a partial glimpse of the picture, out of context. All of the material bore the highest security classification. It was an astonishing haul."

—On May 6, 1977, appearing with him on a local TV show here called "Panorama," I accused Anderson of having blown one of the most sensitive U.S. intelligence operations in history—a project code-named Gamma Guppy, in which the CIA monitored communications between top Kremlin leaders. Responding to my charge, Anderson said: "It's just not factual. At no time have I ever reported—that is, at least until it had been reported elsewhere—that we bugged the limousines."

I interrupted Anderson, asking him: Which is it? Did you report this? Or did you report it after it had already been reported? Anderson replied: "I don't think I reported it even afterwards." But, as he frequently is about a variety of things, Anderson was wrong.

According to an article in The Wall Street Journal on May 8, 1973, Anderson, in September 1971, reported that the United States was eavesdropping on private conversations of "the kingpins of the Kremlin (as they) banter, bicker and backbite among themselves." In addition to small-

CONTINUED

talk between Soviet President and Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet officials, information was also being collected about Soviet plans and policies, Anderson reported.

"And he was right," said the Journal story. "The CIA was busily monitoring the radiotelephone in Mr. Brezhnev's limousine as he sped around Moscow and out to the country for the weekends, chatting with the boys back in the Kremlin as he went. Unfortunately, the column gave Russian counter-intelligence agents enough information to figure out the monitoring source immediately, and the eavesdropping stopped." The Journal quoted one man who didn't think very kindly of Anderson as saying: "It was the best source we had."

Reporting on this same Gamma Guppy intelligence operation, The Washington Post, in a front-page article on Dec. 5, 1973, said that it was "terminated in late 1971 after some details were disclosed by columnist Jack Anderson." Reporting a former intelligence officer with access to the transcripts of the monitored Moscow conversations as saying it was "one of the most valuable intelligence pipelines the United States had in the Soviet Union," The Post quoted this official as saying of Anderson's 1971 leak that it was "completely gratuitous—it served no purpose and blew our best intelligence source in the Soviet Union."

In an April 3, 1972, article in Newsweek magazine, when asked where he drew the line in publishing classified information, Anderson replied: "I leave out anything I feel would jeopardize national security. But I take a different view from the government of what that is."

He sure does. But a more accurate characterization of what Anderson is all about was contained in Time magazine, also on April 3, 1972. Time said: "As for using stolen documents, Anderson has no scruples, except that he and his staff do no pilfering themselves. . . . As long as there are people willing—for whatever motive—to break security, Anderson and Co. are willing to consider the offerings."

—John D. Lofton, Jr.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 812THE BALTIMORE SUN
8 May 1980

TV & radio

Hold the bouquets: documentary on the CIA is as subtle as a brick

Bill Carter

The commercial networks are doing their usual sweep-period handstands this month to try to get you to stay in your living room on these lovely spring evenings.

They are trotting out the big movies, the mini-series, the specials featuring big-name stars, all for the sake of building up audiences for their local affiliates, who need a break in sweep months because that's when the advertisers look at the ratings to decide where they are going to spend their money.

Just in case the prospect of another two-part run of the remake of "King Kong" doesn't give you goosebumps (or azebumps); or you don't quiver with excitement at the lure of watching 90 minutes of the National Cheerleading Championships; or you fall short of hyperventilating in anticipation of Rona Barrett interviewing Bo Derek, Kristy McNichol, Kenny Rogers—and their mothers; or your heart fails to palpitate with lust over the very thought of a TV movie about a videotape dating service called "The Love Tapes," maybe you will find some more worthy diversion in a couple of public television's somewhat more cerebral offerings this week.

Such as the beginning of the three-part examination of the CIA, which will be the entry the next three weeks in "Non-Fiction Television," the series of independently produced documentaries that runs on Channels 22 and 67 Fridays at 9.

Tomorrow night's first part of "On Company Business," as this documentary is called, takes a look back at the agency's history, and sets the tone for the series, a tone that will probably not send joy rushing into the hearts of the those anxious to rehabilitate the CIA's image.

That image took quite a beating during and after the Watergate scandals; and the beating is going to be resumed in this comprehensive examination of some of the agency's more outrageous activities. Those now-familiar tales of assassination plots, conspiracies to overthrow governments, pay-offs to more favored tyrants, are resurrected tomorrow night and over the next two weeks, as this documentary sets out to detail the relationship of the CIA to American foreign policy over the past three years.

The relationship described in this show is intimate indeed. "On Company Business" is not a film that takes even a half-hearted stab at objectivity. Its point of view is transparent throughout. It is making a case for the dangers of allowing an intelligence organization to exercise its power unchecked by the government on whose behalf it is supposed to be acting.

The presence of some of the agency's more vocal critics—including Philip Agee and Victor Marchetti, former agents who have published highly critical books about the agency—indicates this is no bouquet to the CIA.

Part one has some trouble getting going, largely because the documentary takes the form of a chronological study, using old newsreel footage interspersed with inter-

views, to outline the agency's beginnings. Like other independent documentaries, which believe the "modern" approach is to leave out all narration, this one attempts to fill in the gaps with the interviews.

It is not the best technique for this kind of documentary. A narrator definitely would have helped. This kind of film seems to presume that anybody watching already knows plenty about the subject, a conceit that only a show aiming for airing in the elite world of public television would dare.

But as the show progresses it becomes much more absorbing—provided you can get past the imperfect technique. There is certainly much to ponder in the skulduggery of the CIA over the past 30 years.

Part two will concentrate on how the CIA has attempted to shape public opinion in America, specifically as regards American activity in Latin America in the 1960s. Part three examines in detail the CIA's part in the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile. It also includes suggestions for the future role of the CIA from both the agency critics and some supporters, such as William Colby, a former director of central intelligence.

Obviously the source of this film must always be remembered in considering its message. It is an independent film and that immediately sets it apart from a network documentary, which probably would never take on a subject such as the activities of the CIA with its point of view hanging out.

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ON PAGE A-4

NEW YORK TIMES
8 MAY 1980

Giant Soviet Submarine Reported

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 7 — The Soviet Navy is completing work on a new submarine described by Defense Department officials today as the largest under-sea vessel ever built.

The officials said that the huge vessel was spotted by American surveillance satellites late last month when it was moved out of a construction shed at the naval yard at Severodvinsk on the White Sea. The submarine, which has not yet been given a code name by Western intelligence analysts, may be ready to begin sea trials in the near future, the officials said.

According to one Pentagon aide, the appearance of the new Soviet vessel came as a complete surprise and American intelligence officials were still uncertain about its military mission.

Based on the satellite photographs, intelligence analysts have concluded that the submarine is about 480 feet long and 57 feet in diameter, making it larger in volume than the United States Navy's new class of nuclear-powered Trident submarines.

The Tridents, which started deployment last year, are 560 feet long but only 44 feet in diameter. Each Trident is equipped with 24 long-range missiles.

Given its bulk, officials believe that the new Soviet submarine, like the Trident, is nuclear-powered. However, they said that the vessel is apparently not equipped with hatches for launching missiles.

Some officials speculated that it could be the first of a new generation of cargo-carrying ships, designed to carry military supplies around the world without detection. Moscow, they said, might be interested in using a new class of large

submarines for resupplying Soviet forces in the Far East by moving military gear under the Arctic ice cap.

Other specialists suggested that the new submarine could be given a civilian role, as an undersea tanker to pick up oil in the East Arctic Sea and ship it to refineries in the western Soviet Union.

Intelligence aides expect Moscow to launch a submarine to carry a new Soviet long-range missile, known as the Typhoon, which was tested for the first time early this year. But officials believe the vessel spotted at Severodvinsk is not designed to carry or launch missiles.

While the United States is generally said to possess a technical lead over the Soviet Union in the design of submarines, Moscow is reported to have stepped up its development of new vessels.

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OPINIONS ON CHARTERS

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501380001-7

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 44

THE WASHINGTON POST
29 May 1980

House Vote Would Reduce Intelligence Agency Reports

Associated Press

The House, working yesterday on a foreign aid bill, approved President Carter's request to reduce how much U.S. intelligence agencies must tell Congress, but it cut the president's requested aid to Nicaragua.

The votes came as the House started work on the \$5.5-billion U.S. aid bill. House leaders plan to complete work on it by Friday.

The president's request that covert U.S. intelligence operations be reported to two congressional committees, instead of eight, was approved 323 to 50.

Supporters said the revision would reduce the risk of news leaks by requiring that the operations be reported to about 35 members of Congress instead of 200.

The change would also require that, when possible, the intelligence committees be told in advance of covert operations.

House opponents of the prior-reporting requirement said they could accept it because it let the president delay the reports to protect lives or vital U.S. interests.

Carter's request for \$5.5 million in military aid to Nicaragua was rejected 267 to 103, and opponents said they also

would try to cut \$55 million in other aid for Nicaragua from the bill.

House Democratic Leader Jim Wright of Texas denounced the action as "a jingoistic vote to kick them in the teeth." Wright said Congress will only help America's opponents in Latin America by voting to "kick Nicaragua in the teeth and announce to the world we are turning them over to communism."

Rep. Robert Bauman (R-Md.) said the aid will not help Nicaragua, but will only help finance what he called that country's "communist-dominated government."

The \$60 million in military and economic aid for Nicaragua in the bill would be in addition to \$75 million authorized but not appropriated so far by Congress.

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REUTER

17AM-CIA

WASHINGTON, MAY 28, REUTER - THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY TODAY TO LOOSEN A CONGRESSIONAL REIN ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN WHAT WAS SEEN AS A REACTION TO THE IRAN AND AFGHAN CRISES.

BY A VOTE OF 325 TO 50 IT REPEALED LEGISLATION REQUIRING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) TO NOTIFY UP TO EIGHT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES OF COVERT OPERATIONS ABROAD.

INSTEAD IT REQUIRED THE CIA TO TELL ONLY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE.

THE ACTION, DURING DEBATE ON A 5.5 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN AID BILL, WAS THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO DEMANDS THAT THE CIA BE "UNLEASHED" TO DEAL WITH NEW DANGERS IN THE WORLD.

OTHER LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND IS PENDING BEFORE THE FULL SENATE.

THE REPEALED PROVISION, KNOWN AS THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, WAS ENACTED IN 1974 IN REACTION TO DISCLOSURE OF WIDESPREAD ABUSES BY THE CIA.

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17AM-CIA 2 WASHINGTON

THE SUBSTITUTE PROVISION, LIKE THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT, STATES THAT BEFORE A COVERT OPERATION CAN BE UNDERTAKEN THE PRESIDENT MUST DETERMINE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

IT STATES THAT THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES MUST BE NOTIFIED BEFORE THE OPERATION IS INITIATED, BUT SAYS HE MAY DEFER NOTIFICATION IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING VITAL U.S. INTERESTS OR TO SAFEGUARD PERSONNEL OR METHODS.

OPPONENTS OF THE CHANGE SAID THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAD GONE TOO FAR IN EXCLUDING ITSELF FROM INFORMATION ABOUT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

BUT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN CLEMENT ZABLOCKI (DEMOCRAT, WISCONSIN) SAID THAT UNDER THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT UP TO 200 PEOPLE COULD BE INFORMED OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, CREATING THE DANGER OF LEAKS.

HE SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD HAD DIFFICULTY GETTING COOPERATION FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES BECAUSE THEY FEARED LEAKS.

DEMOCRAT TED WEISS PROPOSED THAT THE LAW BE LEFT UNCHANGED AND URGED THAT CONGRESS AWAIT COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION ON INTELLIGENCE. BUT THE HOUSE REJECTED HIS AMENDMENT AND BACKED THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

REUTER 1912 WS

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGEBALTIMORE SUN
28 May 1980

The CIA and Congress

Six years ago Congress added the now famous and controversial Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. This required the president to report to eight committees of the House and Senate "in a timely fashion" about covert Central Intelligence Agency activities. The CIA has been seeking ever since to reduce the number of committees from eight to two. Members of the intelligence community say that the fact that so many members of Congress are looking over their shoulders scares away many foreign contacts and makes planning covert acts almost impossible.

The CIA wanted so much to do away with Hughes-Ryan that it was willing, reluctantly, to go along with the writing into statute of a comprehensive charter for itself. Such is greatly needed, we believe. We were pleased when the Carter administration and the Senate Intelligence Committee worked out a good, if by no means perfect, Intelligence Act—172 pages spelling out what the CIA (and other intelligence agencies) could and couldn't do and making clear the lines of executive responsibility for and congressional oversight of intelligence operations. For example, assassination was prohibited; private institutions such as the press and religious and educational groups were protected from abuse by agents needing such "cover" (though the protection in the draft act was not as great as is needed); the right of private citizens to be secure against surveillance and searches was given much higher procedural protection than now exists, including court

orders in many cases; responsibility for "special" intelligence activities was made explicitly that of very high level officials, including the attorney general and the president. And so on.

Then early this month the committee "streamlined" that bill down to four pages—giving the agency what it wanted on Hughes-Ryan and doing little else. The rest of the charter can be dealt with next year, its sponsors said. Apparently senators on the committee were reacting to pressure generated by American failures in Iran. Nothing in current law caused the CIA to fail, if it did, in Iran. But the agency and its supporters made clever use of the frustrations generated by the Iranian situation (and Afghanistan) by arguing that Congress must now "unleash the CIA!"

Reformers say they are getting something from the streamlined bill. Where Hughes-Ryan just called for the president to report to the eight committees "in a timely fashion," the proposed change would require that the two committees be kept "fully and currently informed" of CIA covert activities, including advance notice in almost all cases. That is something for reformers—but not enough, when you consider that once Hughes-Ryan is overturned, the CIA would not go along with getting a charter passed, and thus there would be no charter. Because of that reality, we would prefer to see Congress do nothing this year, and try next year when times may be more tranquil, to trade off Hughes-Ryan for a charter.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
27 May 1980

Unleash CIA

To the Editor:

I disagree wholeheartedly with the point of the editorial, "Oversight of the CIA is all the more needed now." The CIA should be permitted to do whatever needs to be done in gathering intelligence.

As reported in the editorial, the CIA has had fiascos, but you didn't comment on what important and vital information the agency has uncovered. Placing restraints on the CIA isn't going to help the nation at all. Will it help the situation in Iran? Would it have helped with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

NORMAN HANSEN
Philadelphia

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10

BOSTON GLOBE
23 May 1980

A slice of progress on the CIA

The legislative pendulum has swung back and forth several times this year as the Congress has pondered bills involving the Central Intelligence Agency. Now it has swung a bit toward reform and it ought to be kept there.

At one time this spring, it seemed possible that Congress would senselessly heed the calls to "unleash" the CIA. Then, it appeared briefly that a meaningful charter might actually pass. That effort collapsed and fears arose that Congress would enact legislation to sanction CIA use of clergy and newsmen, to exempt the agency from the Freedom of Information Act, to make even the unknowing publication of an agent's name a crime.

Now the momentum has changed again. The Senate Intelligence Committee has approved legislation that would require intelligence agencies to report to only two committees rather than the eight now required. That change has been aggressively sought by the CIA and by President Carter.

At the same time, the legislation would require the President to give those committees prior notice of all significant intelligence operations and to report

in a timely fashion emergency operations for which prior notice was impossible. Further, it empowers Congress to subpoena all relevant information after the fact when there is evidence that a particular mission has failed or that an intelligence agency has overstepped its lawful bounds.

Missing from the package are outright prohibitions on CIA use of newsmen, the clergy or academics or tighter legislative restrictions on intelligence-gathering techniques. There may be a move on the floor to push amendments that would broaden and improve the bill. But opening it to amendments would risk inclusion of other, troubling changes: an exemption for the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act; ill-considered language designed to punish those who inadvertently reveal the names of intelligence agents.

On balance, the committee bill seems a worthwhile piece of legislation and ought to be enacted as is. It is not half a loaf but merely one slice. However, it does not preclude Congress' trying again next year to legislate a comprehensive and progressive charter for the CIA.

BUFFALO NEWS (NY)
18 May 1980

Balanced Plan on CIA

It is not an easy chore for Congress to legislate a responsible balance that establishes proper checks against abuses by the CIA and other intelligence agencies while still allowing them to fulfill their vital functions.

Congressional committees have wrestled with this problem for several months, but now the Senate Select Intelligence Committee has agreed to what appear to be reasonable proposals for addressing these twin needs.

In particular, the committee's plan would reduce from eight to two the number of congressional committees that must be informed of covert intelligence operations. This would greatly narrow the risk of leaks of sensitive information while still providing for basic congressional oversight of such operations.

Similarly, the proposal would require the president to keep the two committees — namely the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — “fully and currently” informed of intelligence activities, while allowing the chief executive legitimate latitude for special actions in emergency situations.

The Senate plan, however, should go further than it does in some areas, such as including a statutory ban against the recruitment of American journalists as secret intelligence agents. This is particularly needed in light of the recent misguided defense by CIA Director Stansfield Turner and President Carter of using journalists as agents, a policy that reverses a CIA directive written by one of his predecessors, George Bush, in 1976. As the American Society of Newspaper Editors correctly warned, the issue here “is not merely the ability of American journalists to operate effectively, but the credibility of the American press at home and abroad — and in some cases the physical safety of correspondents.”

Such a prohibition should by all means be incorporated in the Senate proposal. Nonetheless, it seems basically a constructive effort to allow intelligence agencies to function effectively within reasonable legislative restraints against abuse. If the choice is between doing nothing at all or approving the Senate proposal, Congress should choose the latter.

CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WVA)
12 May 1980

Unleashing the CIA

WHEN RUSSIAN troops were sent into Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter carefully selected a presidential reaction calculated to show the Russians that America can get tough when it needs to. Remove some of the restraints from the CIA, the president grimly asked. His tone suggested that the CIA had been unjustly restrained.

As a result of the theatrics, Congress has surrendered to the CIA by dropping plans for an intelligence agency charter. Rather than dealing with a charter that would prevent recurrence of CIA abuses exposed in the 1970s, a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on intelligence has taken up a measure that addresses only the con-

cerns of CIA officials.

The proposed law would largely exempt the CIA from requirements to give notice to Congress before undertaking covert operations. It would make it easier for the CIA to refuse to divulge information under the Freedom of Information Act. It would permit the use of spies under the cover of teachers, journalists and clergymen.

Strengthening the CIA might be justified if efforts were concentrated on intelligence-gathering. Certainly the agency's record is none too good in regard to events in Iran. But to create a kind of superagency accountable to no one is inconsistent with American tradition.

CAMDEN COURIER POST (NJ)

9 May 1980

The CIA charter: Don't tear it up

Four years ago, Congress and the American people were hell-bent on reining in the CIA. Today the nation is determined to unleash the intelligence-gathering agency. The drive to create a charter to govern the CIA has been losing momentum since 1978. Last week, it ran out of steam altogether. Legislation now being considered by Congress would take the CIA back the other way — to the least restricted operation it has ever known.

Congress' reversal actually has little to do with the CIA itself, much to do with the broader issue of national security, of which the CIA is only one part.

The efficiency of the CIA — or lack thereof — has become intertwined in public opinion with that of the armed forces. The growing military might and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union has understandably unnerved this nation, but Soviet actions do not in themselves constitute reason to doubt our ability to monitor them.

Secondly, the failures of the CIA, whatever they may have been in recent years, have been laid to restrictions on its operations, even though few restrictions were actually enacted and evidence is scant that those that were had a deleterious effect.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment required the CIA to report to Congress and the Freedom of Information Act was expanded to require the CIA to disclose, upon request, some aspects of its operations. Neither the CIA nor anyone else has alleged that there have been congressional leaks of CIA secrets. The Freedom of Information Act does not permit disclosure of CIA secrets, and while disclosure has occasionally embarrassed the CIA, it has not damaged the national security. The real danger lies in insulating the agency from scrutiny.

The CIA's failure to gauge the extent of revolutionary sentiment in Iran stemmed more from complacency and reliance on its Iranian counterpart than on restrictions imposed by Congress. Lack of restraint by the Shah's secret police, incidentally, was a major cause of the hatred that fueled the Iranian revolution and sustains its rabid anti-Americanism even now.

Certainly morale can be damaged when

an agency perceives itself to be under attack by the society it serves. But the CIA's importance in a hostile world has never been challenged by the American people and the majority of criticism aimed at its operations has been constructive. Support for checks and balances and for accountability — principles that have given our government strength, not just righteousness — need not be interpreted as opposition to efficient intelligence gathering.

The revelations in the mid-70s about CIA abuses — assassination plots; domestic spying; experiments with mind-altering drugs — shocked most Americans. The principles that were to be laid out in a charter for the CIA represented, then, not so much a call for change as an order to return to the way most Americans thought the agency should have been operating all along.

We have no objection to the CIA's proposal to reduce the number of congressional committees to which it is required to report from eight to two. We think it makes sense. But we object to the loopholes in the CIA's reporting proposal that would allow it to undertake extensive covert operations without consulting Congress. One of the foundations of our government is a careful balance of powers between the branches.

We have no objection to the CIA's proposal to impose stiff fines on employees who disclose the identity of undercover agents. But we vigorously oppose the agency's attempts to wriggle out of the Freedom of Information Act altogether. Another of the foundations of our government is the balance provided by a free flow of information. There will always be tension between the CIA's need for secrecy and the country's need for information, but a complete cutoff is unthinkable. Nothing insures incompetence as surely as a shield from public censure.

Finally, we believe that if individual rights are not zealously guarded in this country, reason to guard the country itself is diminished. That means domestic spying must be strictly regulated, and not left to the discretion of the CIA, as is now envisioned by its supporters.

WICHITA EAGLE (KS)
8 May 1980

The CIA Charter

The proposed charter for the Central Intelligence Agency already has been watered down to the point that it is being called a "minicharter." The Senate Intelligence Committee is now in the process of further weakening this crucial piece of legislation. Any additional laxity on current restrictions could be especially harmful.

Conditions in Iran and Afghanistan have been cited by the Carter administration and some members of Congress as the primary reason for their desire to loosen restrictions on America's counterintelligence activities. Lack of accurate information concerning the instability of the Khomeini regime or the intentions of the Soviets to move further into the Persian Gulf may indeed be evidence of poor monitoring by the CIA.

Similar oversights occurred, however, when the CIA had virtually no restraints on its method of operation. Evidence also points to the possibility that the Carter administration was forewarned about the events that have transpired in that volatile corner of the world.

The point, however, is not whether the crises in Iran and Afghanistan adequately were perceived by the CIA. At stake is the potential reoccurrence of the abuses of power that caused a legislative charter to be proposed in the first place. The need for international in-

telligence-gathering is essential for the national security. Coupled with that need, however, is the necessity for continued strong congressional oversight.

The need for such oversight will continue long after current disturbances in Southwest Asia have shifted to another arena. If no meaningful legislation is passed during the current hearings, it will be many years before substantive attempts at imposing curbs are attempted again. It may take the unearthing of another long string of abuses by America's intelligence community to initiate the proper mood in Congress.

At the very least the number of congressional committees that must be informed of covert operations should remain at eight. The present legislation would reduce that number to two. Loopholes exist in the "minicharter" that would allow total circumvention of the Congress under certain conditions.

The proposed removal of most CIA activities from the disclosure clause of the Freedom of Information Act is especially bothersome. The avenue of public access already is too narrow where the activities of this country's investigative bodies are concerned.

The Kansas congressional delegation should make every effort to see that the necessary protections from intelligence abuses are not whittled away further.

HOUSTON CHRONICLE (TX)
7 May 1980

A not surprising delay

It is hardly surprising that the Senate Intelligence Committee has given up for this year in its efforts to write a comprehensive charter for the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community.

The best description we have ever heard of the difficulty of this task is that Congress is trying to write a law to make legal that which is inherently illegal; meaning, of course, some of

those aspects of international intelligence and espionage which are bound to come up in the course of any spy agency's work.

That can be a real stumper when one sets out to draft a "comprehensive" law dealing with all phases of intelligence operations. The committee will reportedly concentrate for now on a narrower measure, leaving the complexities of "comprehensive" to another day.

LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (KY)

4 May 1980

Huddleston loses battle on CIA charter but wins praises on intelligence work

By ED RYAN

Courier-Journal Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — In the last days of the Nixon administration, when the Church Committee in the U.S. Senate started investigating abuses of the CIA, Sen. Walter "Dee" Huddleston can remember going home "sick at my stomach."

"We found things that were horrendous, a massive abuse of civil rights, and the constitutional and legal rights of citizens," Huddleston recalled. "And it was done in a deliberate fashion."

The Kentucky Democrat had been in the Senate only two years. But Huddleston's interest in intelligence matters prompted then-Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to appoint the freshman senator to the special Church Committee,

named after its chairman, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho.

Now, six years later, Huddleston is a veritable graybeard in the Senate on the nation's intelligence system. Only three senators — Huddleston, Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz. — have served continuously from 1974 on the Church Committee and its successor, the permanent Senate Intelligence Committee formed in 1976.

"We have seen more of the intelligence operation of the United States than any other individual, including the CIA directors, the presidents, the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Huddleston said in an interview last week.

Huddleston is close-mouthed about the many secrets he's seen. But, taking a broad perspective, he said there has

been tremendous progress in reforming the intelligence agencies since the Nixon years.

"There is no comparison now in the degree of responsibility with which our agencies are operating," he said.

Last week, however, Huddleston lost a long battle to bring more accountability to the CIA and other foreign-intelligence operations.

For the past two years, as the intelligence subcommittee chairman on charter legislation, Huddleston has led an effort to write a charter specifying legal restraints on the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies.

Such a charter has never existed. And there has been a reform movement

among some in Congress to put a tighter leash on the intelligence community since the abuses of the mid-1970s — the CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders, spying on domestic groups and the use of mind-altering drugs by U.S. agents.

Huddleston, working closely for many months with President Carter and intelligence officials, drafted a 171-page comprehensive charter earlier this year. The charter would not only have put restraints on the CIA, but it would also have allowed the agency to better protect its secrets and to act with greater freedom.

Last Thursday, as White House support began to weaken, Huddleston got the bad news from the Senate leadership — there was no way his charter legislation would get through the Senate this year. So Huddleston "very reluctantly" told his colleagues on the Senate Intelligence Committee that the charter effort would have to be scrapped.

The disappointed Huddleston, instead, presented to the committee a slim seven-page bill that could make it easier for the CIA to undertake covert operations and that could exempt the agency from many provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

The barebones bill would also prescribe criminal penalties for a government official or former official who discloses the identity of an intelligence agent. And it proposes no statutory prohibition on the use of journalists, clergymen and professors as cover for CIA agents.

Huddleston said he would not blame the Carter administration for its lack of support in recent days on such issues as prior notice to Congress on covert CIA operations.

He noted that the crises in Afghanistan and Iran have changed administration and congressional attitudes in recent months about placing legislative restrictions on the CIA. To the contrary, he suggested, a mood now exists to loosen restrictions that currently exist.

Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., chairman of the intelligence committee, praised Huddleston's efforts on the charter.

"I don't know how you can be too complimentary of Sen. Huddleston in his patience and persistence in pursuing the charter," Bayh said.

Last Friday morning, the day after the charter was put in mothballs, the first call that came to Huddleston's office was from former CIA Director William Colby. He said that Huddleston had "fought the good fight" and that he shouldn't be discouraged. Colby was a

frequent ally of Huddleston's in the fight for the charter.

During the past six years, Huddleston has come in contact with the major intelligence figures of recent history — CIA Directors Colby, James Schlesinger, Richard Helms, George Bush and Stansfield Turner. He's also dealt with such shadowy people as the enigmatic former counterintelligence chief James Angleton, who once described the spookish world of intelligence as a "wilderness of mirrors."

Huddleston, once a local broadcaster from Elizabethtown, has had access to much of the secretive, sophisticated spying apparatus of the intelligence community.

But to learn of it, he has had to go to special intelligence committee offices where secret files are kept. He has had to absorb the information in time-consuming sessions in the offices, for he can't take any files home with him, nor can he take any notes while he's there.

His own Senate staff isn't privy to any of the committee information. The senator has to rely on a committee aide who has clearance to deal with the highly classified material.

Huddleston, who operates on the assumption that his telephones are tapped by unknown people, said he never discusses sensitive matters on the phone. There are telephones available to him, Bayh and other committee members that scramble their conversations, making it impossible for a third party to understand what is said.

Occasionally, federal agents will "sweep" Huddleston's Senate office in an effort to detect hidden microphones. So far, none has been found.

The senator hinted that he may be watched by U.S. agents when he goes, for example, to a foreign embassy reception, which isn't often. He suggested that this could be as much for his protection — to warn him about certain people — as it is for the protection of the nation's intelligence secrets.

CONTINUED

During discussions on the comprehensive CIA charter, Huddleston said there has been a general misunderstanding on the part of the public and news media about the differences between intelligence gathering and covert actions.

"We weren't calling for any inhibitions on intelligence collection," emphasized Huddleston, who explained that such collection is done by electronic devices, satellites, individuals "and in a lot of secret ways."

On the other hand, covert operations, he said, "are designed to influence events in foreign countries and to do it in such a way that the hand of the United States is concealed. That can be accomplished by a news article in a paper

to virtually operating a war as we have done."

Covert actions, the Kentucky senator believes, are "very serious activities that should be taken only in extraordinary circumstances."

Huddleston wouldn't discuss whether the CIA participated in covert operations during the recent aborted rescue mission of American hostages in Iran.

One of the key questions still facing Congress this year is whether the White House will be required to give prior notice to the Senate and House intelligence committees about planned covert activities, except in extraordinary situations.

Huddleston's long service on the Senate Intelligence Committee, several aides say, hasn't been a role that necessarily helps him with his constituency back in Kentucky.

His other committee assignments — third-ranking member of the agriculture committee and chairman of both interior appropriations and small business subcommittees — have more political value.

His term runs out on the intelligence committee at the end of this year, but he could be reappointed if an exception is made by the Senate leadership. Then, because of the rotating membership on the committee, he would be chairman.

There is a long-shot chance that Huddleston might also be in line for chairmanship of the powerful agriculture committee next year. It would be a difficult decision, Huddleston acknowledged, if a choice is necessary.

A Huddleston aide, with a strictly political viewpoint, said the senator would choose the agriculture committee, regardless of how much he liked dealing with the "clandestine world" of intelligence.



Staff Photo by Barbara Montgomery

Sen. Walter "Dee" Huddleston
Close-mouthed about secrets

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A18THE WASHINGTON POST
29 May 1980

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Should Missionaries Be Spies?

While Congress debates a new charter for the Central Intelligence Agency, missionaries around the world hold their breath. I would like to suggest reasons why foreign missionaries should not be spies.

From 1960 to 1972 I did missionary work in Tanzania. We were 150 Maryknollers serving farm people of 14 tribes. We built schools, clinics and churches, started farm coops, dug wells, taught and led prayer services. The people wanted progress, but so often leaders had deceived and cheated them that they were suspicious and distrustful, and very careful with strangers. We won their trust and were able to persuade them to invest time, labor and money in projects they could hardly understand, like a well with a hand pump.

In the 1960s, Tanzania had its share of rumors. Many times people questioned me, "Father, does America want to conquer our country? Are missionaries spies?" At that time I could honestly say, "No." But in 1978, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report that declared the CIA had used 21 missionaries and religious persons for

intelligence work. Now I wonder whether I deceived my African friends. Those 21 missionaries betrayed me, their churches and the Third Worlders they professed to serve.

I believe Congress will make a serious mistake if it permits the use of missionaries for intelligence. Yes, church people would make the CIA more effective. Grass-roots people trust them and give information that could help foreign policy makers. But America will do better to respect the integrity of its 35,000 missionaries. The war against communism is a war for minds and hearts. American missionaries are ambassadors who win for the United States the respect of millions of Third Worlders. They bring education and medicine and progress. They speak the truth and are beloved by peoples of many nations. Why should Congress allow the CIA to jeopardize one of America's strongest foreign policy assets? Why win the intelligence battle and lose the allegiance war?

GEORGE COTTER,
Maryknoll Fathers.

New York

ARTICLE ATTACHED
ON PAGE 2-BERIE TIMES (PA)
7 May 1980

Newsmen are Americans first

As far as we are concerned, U.S. newsmen are Americans, like everyone else.

Thus, we part company with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, who have written a letter to President Carter, expressing concern over the President's position on the use of American journalists by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The letter referred specifically to remarks made by Admiral Stansfield Turner, the director of Central Intelligence, when he addressed the organization's convention in Washington on April 10, a convention at which *The Times Publishing Company* was represented. Turner told the editors that he would not hesitate to recruit journalists as agents in given situations if he felt that it was in the national interest to do so. The president said later that he supported the director's position.

The key distinction -- and the only cause for concern on the part of journal-

ists, it seems to us -- is on a possible "paid relationship." We do not think journalists should be on the CIA payroll. But if President Carter or Admiral Turner or anybody in the CIA thinks a

VIEWPOINT

returning journalist has information on a foreign country that could be of use to his or her country, why, then, we think the journalist has to remember he or she is an American first.

The distinction on whether the journalist is paid or not was the basis of a 1976 dispute. At that time George Bush was director of the CIA and he announced -- quite properly, in our opinion -- that the agency would no longer enter into paid relationships with part-time or full-time news correspondents accredited by any American news organization.

Bush's stance then is the one that

should be followed by President Carter and Admiral Turner today. As for the newsmen involved, we think, by and large, American newspaper people are as patriotic as anyone. Individual journalists know where their responsibilities lie.

SYRACUSE HERALD-JOURNAL (NY)
6 May 1980

Waiting

Adm. Stanfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, about a month ago stated he would not hesitate to recruit journalists as agents if he felt it was in the national interest.

Turner, at a gathering of the nation's newspaper editors in Washington, went so far as to describe the editors as "naive" if they believed foreign governments would look upon our reporters as above reproach. He suggested journalists should consider it an honor to be asked to serve their country.

Our cloak-and-dagger director obviously has no grasp of the role of the press. It is because the press is under the influence of government in so many parts of the world that our own journalists are suspect when they go abroad.

Our reporters abroad don't need Turner saying some of them may be on the CIA payroll. The credibility of the press is at stake, here and abroad, and Turner's statement could put reporters' lives in danger.

Even more, what doesn't sit well here is that our president, who should have a firmer grasp of history and the Constitution which precludes a government press, agreed with Turner.

George Bush, now challenging Ronald Reagan for the GOP presidential nomination, was the CIA chief in 1976. He announced the agency would no longer enter into paid relationships with accredited members of the press. We presume Bush hasn't changed his opinion.

We hope Reagan and Sen. Kennedy would find a CIA-influenced press as repulsive as it sounds.

The leaders of the American Society of Newspaper Editors asked Carter to reconsider his stand. They asked for a meeting, if necessary, to express their concern and to discuss the ramifications of Turner's policies.

The White House acknowledged receipt of the letter by the president, but there was no response.

Mr. President, we are still waiting.

MEXICO LEDGER (MO)

5 May 1960

A Spy Or A Reporter?

Should an American newsman act as a spy for the CIA?

Admiral Stansfield Turner says, yes, providing he, alone, personally, as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, approved; and, providing the security of the nation is involved.

Some newsmen strongly disagree.

They feel if any American newsman takes any assignment from the CIA he endangers not only the lives but also the integrity of all American newsmen.

We disagree.

We believe, first, a newsman must not take pay from anybody or any agency other than the new organization he works for.

Next, we believe, every enemy government is going to assume any American newsman can be on a CIA assignment no matter what CIA or White House policy states.

Lastly, we can't imagine any American in a position to help his country in a matter of national security, not going ahead and doing his duty—to us, it is a duty to serve your country.

In taking this position, we are in sharp difference with a number of top newsmen.

They believe total separation, as it were, between government and newsmen is necessary for objective, accurate news coverage.

We agree in principle.

However, we also believe a newsman can serve his readers, can be honest with them, can do his job with full journalistic responsibility and, at the same time, and without pay, cooperate in an exceptional case with the CIA, the military services, the FBI, the Secret Service, and even state, county and local police.

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SVERDLOVSK

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-10NEW YORK TIMES
29 MAY 1980

U.S. Seeks Soviet Talks on Report Of Accident With Germ Weapon

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 28 — After reviewing the available intelligence information, the Carter Administration has decided to ask the Soviet Union for talks to determine whether Moscow has violated an international ban on producing and storing biological weapons, the State Department said today.

In a statement, the department said the Administration was still concerned about reports that an outbreak of anthrax in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk last year was the result of an accident at a biological weapons installation. Responding to Washington's initial diplomatic inquiries in March, Moscow confirmed that an outbreak of anthrax had occurred near the city in April 1979 but asserted that the dis-

ease had been caused by the improper handling of meat products.

However, in its statement today, the State Department said, "Our concerns regarding the incident have not been alleviated and we will continue to pursue this matter vigorously." In private, officials said the Administration would soon seek diplomatic talks with the Soviet Union on the matter and would probably also ask Moscow to permit a team of American scientists to discuss the episode with Soviet experts.

No New Intelligence Reported

Although the Administration, according to officials, has received no new intelligence about the Sverdlovsk incident recently, the question of whether Moscow violated a 1975 convention prohibiting the production or storage of significant amounts of germ weapons is receiving renewed attention. Some Administration critics have charged that at a conference in March to review the 1975 convention, the State Department tried to keep the incident private between Washington and Moscow.

Meanwhile, Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, announced that his House Intelligence subcommittee would hold hearings tomorrow to find out "if the Soviets have violated their agreements on biological warfare and how good our intelligence is with regard to Soviet biological work."

In its statement, the State Department denied any effort to withhold evidence of any Soviet violation from other nations or the public. The department also said that at the March meeting it backed efforts by Sweden and other countries to strengthen verification provisions of the accord.

"We have also consulted closely with our allies regarding the details" of the Sverdlovsk incident, the department said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-19THE WASHINGTON POST
28 May 1980

What Did Happen at Sverdlovsk?

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

One day recently President Carter received and read a devastating intelligence report that appears to eliminate all lingering doubt that the 1979 Sverdlovsk explosion resulted from germ warfare, a finding that now confronts Secretary of State Edmund Muskie with a hard test of his U.S.-Soviet policy.

In chilling detail, the report states, on the strength of a wide number of intelligence sources, that the "first casualties were a fairly large number of male [military] reservists at the military installation," site of the biological warfare laboratory that mysteriously exploded in April 1979. The report says the commander of the military installation committed suicide and that Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov made an unannounced inspection two weeks after the explosion.

The Carter administration admitted on March 18 that it suspected Soviet germ warfare experimentation after preliminary reports of the deadly accident filtered through Soviet secrecy to the West.

Now, Muskie confronts two choices: charge the Russians with violating the 1975 treaty banning germ warfare experimentation or production, or sweep it under the rug at a time of heightened U.S.-Soviet tensions.

Complicating the answer are grave new questions linking Soviet violation of the unenforceable germ warfare treaty to American efforts to verify Soviet compliance with treaties on strategic arms limitation and nuclear testing. U.S. skeptics have always warned that, without verification, Moscow will cheat the U.S. blind. Also at stake, as the untutored Muskie comes to grips with American policy toward the Soviet Union, are specific—but unpublicized—demands of U.S. friends for immediate international policing to force compliance with the germ warfare treaty.

This effort is being led by Sweden, which with other European states has reacted with understandable horror to the mysterious Sverdlovsk disaster. Muskie's predecessor, Cyrus Vance, and the ardent U.S.-Soviet detentists who advised him flatly rejected Sweden's pressure at the recent Geneva conference called to review the unenforceable 1975 treaty. Vance wanted to limit

talk about the Sverdlovsk explosion and its alleged treaty violation strictly to Washington and Moscow.

"It is far too important for that," one leading European ambassador told us. "It belongs to all of us, not just to the U.S., because we are all imperiled."

Just how imperiled becomes clear from reading the lurid yet understated intelligence report recently sent to the Oval Office. The report fully justifies the demand for an immediate international move to insist on ways to enforce the germ warfare treaty.

In the past few years, the report states, the Soviets "have acquired significant technology and equipment, built large-scale biological fermentation facilities and made progress in other areas considered useful should Moscow decide to pursue production of biological weapons."

Starting in late May 1979, persistent rumors were heard on the streets of Moscow—one of the few places where conversation is safe from police discovery—that a "disaster" had occurred in Sverdlovsk. Workers in an adjoining Sverd-

lovsk institute trying to flee the fatal germ poisoning released in the explosion, "were held inside the facility by security personnel." Other workers, downwind in a ceramics factory, died even though they remained inside their building; ventilators had sucked in the fatal bacilli.

When Soviet authorities finally decided a public statement was mandatory, they blamed the deaths on infection from a slaughtered cow that had been suffering from anthrax.

But that "explanation" of the disaster as an outbreak of a "rare disease" called gastric anthrax was undercut when a Soviet general, who commanded the installation that housed the germ factory, committed suicide. Further weakening the "rare disease" myth was the unpublicized arrival of Defense Minister Ustinov, one of the three or four most powerful men in the Kremlin and a possible successor to ailing President Leonid Brezhnev.

The question of why a leading member of the Politburo would bother himself about the outbreak of a rare disease in a distant provincial city is so bi-

zarre that the intelligence report does not address it.

Adding to evidence that the dead died from pulmonary anthrax—breathing in of the biological agents released by the accidental explosion, not infection from touching or eating diseased meat—is the fact that "large areas around the military installation were graded and covered with asphalt" for decontamination.

An effective lethal dose of anthrax for an average man is about 10,000 spores. Accordingly, the death of several hundred human beings indicated "an extremely large number of anthrax spores—effectively negating any assessment of peaceful or defensive research being conducted" at the military facility.

That is the intelligence finding given Jimmy Carter, with all its dispassion. What to do about it now becomes a showcase example for Edmund Muskie as he approaches the most important challenge in his new job—the challenge of how to deal with the Soviet Union.

REUTER

***R251

R 19716)18YLWYDZBT

47AM-GERMS

WASHINGTON, May 28, REUTER - U.S. OFFICIALS REPORTED TODAY THAT A SOVIET MILITARY COMMANDER KILLED HIMSELF AFTER HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE DIED IN AN ACCIDENT BELIEVED HERE TO INVOLVE THE RELEASE OF GERM WARFARE MATERIAL NEAR THE CITY OF SVERDLOVSK.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT EXPRESSED CONTINUING DOUBT OVER THE KREMLIN'S EXPLANATION OF THE ACCIDENT LAST YEAR THAT THE DEATHS WERE DUE TO CONTAMINATED FOOD.

"AS OF THIS TIME, OUR CONCERNS REGARDING THE INCIDENT HAVE NOT BEEN ALLEVIATED..." STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN THOMAS RESTON SAID IN A STATEMENT.

THE UNITED STATES HAD PURSUED THE MATTER WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR INFORMATION, HE ADDED. THE SOVIET UNION IS A SIGNATORY OF A 1975 CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

AT THE SAME TIME, U.S. OFFICIALS RELEASED MORE U.S. INTELLIGENCE ON THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED NEAR SVERDLOVSK, A STEEL PRODUCING CITY IN THE URAL MOUNTAINS, IN APRIL 1979.

THE OFFICIALS SAID INTELLIGENCE AGENTS REPORTED THAT A "FAIRLY LARGE" NUMBER OF MALE MILITARY RESERVISTS WERE KILLED IN AN EXPLOSION AT A MILITARY INSTALLATION HOUSING A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE LABORATORY.

47AM-GERMS 2 WASHINGTON

THE REPORT SAID THE COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY INSTALLATION COMMITTED SUICIDE AND SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER DMITRI USTINOV MADE AN UNPUBLICIZED VISIT TWO WEEKS AFTER THE ACCIDENT.

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE REPORT SAID THAT WORKERS IN AN ADJOINING INSTITUTE TRIED TO ESCAPE THE GERM POISONING, BUT WERE KEPT INSIDE THE BUILDING BY SECURITY GUARDS.

OTHER WORKERS IN A NEARBY CERAMICS FACTORY DIED BECAUSE BACILLI WERE SUCKED IN THROUGH ITS VENTILATION SYSTEM, THE REPORT SAID.

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REUTER

SOVIET AUTHORITIES BLAMED THE DEATHS ON GASTRIC ANTHRAX;
CAUSED BY INFECTION FROM IMPURE BEEF.

BUT U.S. INTELLIGENCE BELIEVED THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS
PULMONARY ANTHRAX; CAUSED BY BREATHING IN THE BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
RELEASED IN THE ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION; THE REPORT SAID.

IT ADDED THAT LARGE AREAS AROUND THE MILITARY INSTALLATION
WERE SUBSEQUENTLY COVERED WITH ASPHALT; APPARENTLY FOR
DECONTAMINATION.

DETAILS OF THE REPORT FROM THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
THE MILITARY COUNTERPART TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
WERE PUBLISHED BY COLUMNISTS ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK AND
LATER CONFIRMED BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.‡
MORE 2027 WG

†††R253

R 19726) LBYLHYDZYR

‡FAM-GERMS 3 WASHINGTON‡

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTED A SOVIET EXPLANATION FOR THE
INCIDENT AT A CONFERENCE HELD IN MARCH BY SIGNATORIES OF THE
1975 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

THE SOVIET UNION REJECTED THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DEATHS
WERE CAUSED BY GERM WARFARE AGENTS AND PUBLICLY REFERRED TO AN
OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX.‡

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AFGHANISTAN

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 May 1980

France hints US should do more to aid ill-equipped Afghan rebels

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Paris

The Soviet Union continues to accuse the United States of subversive activities in Afghanistan, but the evidence from European sources is that the US has done little to help arm the Afghan guerrillas.

Analysts in both London and Paris say the guerrillas still have little in the way of weapons to counter Soviet tanks and helicopters. Their information suggests that what is being done by the Americans to supply arms, even in the way of less sophisticated weapons, is "minimal."

Some French officials have hinted to the Americans, in an apparently quiet and informal way, that they ought to do more for the Afghan rebels if they are really serious about getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. In their view, the US has a tendency at times to "speak loudly but carry a small stick."

US officials say they have no comment on reports of secret American weapons supplies to any country in the world, including Afghanistan. But a senior American diplomat interviewed by this reporter found it annoying, to say the least, that Europeans should suggest the US do more to help the Afghan rebels when the US, in his view, is already doing much more than the Europeans to deter the Soviets in the Gulf and to make sure Moscow thinks twice before again using raw military power.

In mid-February, the New York Times quoted White House officials as saying that starting in mid-January, the US had launched an operation to supply light infantry weapons to Afghan insurgent groups. According to the Times, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned to carry out this "covert" mission, the first of its kind and magnitude since the Angolan civil war ended in 1976. The weapons were reported to be of Soviet design, some possibly coming from stocks acquired in earlier years by Egypt.

But a number of insurgent leaders subsequently complained that they were getting little outside help. And there are some indications that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other

Middle East countries have assisted the insurgents more than the Americans. Iran recently gave considerable symbolic support to the rebels by bringing a group of guerrilla leaders into the Islamic foreign ministers conference at Islamabad. The Iranians made the guerrillas part of their delegation. The US has apparently been concerned that if it becomes too deeply involved in aiding the insurgents, the Soviets will retaliate against Pakistan. At this point at least, any American-supplied arms would have to be sent through Pakistan.

American officials have debated this question at some length, and according to one analyst, many have concluded that "the Pakistan pipeline can't stand too much strain."

Some officials appear to agree with Christopher Van Hollen, a former deputy assistant secretary of state, who wrote in the spring issue of the magazine Foreign Policy that providing weapons to the guerrillas might be "the policy least likely to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan."

Mr. Van Hollen, now a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment, argues that the supply of American arms would probably trigger Soviet retaliatory measures such as cross-border "hot pursuit" missions and bombing raids on refugee camps inside Pakistan. He sees a further risk that arming the rebels would encourage the Soviets to promote an insurgency inside Pakistan's troubled province of Baluchistan.

The Soviets justified their invasion of Afghanistan on the grounds that the US and China were supporting the rebels in an attempt to overthrow the government in Kabul. Despite contrary testimony from the scene, the Soviets insist that this alleged support continues. The official Soviet newspaper Pravda May 25 accused the US of carrying out "unceasing aggressive activities, subversive acts, and other forms of imperialist interference."

European analysts consider this mostly propaganda. But some of them are also convinced the Soviets have given the US a clear warning: Should the US or China supply the Afghan rebels with sophisticated weapons, there would be immediate retaliation against Pakistan.

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ON PAGE 15

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
2 June 1980

Washington Whispers

Latest reports from U.S. intelligence officials on Russia's growing problems in Afghanistan: The Afghan government's armed forces, once numbering 100,000, have shrunk to 30,000 because of large-scale desertions. And near paralysis of the Afghan economy has forced Russia into undertaking the feeding of most of the nation's population of 16 million.

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IRAN

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-23NEW YORK TIMES
28 MAY 1980

U.S. Policy On Iran

By Gus Hall

The United States hostages in Iran must be freed, and the sooner the better. They should be freed not only for humanitarian reasons and not only because we cannot condone the violation of traditional diplomatic norms. There is an even more urgent reason — to avoid war.

Let us speak bluntly. There are those in the Pentagon and the White House for whom the hostages have become a standing pretext for armed intervention. They envision military action in order to re-establish neo-colonial domination over Iran and the uncontested control of the region's oil by the Western oil giants.

It was in such a perspective that the Iranians and most of the world viewed the aborted "rescue" operation. To Iranians it had all the earmarks of armed intervention planned to coincide with a counter-revolutionary uprising against the Iranian Government. To them it had the stench of the 1953 coup, organized by the Central Intelligence Agency, that overthrew nationalist Premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, restored the fugitive Shah to the Peacock Throne, and handed control of the nationalized oilfields back to the foreign monopolies.

Any attempt to repeat such a military action — or a C.I.A. operation, whether apparently internal or seemingly emanating from a neighboring Arab country — would send Iran and much of the Persian Gulf area up in flames. Therefore, it is in the overriding interest of peace that one must approach the issue.

Neither a tricky mumbled diplomatic "apology" or John Wayne-type military adventurism will resolve this fateful crisis.

What is required is bold and decisive action of a radically different sort — a 180-degree turn in Washington's policy toward Iran.

Primarily it requires that the United States Government once and for all come to terms with the fact that Iran has experienced a great national

democratic revolution. Whatever its internal problems, Iran is a sovereign nation no longer ruled by the torture regime of a Shah and Savak, the barbaric C.I.A.-trained secret police. It is a nation that will never again suffer a Shah serving as gendarme over the Persian Gulf and its oil treasures for the benefit of foreign monopolies.

This means that Pentagon and C.I.A. plans for overt or covert intervention in Iran must be definitively shelved. Iron-clad assurances of non-intervention must be publicly given.

Some specific steps to implement such assurances might include the following: withdrawal of all United States naval and military forces from waters adjacent to Iran; lifting all sanctions on Iran; unfreezing Iranian assets held in United States banks and returning to Iran the vast sums taken out of the country by the Shah and his entourage; resumption of normal diplomatic relations; ending all Government harassment of Iranian students and other Iranian nationals now in the United States; opening negotiations for a nuclear-free zone of peace in the Persian Gulf area.

There should also be a report, or white paper, by a joint Senate-House committee reviewing the actions of the oil and banking interests and the C.I.A. in respect to Iran since 1952. Links of the Shah and his embassy officials to various members of Congress and other Government officials should be placed on the public record. Such a document would set the record straight.

It need hardly be emphasized that these steps can be most effective in an atmosphere of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Peace in the affected area can hardly develop in a cold war atmosphere.

These steps would represent a decisive break with the Rockefeller-Kissinger-Brzezinski, pro-Shah, pro-oil-monopoly policy pursued by our Government. Such steps would lay the basis for the prompt release of the hostages. Further, they would assure normal trade relations, including the unimpeded flow of oil from the region.

Most important, such steps would defuse a time bomb that could explode into thermonuclear war. The whole world would heave a gigantic sigh of relief.

Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, is its Presidential candidate.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE *A-1*

NEW YORK TIMES
25 MAY 1980

Doubt Is Raised About Dispersal Of the Captives

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24 — The Carter Administration believes that most American hostages in Iran have not been dispersed as their captors report and that those removed from Teheran after the unsuccessful rescue attempt last month are being returned.

Although the Administration lacks conclusive proof, senior officials say that the majority of the hostages never left the embassy compound in Teheran.

Information reaching the United States through diplomatic and intelligence channels indicates that dispersal of the hostages presented major security and logistical problems for the militants who have held them captive since Nov. 4.

'Not a Factor Outside Teheran'

"The militants are just not a factor outside Teheran," a senior American official said. "Once they move outside the tightly controlled grounds of the American Embassy compound in Teheran they can't be sure of getting their way."

News of the whereabouts and condition of the hostages has been limited since the rescue mission, which was halted April 24 in the desert 200 miles southeast of Teheran because of helicopter mechanical failures.

With the exception of letters dated before April 24, families of the hostages have received no messages from them since the rescue attempt, according to State Department officials.

Two days after the rescue effort, the militants holding the American Embassy announced that their 50 hostages had been removed and would be scattered to prevent further rescue attempts.

In the weeks since the dispersal was

announced, the militants have reported that the hostages were being held in 15 cities and towns. Fragmentary accounts reaching the West described the movement of hostages to provincial cities, including Zenjan, Meshed and Tabriz.

The only transfer that the United States has been able to confirm, the officials said, was to Tabriz. The exact number moved there is undetermined, but the officials said the total was apparently less than 15.

The other reported moves appear to be a smokescreen, another official said, adding: "There is no hard evidence of other hostage movements. What evidence we do have tends to disprove announcements that they have been scattered."

Still another official said that "it's never made any sense" for the militants to move the hostages from the embassy compound. "All the power they have derives from their ability to hold the hostages, and that ability is threatened as soon as they leave the embassy, which is their fortress," he explained.

Available evidence indicates that most of the militants come from Teheran — a big advantage in arranging for supplies to support the embassy takeover. The embassy compound, according to the officials, also gives the militants a relatively small, walled area to defend and control.

Support Lacking Outside Teheran

Similar advantages do not exist outside Teheran, the officials say. "It's not easy transporting, feeding and guarding captives when you lack active support within a community," an American intelligence official said. "The militants simply don't have that support outside Teheran."

As far as the Administration knows, no neutral observers have seen the hostages since the rescue attempt. Red Cross officials who visited the compound several weeks before the rescue effort said the hostages appeared to be in reasonably good condition.

The parents of one hostage, Rodney Virgil Sickmann, a 22-year-old Marine sergeant, said they tried to call their son at the embassy last week but were told that he was "far, far away."

Last week the militants demanded that the new Parliament vote to put the hostages on trial as spies and hinted that they would defy any other decision. The announcement was issued in Zenjan, one of the provincial cities where hostages were said to be held.

In discussing the doubts about dispersal of the hostages, White House officials have acknowledged that President Carter asked the Defense Department to prepare for another rescue attempt if a feasible plan could be designed.

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FORMER EMPLOYEES

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SPRING/1980

Books:

Testing
Intelligence

WALTER PFORZHEIMER

The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA, Thomas Powers, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. 393 pp. \$12.95

This is a difficult book for a professional intelligence officer to review. With a few exceptions, the plethora of publications on intelligence in general, and on CIA in particular, over recent years has generally run the gamut from awful to dreadful, usually giving vent to exaggerations and misstatements that have done neither intelligence nor the country good. Now we are faced with yet another book; yet in some ways this one is different.

The author, Thomas Powers, is a journalist who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1971 for his reporting on the case of a Weatherman terrorist. Prior to *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, he had written at least one piece which could best be described as hostile to CIA in general and Richard Helms in particular. For that reason, this reviewer refused to meet with Powers when the latter requested an interview while writing this book. For their own reasons, two other former senior officials of CIA also refused to meet with him. Nonetheless, over a two-year period, Powers succeeded in

Walter Pforzheimer was CIA's first legislative counsel, 1946-56. Following this he held other positions in CIA, retiring finally in 1977. He is considered an expert in the literature of intelligence, which he teaches, and he possesses one of the finest private libraries on the subject in the United States.

interviewing more than 40 former CIA personnel, many of whom had held high positions in the agency. In the end, he even managed to interview Helms himself. Those who talked with Powers did so largely on the grounds that this book's publication was probably inevitable, that Powers had much material from public sources, ranging from congressional hearings to the writings of former professionals, as well as by those outside the community in the media and elsewhere. It was the opinion of most of these former CIA people that the time had come to set the intelligence record straight, where that could be done without breaching necessary security. Indeed, some of the errors in this book are the result of Powers having stumbled over some partial facts on which his sources flatly refused to elaborate for security reasons.

The reviews of the Powers book present varied points of view. Richard Harwood, deputy managing editor of the *Washington Post*, writes (October 21, 1979) that:

This impressive book by Thomas Powers persuades me, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Central Intelligence Agency, by and large, has been a most careful servant of the American government and, by extension, the servant of us all. . . . Mostly it is a masterful portrait of an agency and its managers and of their relationships to the governments they served. . . . the finest book I have yet read on the CIA.

Ward Just in the *Boston Sunday Globe* (October 7, 1979) calls it a "remarkable book. . . . too thorough, serious and intelligent to summarize in a review." Michael Ledeen in his review (*Commentary*, January 1980) describes it as "a serious book" and "a balanced work, written with care and maturity," although Ledeen does not fail to call attention to some of the book's major shortcomings. On the other hand, reviewers long known for their opposition to CIA and the craft of intelligence, such as David Wise (*New Republic*, November 3, 1979) and

Daniel Schorr (*Chicago Sun-Times*, October 7, 1979), as well as John Leonard in the *New York Times* (October 11, 1979) have utilized their reviews as vehicles for attacking much that intelligence has done, although they too generally praise the author's efforts. One is forced to wonder how many of these reviewers can characterize *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* as "the best book on CIA," or some similar phrase, when the great majority of them really don't know very much about the agency or the profession it represents; but, of course, lack of such knowledge has not always stopped them.

This reviewer has thought long and hard over what to say about the Powers book. To say that it is "the best book" on CIA leads one to ask, "Compared to what?" Even reasonably good memoirs by former professionals are usually somewhat limited in subject as the authors relate their own experiences within the comparatively narrow scope of their duties. When one considers what has been written on the history of CIA over the years, it is probably safe to say that *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* is the most comprehensive book on the subject, partly because the author has had more published material on which to draw, and partly because many former officers helped to straighten out his text out of loyalty to CIA and, in some measure, out of loyalty to Director Helms. Powers has presented, in part, a relatively balanced viewpoint for someone writing from the outside, although a fair assessment of the amount is hard to quantify. He came to the task with what many thought were negative credentials.

The author himself admits that the sheer weight of the evidence with which he was confronted made him change his mind from original positions of hostility to his subject. He certainly leaves the general public with a much better understanding of relationships among senior CIA personnel as well as their motivations—this in itself is a major service. Granted that Powers found himself forced, in

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many instances, to change his mind in writing this book: he has probably advanced perhaps only 50 percent from his initial hostile views, but even this is to his credit. Perhaps Powers had tried to synthesize too many viewpoints and hasn't altogether succeeded. He still falls into occasional moralizing about intelligence and certain of its activities to the point of making himself the moral judge of U.S. policies that the CIA supported, without offering viable alternatives. But one point that Powers makes above all—and this is doubly important from a convinced outsider—is that in all of its functions, the CIA operated under the absolute control of the president of the United States at all times and was never the “rogue elephant” which others have charged. Perhaps Powers was amazed to have to come to this conclusion with such finality, but that is his conclusion after careful study and that is a sizable plus, given his initial hostility.

One other point to make: this book contains 480 footnotes, often larded with some of Powers' best nuggets—pro and con. They must not be overlooked by the reader.

The subtitle of this book, *Richard Helms & the CIA*, is perhaps misleading. As Powers says in his introductory chapter, Helms' “career offers an ideal pathway through the secret history of thirty years.” But this book is not a biography of Richard Helms or anything like it. He is more a thread that winds through the book because of his long career in intelligence, and, obviously, his role becomes more pronounced in its pages when he becomes director of central intelligence (DCI). It is obvious that Powers does not fully know or understand Richard Helms, but to the author's surprise, he ends up liking and even admiring him. Nevertheless, Helms' portrait emerges flat and humorless, as if made of bureaucratic cardboard. Powers sees Helms as the average case officer might often have seen him—a cold professional, but above all a professional. What Powers has unfortunately

not been privileged to see is the Richard Helms seen by those who knew him well and saw him frequently—a figure often warm, happy to laugh at a light sally, with a certain amount of camaraderie with close friends, and certainly a more relaxed figure than Powers encountered. Perhaps the point the author missed was the inherent decency of Richard Helms, and also his being a man who above all did his homework, particularly in those fields of analysis and technology new to him as he ascended the ladder from the clandestine services.

One point must be made here regarding Mr. Helms' problems with the Department of Justice and his ultimate plea of nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge of failing to testify fully and completely to the Congress on a very limited point. What this reviewer finds utterly reprehensible on Powers' part is his use of the words “lie” and “perjury” in writing of this matter. Even in the index, the case is listed under Helms' “trial for perjury.” Powers knows better and said privately that Helms was never formally charged with perjury, he has never conceded perjury, he did not plead nolo contendere to perjury, and perjury has never been proved, in the legal sense, against him. Perjury is a highly technical legal term, and to throw it around in a pejorative manner, as has been done in this book, together with the word “lie,” does neither the author nor the book any credit.

Having conceded some of the merits of Powers' book, one must turn to the other side of the coin to point out that this book contains many errors, some small, some more serious, resulting either from Powers' inability to learn all of the facts on a given point, or from pure carelessness. Some of these errors will be pointed out in more detail below. What concerns this reviewer above all is the fact that when people call this “the best book” on CIA, a vast readership will take it as gospel without realizing that it is sometimes misleading and sometimes flawed. There are some who feel that “we are lucky” to have

Powers' volume and, in its comprehensiveness, perhaps they are right. There will never be a perfect book about CIA: there are a few errors in Allen Dulles' *Craft of Intelligence* and Bill Colby's *Honorable Men*. Perhaps one reason for Powers' errors is that he has relied to a major extent on the recollections, usually accurate but sometimes fading, of many former officials, as well as on the writings of many people, some professional and others not. A few of his sources have certainly been self-serving, but this reviewer, as a quasi-historian, feels that Powers would have been better served had he spent more time with available official documents as well.

There are small and sometimes careless errors. No, Edward Farrell Stone did not design the CIA building at Langley: the Dulles-selected architect was Wallace Harrison (p. 5). No, CIA office doors are not all locked at night (p. 5). Nor was the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, but rather by amendments to that act in 1949 (p. 27). Colonel Kilbourne (“Pat”) Johnson was never deputy director of plans (DDP); he was assistant director/policy coordination (ADPC) (pp. 50, 310). Furthermore, the author fails to note that “Pat” spelled his name Johnston (with a “t”) to differentiate himself from his famous father, General Hugh Johnson. Allen Dulles did not “sacrifice” Carmel Offie as a “security risk”; Offie was long gone when Dulles appeared on the scene, having left while Admiral Hillenkoetter was DCI (p. 60). Similarly, Governor Dewey could hardly have blamed General Walter Bedell Smith during the 1948 presidential campaign for “failing to predict” the Bogotazo (riots in Bogotá) in Colombia that year. Smith did not become DCI until October 1950 (p. 336). A list of these little errors could stretch on and on, but space does not permit. Are they important to the book as a whole? Perhaps not, but they are unfortunate for the general reader who might accept Powers' statements with an uninformed or uncritical eye.

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Then there are more important errors in the book, a few of which are worth noting as examples. In these, in some cases, Powers has fallen victim to his sources or incomplete research. One such case is his badly garbled account of the first Marchetti case (pp. 244-45). He states that CIA, in March 1972, had obtained in New York a copy of the outline for Marchetti's book which had been submitted by the latter's agent to several publishers. Powers then says that the Justice Department "pressed its suit vigorously and eventually forced Marchetti to drop 168 passages from his book." The Justice Department had entered the case following Mr. Helms' appeal to the president. As there have been various versions elsewhere as well, garbling the actual facts in the Marchetti case, we owe it to our readership to set them forth correctly. In March 1972, CIA did receive from sources in New York a copy of an article which Marchetti or his agent submitted to a few magazine publishers for possible publication. A CIA review of that article immediately revealed that it contained serious security breaches, describing several important agency operations and naming the names of both officers and agents. Attached to the article was an outline of some 10 or 12 pages (to the best of my recollection) of a book which Marchetti proposed to write about CIA. The security damage inherent in the possible publication of the Marchetti article, when brought to the attention of Director Helms, led him to take the matter up with President Nixon, and subsequently conversations were held between the CIA lawyers and John Ehrlichman, as described in Powers' book. As a result, the government sought and received a temporary restraining order in mid-April, and a permanent injunction in mid-May against publication. It should be stressed—and this is the point that Powers has overlooked—that the urgency of this matter was to enjoin the publication of a potentially damaging article from the standpoint of security, although Marchetti's proposed outline for his book was

included in the sealed exhibits presented to the court.

Powers' description of Marchetti being forced to drop 168 passages from his book refers to the later submission, in August 1973, of the full manuscript of the book by Marchetti and his coauthor, John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, for security review. In this second "Marchetti" case, which developed into a suit by the publisher and the coauthors against CIA (*Knopf v. Colby*), the court upheld CIA's deletion for security reasons of approximately 168 items, which consisted more often of a word or a phrase rather than passages. (The final decision in the second case did not come down until February 1975.)

Another case in which Powers' speculation leads him astray (footnote 2, p. 316) involves a strange book entitled *Operation Splinter Factor* by Stewart Steven, a British journalist. Powers writes, "I do not know what to make of Steven's book," which deals with purported Dulles operations in the Cold War involving, among others, Noel Field and a Polish intelligence defector, Joseph Swiatlo, who had defected to the West in 1953. While Steven's book assumes that Swiatlo had been a CIA agent prior to his defection, it can be said with certainty that such was not the case. Therefore, Powers' speculation that a message from CIA to Swiatlo may somewhere be in existence is wide of the mark. Powers continues that "the fact Steven cannot reproduce such a text is no evidence it is not still buried in the files somewhere." A few discreet questions would have saved Powers from leaning on a very weak reed indeed.

One Powers subject is possible CIA assassinations. Obviously, he has much congressional testimony and reports from which to draw and, by and large, despite a little waffling, he comes to the same conclusions with which we are all familiar, especially as involves Castro. However, he does conclude that CIA would have engaged in such endeavors only with approval from the highest

authority—never as an agency venture on its own. This reviewer feels that Powers' text on this subject is somewhat weak when he comes to the murders of Diem and Trujillo, in neither of which did CIA have a hand. Powers also concludes that "the evidence, fragmentary as it is, suggests that the CIA draws the line at what is commonly meant by the word 'murder'" (p. 127). His footnote 12 (p. 335) states that "this conclusion was not easily reached. One has learned to be skeptical." What Powers had found particularly difficult were rumors he came upon that CIA tended to murder agents who had become troublesome or who had come in for hostile purposes. His inclusion of such findings in an earlier draft of his book met with serious criticism from those former CIA people to whom he showed the draft, leaving him with "no choice but to reconsider the whole matter." In effect, he had no valid evidence for these charges, which led him to ask, "Was I so hostile toward the Agency that I actually preferred to believe the worst? . . . It would not surprise me to learn that agent murders had, in fact, taken place." But here, Powers has recognized that his lack of evidence would not support loose charges.

Another subject is the long-argued North Vietnamese order-of-battle figures controversy, in the center of which was a CIA analyst named Sam Adams. Here Powers appears to have been somewhat taken in by Adams' charm and fluency in support of his position that the North Vietnamese figures in 1965-67 should be much higher than those being reported from the military. It would be futile to try in this review to reiterate all the arguments pro and con in this running battle, other than to note that these arguments were often more over categories than over actual numbers. Adams argued his case in the agency and in meetings in Honolulu and Saigon. Basically, other experts felt that Adams' data base was slim and was too small

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to support the figures which he extrapolated from it. A basic problem which Powers does not recognize is that Adams, for all his powers of persuasion, was riding a hobbyhorse from which nobody could bring him to dismount. When a substantive analyst rides a hobbyhorse for as long as Adams rode his, despite his opportunities to present his case to the highest authorities, all of whom rejected it, his usefulness as an analyst has ceased. It would appear that Powers has lost much of his perspective in the Adams case; it does not help his book. Furthermore, Powers writes (p. 188) that Helms sent George Carver, special assistant to DCI for Vietnamese affairs, a cable in Saigon which "directly ordered Carver to reach agreement," in effect, on the military's figures. Carver has assured this reviewer that he received no such cable from Director Helms, but, to the contrary, Helms' cable told him to use his own best judgment and was completely supportive of Carver's efforts.

Powers again falls into error in saying that Director Helms did not seriously try to run the intelligence community. Here, again, he overlooks a good deal of Helms' attempts in this field. To achieve community coordination has never been easy, and it is still a far cry from perfection. Without going into a long list of Helms' accomplishments in this field, one should at least state that much of what is now being done has been built on foundations started during the McCone and Helms directorships. Mr. Helms did spend a lot of time trying to run the community. Perhaps the reason Powers has been erratic in his reporting of this matter is that many things took place in this work of which he is apparently unaware.

Having said all this, where does this book leave us? Essentially, if one considers this "the best book on CIA," it is probably because it does not have much serious competition. By and large, it is certainly well written, which is always a blessing. It is probable that Powers made a real effort, by his lights, to be fair and balanced, particularly given his

original hostility to his subject. His moralizing on many points comes down to his disagreement with specific aspects of U. S. foreign policy from 1947 through 1976. Unfortunately, while firmly recognizing that CIA's role in these policies was strictly supportive and under the direction of the most senior policy figures in the administration, he tends to be unhappy or quarrelsome with the fact that somehow CIA supported policies with which Powers viscerally disagrees; although he is quick to say that a nonsupportive CIA would be the worst of all possible evils in a democratic government. Above all, Powers has failed to recognize or understand the world as it was from 1947 onwards; or that really there was a major Soviet threat which presidents had to face, often by clandestine or covert means; in fact, his total lack of weaving the world situation into the CIA tapestry may be the book's greatest weakness. Thus, in the end, we have what I said at the beginning: the most comprehensive book on CIA yet produced, warts and all.

THE ECONOMIST

30 May 1980

And be damned

DECENT INTERVAL

By Frank Snepp.

Allen Lane. 496 pages. £8.95
(paperback £2.95).

The United States lost the war in Vietnam in 1968, not so much because of the communists' Tet offensive in January of that year (which was in fact a solid defeat for them, by any reasonable measure) but because the American army, after four years of heavy involvement and heavy spending, had failed to make any discernible progress towards winning the war, and the American body politic had got fed up with the whole thing. Once the United States had got out and put South Vietnam largely on its own, five years later, the end result was pretty clear in the minds of most objective observers. The only questions were when and how South Vietnam would be taken over by its tough and warlike neighbour to the north.

Mr Frank Snepp was a CIA intelligence analyst in the American embassy in Saigon throughout the critical "ceasefire" period from the Paris accords of 1973 until the North Vietnamese army smashed into Saigon in April, 1975. He has produced a detailed and controversial account of the capture of Saigon which reads more like a thriller than an important historical analysis, which it is. He concentrates mainly on the evacuation of the Americans and their South Vietnamese employees, friends and families from Saigon in the frenetic last few days.

In his view this operation was badly bungled, mainly because the ambassador, Mr Graham Martin, and Mr Henry Kissinger failed to act on intelligence that was available from the CIA in Saigon. They preferred, in the face of mounting evidence, to dream the impossible dream of another round of negotiations that would deny North Vietnam what it was clearly winning in the field; and they risked lives and property in a futile battle to make congress fork out a new huge aid appropriation long after it had become apparent that new money was not going to solve the problem.

The counter-argument, that the United States dared not start its evacuation early because any whiff of a pull-out would have brought the entire South Vietnamese structure—government and army—crashing in ruins, quite evidently has a good deal of logic on its side. It is possible

that, because of this tinder-box effect, an orderly withdrawal was never possible. But Mr Snepp proceeds through his account on the implied assumption that things would have been better—more "high-risk" Vietnamese saved, less secret material and expensive equipment abandoned—if the evacuation had been allowed to start earlier. Maybe he is right. He makes a convincing case that the way the evacuation was done was both dishonourable and damaging. But in the way of historical analysis, he cannot prove what might have otherwise happened.

This should not be expected of him. Nevertheless, he fails to meet, or even to discuss, the logical defences of those whom he attacks: he concentrates on describing what happened and asks the reader to take on faith that his way—better planning and an earlier start—would have produced a happier ending. Despite this serious analytical flaw, he has produced a very readable and very important book.

And one that has become not only a contentious eyewitness account, but a legal landmark into the bargain. When the CIA tried to discourage the idea of Mr Snepp publishing his account, he connived with his American publisher to do it all secretly, to avoid an injunction that could have stopped it. Thus the book first appeared in the United States, in 1977, without anyone expecting it and without the CIA having been allowed to examine the manuscript as it was entitled to do under its standard agreement which Mr Snepp had signed. The CIA sued Mr Snepp for breaking this agreement.

On its way through the courts, the case picked up another, different, argument: that, besides breaking his contract, Mr Snepp had violated his position of trust. Finally, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment in equity, the branch of civil law doctrine based on fair play rather than the letter of the law, and assigned him a penalty—forfeiture of all profit from his book—which goes beyond what would normally have been expected for a simple breach of contract. This fairly open-ended principle worries a lot of people in the United States, even some who are happy enough to see Mr Snepp hit over the head for cocking a snook at the CIA. They argue that the "breach of trust" concept could logically be extended to almost any employee, and is therefore a serious challenge to America's guarantee of freedom of the press.

Mr Snepp argues that the CIA has never accused him of revealing classified information. This is true, but it does not mean he did not. The CIA might well have judged that a criminal trial over the release of secrets would be too damaging to contemplate and opted for a civil suit instead. He says that the government purposely leaked misleading information to tame reporters to justify its policies and to cover its failures in the evacuation, and that in order to set the record straight he published and was damned.

Three things can be said about all this. One, if his goal was to score points in the battle of words, he has succeeded. His hard-hitting book wins hands down over the dry testimony of the bureaucrats and whatever fragmentary newspaper accounts may have come from the leaks. Two, if the truth was his main goal, both he and the freedom-of-the-pressers should be reasonably happy. He has told his story; whether he should be allowed to profit from it is almost (although not quite) another matter. Three, his is a good story and one that adds significantly to the knowledge of America's war in Vietnam; it would have been a shame to have missed it.



Snepp published and was damned

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
25 May 1980

RUDY MAXA'S

Front Page

'I'M BROKE,' SAYS JOHN

The federal government may come up empty-handed even if it pursues and wins its lawsuit against ex-CIA agent John Stockwell, author of a book about America's covert efforts in Angola.

Stockwell says he's broke.

But the Justice Department wants him to forfeit all money he earned by writing *In Search of Enemies*—a CIA Story because he didn't submit his manuscript to the intelligence agency for review. Earlier this year another former CIA agent, Frank Snepp, was ordered to do just that for the same reason in the case of his book, a harsh look at America's last days in Vietnam.

"I don't have any money," says Stockwell, who lives with his family in Austin, Tex. He estimates he earned about \$60,000 over the course of three years, but he says taxes, research costs and living expenses devoured that total. "I own no car, no stocks, no bonds or assets except a modest house, which they can't take away," Stansfield



Turner must know better—books like this don't get big advances, and you don't make much money. I don't think people of his ilk can understand that you don't do things like this for the money."

Stockwell says he occasionally lectures about his CIA tenure and is working on a novel that, he hastens to add, "has nothing to do with the government."

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MISCELLANEOUS

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28 May 1980

Israeli '67 Attack on U.S. Ship Deliberate, Ex-Officer Says

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

A former officer of the Navy eavesdropping ship Liberty says the Israelis deliberately tried to sink the vessel and kill all hands during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

James M. Ennes Jr., a lieutenant on the American ship who watched much of the attack from the bridge, theorizes that the Israelis were trying to prevent the Liberty from informing the U.S. government that Israel was planning to invade Syria and thus could be considered the aggressor.

Thirty-four American sailors were killed in the attack and 171 wounded, including Ennes.

Ennes, now retired from the Navy, accuses the U.S. and Israeli governments and Navy leaders of trying to keep the facts of the attacks secret. He relies on his recollections, those of

shipmates and government documents to rebut the Israeli claim that the action was a case of mistaken identity.

His recently published 299-page book, "Assault on the Liberty," includes this raw informational report, not a conclusion, from CIA files:

Israeli Gen. Moshe Dayan, the report says, personally ordered the attack on the ship. One of his generals adamantly opposed the action and said, "This is pure murder."

Spokesman Aviezer Pazner at the Israeli Embassy said yesterday that the report was "baseless." He said the Israeli attack "was an unfortunate accident, like so many times happens in the heat of battle."

Pazner said Israeli pilots reported the Liberty was not flying the American flag. "It was identified as an Egyptian ship and attacked as an Egyptian ship." The same kind of

mistaken identification caused Israeli aircraft to attack Israeli tanks during the 1967 war, he added.

Ennes stood watches on the bridge as well as performed secret code work on the Liberty. He reported for duty early on June 8, the day of the attack.

One of the first things he did was order the sooty American flag the Liberty was flying replaced by a new one. The signalman protested because he wanted to save the oversized holiday flag for a special occasion.

Ennes writes:

"We must fly the new flag, I said, explaining that we were operating in a dangerous area and could afford to show only our clearest, brightest colors."

The new flag was raised and remained visible all that clear day of the attack, Ennes says. Israeli recon-

naissance planes flew over the ship at low level six times, Ennes writes, and could not have missed the flag.

Besides that, he states, two armed jets flying over the Liberty at 10 a.m. on June 8 radioed to shore that the ship was flying the American flag as it stood off the Gaza Strip listening in on the Arab-Israeli War.

After all that reconnaissance, the Israelis launched a devastating air attack against the Liberty at 2 p.m., raking the ship with gunfire, rockets and napalm.

Torpedo boats raced in next, firing torpedoes into the blazing ship and shooting guns along the waterline in an apparent attempt to disable the boilers.

"Lurking lazily a few hundred yards away," Ennes writes, "patiently waiting for Liberty to sink, the men on the torpedo boats watched the orange

life rafts drop into the water" as the Liberty prepared to abandon ship.

One of the torpedo boats "moved closer to the Liberty. When within good machine gun range, she opened fire on the empty life rafts, deflating two and cutting the line on the third, which floated away like a child's balloon on the surface of the water."

Petty Officer Thomas Smith, Ennes continues in his account, "curled helplessly as a torpedo boat stopped to take the raft aboard. Then the boats added speed, taking the raft with them and turned toward their base at Ashdod, 65 miles away."

"As the torpedo boats faded in the distance, helicopters could be seen approaching the ship. Stand by to repel boarders," barked the announcing system. A sailor broke away from his station and ran screaming through the ship: "They've come to finish us off."

But the clearly marked Israeli helicopters, Ennes writes, suddenly left without landing on the ship. The Israeli command had apparently called them back to the base. The Liberty crew fought to keep the ship afloat and, in an effort that won her skipper, Cmdr. William L. McGonagle, the Medal of Honor, made it back to port in Malta.

The Liberty had the equipment for eavesdropping on Israeli battlefield communications, including the preparations to invade Syria which would be reported to Washington. "So," writes Ennes, "by remarkable coincidence, if not by design—Gen. [David] Elazar was forced to delay the invasion until Liberty was dispatched. Instead of attacking Syria, Israel's air, sea and shore coordination forces worked together to attack a United States ship."

ARTICLE CALLED
ON PAGE **B-15**

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 May 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Terrorists Closing Atom Gap, CIA Says

While the possibility of a nuclear holocaust is of paramount concern to world leaders, a more likely threat is worrying intelligence analysts: The increasing danger that some irresponsible terrorist group will acquire a nuclear bomb or the material with which to make one.

This is no wild-eyed fantasy dreamed up by scriptwriters for a Hollywood disaster epic. It's a dead-serious appraisal by the cold-eyed men of the Central Intelligence Agency, who have been keeping track of terrorist groups for years.

In fact, intelligence experts told my associate Dale Van Atta, there is no question in their minds that sooner or later terrorists will achieve nuclear "capability"—and their guess before the end of this decade.

The CIA recently reported that while the number of international terrorist incidents had decreased somewhat in 1979, the actual destructive violence of their operations had increased.

What the public report left out, however, were the ominous conclusions of a secret CIA document: "If the current trend of increasing terrorist violence continues, we would expect a corresponding erosion of the constraints against terrorist use of nuclear explosives."

What has stopped them so far? "Terrorists are and will continue to be greatly sensitive to the quantity and quality of security systems protecting nuclear weapons and the material from which nuclear explosives might be made," the report states.

Because weapons are guarded more closely than nuclear ingredients, the report concludes, a terrorist group will

most likely try to steal the material and make its own bomb. "None of the individual steps involved would be beyond the capabilities of a sophisticated, well-funded group," the CIA warns.

The CIA analysts figure that of known terrorist groups, "the most competent" for a nuclear attempt would be "one of the Palestinian groups," possibly in collaboration with Western European terrorists and/or the "Japanese Red Army."

For what cold comfort it provides, the CIA analysis predicts that nuclear-armed terrorists would be most likely to use their bomb as "a credible threat for blackmail and/or publicity," rather than for a direct attack. "In a extreme situation, however, some might attempt a detonation," the report warns.

Memo to the President—There's only one way to end this nation's dangerous dependence on foreign oil. We must develop alternative fuels.

The CIA expects the Soviet Union to cross the great divide into oil dependency within a year. Soon the two superpowers will be competing for Persian Gulf oil. Your strategic advisers have warned that the resulting confrontation could lead to World War III.

The crisis can be defused simply by finding some other fuel to operate our automobiles, trucks and tractors. For years, I have been calling for an emergency alternative fuel crash program. I believe the nation that landed the first men on the moon can develop a substitute for oil.

But it will take another Manhattan Project, mobilizing all the resources of the United States. We must draft the best scientists, engineers and managers from American industry, not just those the corporations consider

expendable. We must make this the nation's first priority, not just a subject for political rhetoric.

The first task is to overcome the obstruction of the oil companies, which are quietly blocking the development of new fuels until they have squeezed every last dollar out of every last available oil well. True, they're studying alternative fuels, because they know their wells eventually will run dry. But the time has come to stop studying and start developing oil substitutes.

Political Potpourri—Both the Democratic and Republican national chairmen have held worried consultations with party leaders about the huge number of undecided voters. They're worried that the November election could be thrown into the House of Representatives, with irreparable damage to the two-party system. . . . Republican favorite Ronald Reagan has been criticized for his short, sharp, simplistic answers to complex issues. Republicans seem to love this style, but there aren't enough registered Republicans to win the election for him. . . . Some GOP moderates in Congress, who've had their doubts about Reagan all along, are now saying they're afraid President Carter will chew him up in any campaign debate. The GOP doubters fear Carter's careful, detailed responses to questions will make him appear more knowledgeable than Reagan. . . . The California Democratic primary looks like a toss-up, with most blacks for Carter, most Hispanics for Kennedy and most others undecided. . . . Carter is not popular in Ohio, but neither is Kennedy. The latest polls show Carter ahead in next week's crucial primary.

Associated Press

MK ULTRA, 300

BY JAMES H. RUBIN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE TOWN OF CHESTER, PA., MAY HAVE BEEN A TARGET OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE TESTING IN 1957, ACCORDING TO CIA DOCUMENTS MADE PUBLIC TODAY BY THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY.

A REFERENCE TO CHESTER WAS MADE IN A PAY RECEIPT DATED AUG. 21, 1957, THAT WAS OBTAINED BY THE SCIENTOLOGISTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

THE DOCUMENT SAID THAT 40 CENTS WAS PAID FOR TWO COPIES OF "CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA SHEETS TEST AREA, CHESTER, PA."

THE CHURCH SAID THE CIA CENSORED ALL OTHER REFERENCES TO LOCATIONS WHERE TESTS ON BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL AGENTS WERE CONDUCTED UNDER THE SO-CALLED MK ULTRA PROGRAM RUN BY THE CIA AND THE ARMY.

"A REFERENCE TO THE CHESTER, PA., TEST SITE SLIPPED THROUGH," THE CHURCH SAID IN A STATEMENT.

A CIA SPOKESMAN, DALE PETERSON, SAID "WE DON'T HAVE A VERY CLEAR PERCEPTION OURSELVES OF WHAT TOOK PLACE" IN THE MK ULTRA PROGRAM. HE SAID THAT THE SCIENTOLOGISTS' REPORT IS BASED ON "FRAGMENTED INFORMATION."

THE CHURCH SAID THE LATEST DOCUMENTS SHOW THE CIA CONDUCTED AT LEAST SIX OPEN-AIR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE TESTS IN THE MID 1950'S THAT WERE NOT DISCLOSED PREVIOUSLY.

THE DOCUMENTS WERE TURNED OVER TO THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, THE CHURCH SAID.

A CHURCH OFFICIAL, BRIAN ANDERSON, SAID "AMERICAN CITIZENS HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW WHENEVER THEY HAVE BEEN USED FOR CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE TARGET PRACTICE."

THE CIA SAID MOST OF THE MK ULTRA DOCUMENTS WERE DESTROYED IN 1973 AND ONLY SOME FINANCIAL RECORDS OF THE PROJECT REMAIN.

ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENTS MADE PUBLIC BY THE CHURCH, THE ITEMS PURCHASED IN THE PROGRAM INCLUDED A "COMMUNICABLE DISEASE BOOKLET" FOR 60 CENTS; A "KING DAVID SUPER SLING MECHANISM" FOR "DISSEMINATION EXPLOITATION" THAT COST \$2; AND 10 COUNTY MAPS OF UNIDENTIFIED AREAS FOR \$3.15.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **B12**

THE WASHINGTON POST
27 May 1980

JACK ANDERSON

A Response to Watergate-Era Authors

Three refugees from the Watergate era—G. Gordon Liddy, John Ehrlichman and Spiro Agnew—have been promoting their latest books on TV talk shows to my discomfort.

The incomprehensible Liddy has cordially confessed that he had plotted my liquidation. He called this "justifiable homicide" because my reporting supposedly had resulted in the Soviet detection and torture of a CIA undercover agent.

Ehrlichman allowed that he would not have been a party to anything so base as putting out my lights forever, but he confirmed gravely that my reporting had exposed not a CIA agent in Russia but a CIA informant in India.

Agnew merely implied that my elimination would have been a desideratum that would have added to the sum of human happiness. But when he was asked why he had allowed the Food Fair supermarket chain to stock his pantry with free food while he was vice president, he explained it on the grounds that I, too, had received free groceries from Food Fair.

May I be permitted a brief response? Ehrlichman alluded to my India-Pakistan stories, detailing the administration bias toward Pakistan, which were published before Christmas 1971. Yet Nixon waited until the following February to unleash his watchdogs on me. This coincided with my investigation of the ITT scandal, which badly embarrassed Nixon. I reported an incriminating memo written by ITT lobbyist Dita Beard. I also reported that Nixon had received two secret cash contributions of \$50,000 each from industrialist Howard Hughes.

Embarrassments such as these, not the exposing of some unnamed CIA informant, infuriated Nixon. Ex-White House

aide Charles Colson has testified that he was asked "many times" by President Nixon to take action "to discredit Jack Anderson."

To this end, the CIA assigned 18 radio cars to keep my operation under surveillance. The Pentagon, according to its former security chief W. Donald Stewart, conducted at least 11 investigations of me, sparing no expense. The FBI secretly grabbed my telephone records, and the Internal Revenue Service conducted a penetrating, year-long audit of my finances.

This should have been intimidation enough that someone in the White House didn't like me, but I never dreamed my popularity had fallen so low that Liddy would seek to do me in. He got his motivation, whether by osmosis or otherwise, from Richard Nixon, who was concerned about his own fate, not some CIA informant's.

As for Spiro Agnew, I have a sporting proposition. If he can prove that I received free food deliveries from Food Fair as he did, I'll keep him supplied with food for a year. But if he can't prove it, then he should pay my grocery bills for a year. Fair enough, Spiro?

Memo to the Pentagon—Most Americans are willing to spend whatever it takes to keep the United States strong enough to safeguard the national security. They don't begrudge the Pentagon its growing share of the tax dollar, as long as the money is spent efficiently.

But there are too many generals and admirals who act like small boys let loose in a toy store with a rich uncle's credit card. These profligate brasshats lavish the taxpayers' money on fancy

gadgets that subtract from a weapon's efficiency as they add to its cost.

A typical example is the Army's XM1 tank. This super-sophisticated, super-expensive battlewagon is equipped with every gimmick the designers could dream up. Unfortunately, such forgotten basics as the turbine engine, hydraulic system and fuel lines keep breaking down.

Recent tests at Fort Knox, for example, showed that the tanks could go only 140 to 169 miles on a tank of gas, instead of the 275 to 375 miles required. Air filters, necessary to keep dust from clogging the finicky turbine engines, had to be changed every 75 to 100 miles.

The Pentagon has pooh-pooed these problems and has authorized the Chrysler Corp. to increase its production this year from 110 to 352, at about \$1 million per copy. And there are no rebates for the taxpayers.

Persian Drug—Central Intelligence Agency analysts estimate that Iran now produces 60 times as much heroin as Mexico. According to intelligence briefings, the "Silver Crescent" of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan now exports at least 10 times as much heroin as the notorious "Golden Triangle" of Vietnam, Thailand and Burma.

Senior Partner—For the past few years, the United States and Japan have been cooperating on energy projects of mutual benefit. But Uncle Sam seems to be doing most of the cooperating. Recently, for example, U.S. and Japanese scientists embarked on a joint venture in high-energy physics. The Japanese government will contribute about \$5.7 million for 1980. The American share is \$326 million.

ARTICLES
ON PAGE 7CHICAGO TRIBUNE
26 May 1980

CIA ethics: Ends justify means

By Ernest W. Lefever

FORMER SECRETARY of State Henry Kissinger has said the "emasculatation of the CIA" contributed to the failure of United States policy in Iran in three ways: by making intelligence analysts overly cautious, by practically depriving us of "covert capabilities," and by altering the balance of expectations within Iran.

Kissinger properly observed that the blame for our inability to respond effectively in Iran in 1978 must be shared by Congress, the State and Defense departments, and the White House. He might well have added the nation's press.

In the latter half of 1974, for example, the New York Times printed a series of page-one stories by Seymour Hersh reporting alleged illegal Central Intelligence Agency activities in the United States. On Dec. 30, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act became law.

In the name of congressional oversight this amendment has had the effect of bringing the already reduced covert activities abroad to a virtual standstill by requiring the Executive Branch to report on each covert action to eight committees in a "timely" fashion, interpreted to mean near the start. Any congressman or senator may have access to this information. It is not difficult to imagine the chilling effect of this reporting requirement.

IN ADDITION, the three commercial TV networks bear considerable responsibility for crippling the CIA by sensational, one-sided, and out-of-context reporting. One chapter in the recently published study, "The CIA and the American Ethic," examines the performance of the TV evening news shows of ABC, CBS, and NBC from January, 1974, through October, 1978. During these 58 months, less than 5 per cent of the intelligence news was devoted to Soviet-bloc agencies while slightly more than 95 per cent dealt with the CIA. Fewer than five references to the Soviet KGB were found during the entire period.

The distortion was exacerbated by the one-sided picture of the CIA. Of all the CIA stories (measured in minutes), 68.2 per cent reflected unfavorably on the agency, 13.9 per cent reflected favorably, and the rest were neutral. The reporting on Chile was particularly lopsided.

But are foreign intelligence operations — particularly covert action which involves secrecy, deception, and sometimes lethal force — compatible

with the Judeo-Christian ethic?

THE DOCTRINE of the "just war" provides a moral yardstick for assessing the justness and rightness of intelligence operations. *Is the objective of the action just?* Military action taken solely to conquer or subjugate other peoples is illegal and unjust, whether carried out by overt military action or covert means, while military action designed to defend one's own or an ally's territory against external aggression is justified. A just war (and, by extension, a just covert operation) may never be undertaken for trivial motives, such as the desire to bolster the ego of a ruling group, or for inappropriate purposes, such as an effort to reform the domestic institutions of other societies.

Are the means employed both just and appropriate? Excessive force is always wrong. But in a just cause, such

Intelligence operations frequently make use of unusual means — such as secrecy, deception, and violence — that are not permissible in normal peacetime pursuits.

as repelling an invader, the use of too little force is wrong also, because it may prolong the struggle or even enable the aggressor to succeed, thus causing a greater loss of life or a setback for justice and independence, or both.

Certain uses of force are categorically wrong. These include the wanton or purposeless destruction of life or property. Hence the U.S. military code prohibits the deliberate killing of prisoners of war.

Intelligence operations frequently make use of unusual means — such as secrecy, deception, and violence — that are not permissible in normal peacetime pursuits. In a just war, people are killed, and "peacetime" intelligence is often an extension of warfare, though with far less loss of life.

Will the chances for justice be enhanced if the action succeeds? However noble the end and just the means, military or political action is not justified if it has little or no prospect of achieving its objective. A parable of Jesus makes this point: "What king will march to battle against another king, without first sitting down to consider whether with ten thousand men he can face an enemy coming to meet him with twenty thousand? If he cannot, then, long before the enemy approaches, he sends envoys, and asks for terms" (Luke 14:31, 32).

LET US THEN apply these standards to three well-known instances of

covert action. The CIA's covert subsidy to the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio during the Allende regime clearly meets the criteria with flying colors. Its objective was just — namely, assisting a popular opposition newspaper to continue publishing against the government's extra-legal attempts to silence it. The means employed, a modest subsidy, were both just and appropriate. And the consequences of this subsidy were to enable the Chilean people to continue receiving information from non-state sources.

But the Bay of Pigs operation does not meet these same standards. Its objective was certainly just, and the means employed, namely armed insurrection, the only available method of ousting a brutal and well-armed dictatorship like Fidel Castro's regime. However, once the attempt to destroy Castro's small air force failed and

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
there was no U.S. decision to provide the Cuban exile force with air cover, then the operation was almost bound to fail. It cannot be morally right to risk lives and engender expectations of justice and freedom without a reasonable prospect of victory.

Yet the 1953 coup which overthrew the Mossadegh regime in Iran and restored the shah to his throne can be defended on every important point. For the small price of hiring a few prostitutes and taxi-drivers to march and demonstrate against Mossadegh, an unstable, disruptive, and anti-American regime was replaced by a friendly and responsible government that provided 25 years of internal and international stability. It was, like all neighboring regimes and its own predecessors, a despotism that maintained order by dubious and sometimes brutal methods. But, unlike its neighbors and predecessors, it was a relatively enlightened despotism, which introduced land reform, modernized the bureaucracy, developed industry, expanded education, and established the civil rights of women and minorities. Full democracy would, of course, have been ideal. But there is some truth in the shah's remark that he would behave like the King of Sweden when his subjects behaved like Swedes.

ON FEB. 8, 1980, the Senate Intelligence Committee proposed a new CIA charter that would limit the requirement of prior notice of covert activities to two committees and would virtually exempt the CIA from having to disclose information under the Freedom of Information Act.

These are moves in the right direction. What America needs now is a significant upgrading of our military and intelligence assets in the face of growing Soviet might and adventurism in vital areas around the globe. A central element in this upgrading is a recognition that well-conceived covert operations abroad are politically necessary and morally right.

Ernest W. Lefever is the director of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C. This article is excerpted from the spring issue of Policy Review, the quarterly journal of The Heritage Foundation.



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-27NEW YORK TIMES
25 MAY 1980

C.I.A. Says Cambodia's Population Fell by Nearly 2 Million After 1970

By GRAHAM HOVEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24 — Cambodia lost nearly 2 million of a population estimated at 7.1 million between 1970 and the end of 1979, and Cambodians may still be threatened with "virtual extinction as a people," according to the Central Intelligence Agency.

In a research paper, "Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe," the C.I.A. says the decline, during a decade of war, social revolution and invasion, is "unprecedented in any national population since World War II." Starvation, military action, killings and emigration were cited as major factors in the decline in Cambodia, whose traditional name, revived by the Communists, is Kampuchea.

"We acknowledge that our assumptions are highly speculative," the report says, "given the uncertainty surrounding events in Kampuchea and their demographic impact." It projects three possible levels of population loss: during the decade but uses for most of its calculations what it calls "the medium series."

The study says that almost four years of "savagery" and "brutal rule" by the Communist Government of Prime Minister Pol Pot, from April 1975 to January 1979, "drastically accelerated the disintegration of Kampuchean society."

Many Educated People Lost

"The conditions imposed upon the people by the Pol Pot regime resulted in an absolute decline in the population of an estimated 1.2 million to 1.8 million people," the report says. "Educated persons, military personnel and the skilled were disproportionately represented in the numbers lost."

But the ouster of Mr. Pol Pot by Vietnamese forces and the installation of the Hanoi-sponsored Heng Samrin Government in January 1979, the study says, not

only failed to halt the drop in population but "may ultimately spell the demise of the Khmer as a people." Khmer, the name of the aboriginal people of Cambodia, is now often used to mean Cambodians in general.

"The first six months of the Heng Samrin regime were characterized by the destruction of the agricultural system and another reordering of the population," according to the report.

It says people were urged to leave the communes into which the Pol Pot Government had moved them and to return to their villages to grow food. But there, it says, they were often attacked by Pol Pot guerrillas who had retreated to mountain strongholds near Thailand when Mr. Heng Samrin took power.

Admission to Cities Refused

As a result, the report says, the peasants abandoned their farms, some trying to return to the cities, where they were often denied entry, and thousands more fleeing the country.

"Thousands of those who chose not to flee died of starvation and disease," the C.I.A. study says. "A conservative estimate is that for every Kampuchean born during July-December 1979, 10 died. All told, the first year of the Heng Samrin rule had brought an additional drop of 700,000 in the population, to an estimated 5.2 million."

The report says that despite international efforts to provide food, Cambodia's short-term prospects are grim, with "severe hunger at best, famine at worst," likely to strike again and possibly extend well into 1981, especially if "internal obstructions" continue to prevent the distribution of food and seed.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 86

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
25 MAY 1980

Letter

T H E E D I T O R

Accountability of The C.I.A.

Tad Szulc argues that leaks concerning C.I.A. covert operations from Capitol Hill sources are no problem and asserts that Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner "has admitted that he knows of no examples of such leaks from Capitol Hill sources" ("Putting Back the Bite in the C.I.A.," April 6).

If Admiral Turner's admission was correct as of the time it was made, he now needs to look no farther than Mr. Szulc's own article to find a leak on a sensitive C.I.A. matter from Capitol Hill sources. The article describes a meeting in S-407, "the most secure room in all of Congress," to review C.I.A. plans for covert, paramilitary operations in Afghanistan. In view of the detailed description of the discussion and decisions made at a secret meeting attended only by members of the Senate, C.I.A. representatives and the staff directors of the Select Committee, how can it be maintained that there are no leaks from Senate sources on matters of national interest?

CHARLES A. BANE
Chicago

As the wife of a C.I.A. operative, I find the prospect of a less accountable C.I.A. threatening indeed.

I'm also puzzled by the claim of some that had the C.I.A. not been stripped of its powers, we would not be in the mess we're in today, especially the mess of Iran.

How quickly we seem to forget that the C.I.A. masterminded the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953, putting the Shah in power. The excesses and the unaccountability of the agency in Iran, and in many other now anti-American countries, have made the mess.

It is not a question of what might have been good for Iran, or what is right or wrong. It is a question of interference. A backlash is inevitable. The greater the power of the C.I.A., the more Irans we can expect. Indeed, El Salvador and Nicaragua stand as examples.

CLAUDIA BACH
Carbondale, Colo.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
24 May 1980

Soviet Reporters All Double as KGB Agents, Defector Says

LONDON (AP)—All Soviet news correspondents abroad are secret-police agents to some extent and send information to Moscow tailored to suit the Kremlin's point of view, a former KGB officer who defected last month was quoted as saying in an interview in The Times of London on Friday.

As a result, defector Ilya Dzhirkvelov was quoted as saying, Soviet leaders receive and even act on this "disinformation," giving them a distorted picture of world events.

The newspaper said Dzhirkvelov, who defected to Britain with his wife and daughter, was a full-time KGB intelligence officer until 1956, when he became a correspondent with Tass, the official Soviet news agency.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MO)
4 May 1980

Tax Evaders Aided By CIA

The latest revelation of Central Intelligence Agency interference with other government agencies raises the not altogether whimsical question of whether the CIA exists for the benefit of government or whether government exists for the benefit of the CIA. The *Wall Street Journal* reported the other day that a major tax evasion investigation was suspended by the chief of the Internal Revenue Service; and later a tax evasion prosecution, involving nearly 500 cases and perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars, was called off by the Justice Department. Both operations, aimed at the same targets, apparently were ended because of objections by the CIA.

Although the reason given for the cutoff of the tax cases was that a federal judge had ruled that part of the evidence was obtained in an illegal search, the fact was that the government also had in its possession the same evidence, legally obtained. The real problem for the government seems to have been that the evidence involved the

Bahamas-based Castle Bank, which was used by the CIA as a conduit for millions of dollars to finance clandestine operations against Cuba and other countries in Latin America and against countries in the Far East.

The dropping of what the *Journal* called "the biggest tax evasion case of all time" makes one wonder how far the American people are going to be asked to let their government's operations be subverted in the name of "national security" by an agency that is scarcely ever publicly accountable. The basic issue is not the CIA's ability to gather intelligence (which almost everyone agrees is important) but its continued freedom to carry out dirty tricks against other countries — a mode of operation that not only undermines the integrity of other U.S. agencies but that also poisons U.S. relations with other nations and that institutionalizes corrupt methods to achieve foreign policy objectives that might be better accomplished by legitimate means.